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Introduction- Oil and Gas Pipelines (OGPs) are a safe and economical mode of 
transportation of petroleum products around the world. However, they face different types 
of challenging Risk Factors (RFs) that affect the safety of the OGP projects at planning, 
construction and operational stages. Moreover, the OGP projects often suffer from the risks 
associated with Third-Party Disruption (TPD) such as terrorism and sabotage attacks, which 
make the pipelines vulnerable and add complexity in managing the RFs and safety threats to 
OGPs in developing countries with low levels of security.  
Problem - After an in-depth review of the literature about the existing risk management 
approaches in OGP projects, it was found that these approaches have the following 
limitations. (I) Most are designed at the local scale and focus on certain types of RFs, so they 
are not applicable in OGP projects elsewhere. (II) They are not effective in mitigating the 
RFs in OGP projects when the data and records about them are scarce particularly in 
developing countries, where the documentation is poor. (III) Building new pipelines without 
analysing the potential level of risk in the potential routes at the planning stage could result 
in vital safety consequences in the future with supply chain disruption and loss of big 
investment. (IV) There is a lack of awareness about the potential impact on project delivery 
when developing new OGP projects without a an appropriate analysis of the RFs. The 
literature review concludes that there is a need for a logical and integrated risk assessment 
approach for the RFs relevant to OGP projects, specifically, the safety RFs relevant to TPD 
because they have not been accurately analysed in the past. Moreover, these approaches are 
mainly focusing on managing the associated RFs at the operational stage of OGP projects. 
However, managing the RFs during the entire project’s life makes risk management more 
comprehensive and effective. Finally, the literature revealed that there is a lack of effective 
Risk Mitigation Method (RMM) suggestions to mitigate the RFs in OGP projects because 
the RMMs have not been analysed with regard to their degree of effectiveness in past 
projects. 
Aim and Objectives- This study aims to design an integrated Risk Management Framework 
(RMF) for OGP projects. The objectives are (I) identity, analyse and rank the RFs in OGP 
projects; (II) select safest pipeline routes/alignments for the new projects; (III) identify and 
recommend the effective RMMs in the projects; and (IV) quantify the impact of the recorded 
RFs on a project’s duration and forecast the probability of the project’s delivery on time. 
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Originality- The novel idea in this research is to develop an RMF which enables users to 
deal with all the types of RFs in the projects on one platform. The RMF will contribute in 
providing a wide range of knowledge about the RFs and RMMs in OGP projects. And also, 
it will enhance the reliability of the results of RFs analysis by analysing them based on the 
findings of the literature review and the results of an industrial survey, the application of 
fuzzy theory and Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS).  
Method- A mixed approach was used to collect and analyse the research data for the design 
of an integrated RMF using the following steps (I) A comprehensive literature review, an 
industrial survey and the fuzzy logic theory integrated within MATLAB software were used 
to identify and analyse the critical RFs and RMMs in OGP projects. (II) A risk optimisation 
method was used to select the safest route/alignment for a new project based on risk levels 
in the potential routes/alignments. (III) The findings from the survey were used to identify 
and recommend the effective RMMs to mitigate the potential RFs in the projects. (IV) MCS 
integrated within ASTA and @Risk programs were used to analyse and quantify the delay 
impact of the RFs in OGP projects. 
Results- The study recognised 30 common RFs and 12 RMMs in OGP projects based on the 
literature review. The survey results revealed that TPD RFs such as terrorism, sabotage and 
theft are the most critical RFs in OGPs particularly in Iraq, whereas anti-corrosion measures, 
laying the pipes underground, and advanced monitoring system of the RFs are the most 
effective RMMs. The developed RMF was used to optimise the risk level in the routes 
suggested to build a new pipeline project in the south of Iraq. It was found that route number 
4 (from Badra field to Basra via, Bazirgan, Gharraf–An Nassiriyah and Zubair) is the safest 
route for this OGP project. In addition, the average project delay caused by the associated 
RFs within the project was found to be 15-18 days when using ASTA risk simulator but 45 
days when using @Risk Simulator.  
Contribution and Value- This study is the first research related to making a comprehensive 
study for the OGP projects in Iraq to develop an integrated RMF. It was concluded that the 
developed RMF is a useful risk assessment tool that could be used by the stakeholders and 
academics for understanding, identifying and ranking the RFs in OGP projects, selecting the 
safest pipeline routes/alignments for the new projects, and quantifying the delay impact 
caused by RFs in OGP projects. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the research background; research problem; rationale and hypothesis; 
research questions; research aim and objectives; adopted research methodology; research 
scope and limitation; and research contributions followed by the thesis structure for the rest 
of the chapters. The next section describes the research background of the Oil and Gas 
Pipeline (OGP) projects and the importance of managing the risks associated with these 
projects.   
1.2 Research Background 
Oil and gas production is the cornerstone of the world’s economy (Torres et al. 2012) and 
the lifeblood of the industrial economy as well (Quan, 2015). Since its origins, the petroleum 
industry has contributed to the world’s economic growth and enhanced the standard of living 
in many countries (Duch-Brown and Costa-Campi, 2015). Oil and gas are vital energy 
resources, which have a significant influence on the economy of countries that produce or 
consume them (Dolatabadi et al. 2017). Oil and natural gas are the most used energies in the 
world, contributing to 57.5% of global primary energy consumption (Chen et al., 2020). 
Although nuclear and renewable energy are the world's fastest-growing energy sources at a 
rate of 2.5% each year, it is estimated that petroleum products (oil and gas) will continue to 
supply about 80% of the world’s energy until 2040 (EIA, 2016; Leira et al. 2016), see Figure 
1.1. This means that, in the coming years, these products will make a strong contribution to 
the world’s natural energy resources (Almadhlouh, 2019). 
 
Figure 1.1: Snapshot of energy growth trends across the world until 2040 (EIA, 2016). 
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Pipelines are the most used mode to transport petroleum products. The next section, 
therefore, provides an overview of the OGPs industry, pipeline design, construction and 
operations, and outlines the importance and characteristics of risk management in the field 
of oil and gas projects. 
1.2.1 Overview of the Oil and Gas Pipeline (OGP) Industry 
Oil and gas projects are divided into three sectors, which are upstream, midstream, and 
downstream projects. Upstream projects deal with the exploration and drilling activities and 
the extraction of crude oil and natural gas from the ground. Midstream projects involve the 
infrastructure and facilities that transport the extracted products to the refinery or 
consumption points, such as OGPs. Downstream projects are the projects that provide the 
products to the final users (Gabrielson, 2015; Almadhlouh, 2019). The figure below shows 
the three sectors. 
 
Figure 1.2: A general view of the upstream, midstream and downstream in the oil and gas 
industry (Energy HQ logo, 2020). 
OGP projects are used in the process of gathering and transporting petroleum products (e.g. 
oil and gas) (Gunes, 2013). These projects include the pipes that transport petroleum 
products and the components that control the process of transportation, such as the valves, 




The focus area of this research 
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Devold, 2006). The mission of these pipelines is to transport oil products to the storage 
facilities and from storage to distribution points across the world.  
This research focuses on the pipelines that transport the petroleum products in the midstream 
sector of the oil and gas industry, as shown in Figure 1.2. In other words, this research does 
not focus on the transportation of the oil and gas products within the upstream sector of the 
oil and gas industry. This is because the transportation of the extracted crude petroleum 
products in this sector (i.e. the upstream sector) is limited between the wells and the storage 
facilities inside the production area. In contrast, the transportation of petroleum products in 
the midstream sector is wider and goes further. This is because the pipelines in this sector 
are transporting the products to the refinery stations, and end users, such as commercial 
customers and electricity generation stations, export points, storage facilities, etc. This 
research, therefore, focuses on such pipelines as they have a significant social and economic 
impact on countries and nations.  
The pipelines are safe and economical compared to other modes of petroleum product 
transportation (Vaezi and Verma, 2018; Xie and Tian, 2018; Zarei et al. 2017). For instance, 
they are 100 times safer than tank trucks, 40 times safer than railroad tank cars, 1.19 times 
cheaper than ships, 5.29 times cheaper than rail and trucks, and 40 times cheaper than 
aeroplanes (Hopkins et al. 1999). Lambert and Stock (1993) made a comparison between 
air, sea, rail, road and pipeline and concluded that OGP transportation is the cheapest mode 
of transportation. OGPs are the cheapest and quickest mode that could be used to transport 
petroleum products (AL-Kadi et al. 2013). 
OGPs are resource-saving, energy-efficient, high security, durable and provide a stable 
supply (Ai et al. 2006). With regard to the efficiency of transporting petroleum products 
using different modes, Antoniades et al. (2018) found that the efficiency of the oil pipeline 
network is equivalent to 4,200 rail cars or 15,000 vehicles. Therefore, more than half of the 
petroleum products in the world are transported by pipelines, which are more efficient, 
flexible, lower cost and less time consuming compared to tank ships and tank cars (Briggs, 
2010). 
The increment in using oil and gas products requires a massive number of OGP projects in 
order to transport these products from the extraction fields to the consumption points. 
Therefore, OGPs are the artery of the economy in the oil-producing and consuming countries 
(Johnson, 2017). In other words, OGP projects are considered the most important and 
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essential infrastructure projects for any country, as they are transporting millions of barrels 
of petroleum products daily. The next section explains the importance of risk management 
in OGP projects.   
1.2.2 Importance of Risk Management in OGPs 
Since OGPs are transporting flammable products for thousands of kilometres, they will be 
subject to an infinite number of risk factors that affect their safety and operational 
performance during the entire life of these projects. For instance, OGPs are subject to a vast 
range of hazards and accidents that may damage the pipes, and countries with low levels of 
security often suffer more than other countries from malicious activity such as terrorism and 
sabotage attacks. Figure 1.3 shows some of the common and critical safety risks of OGP 
projects, particularly in a developing and insecure country such as Iraq. 
 
Figure 1.3: Typical images of pipeline incidents (SCOP (State Company for Oil Projects), 
2016). 
OGPs have potential risks that not only affect the safety of these pipes but also generate 
long-term severe economic consequences and environmental impacts for nations. 
Additionally, the hazardous environments make risk management in OGP projects more 
challenging and complex. Accordingly, OGPs must be planned, designed, installed, operated 
and maintained with regard to the safety requirements. Subsequently, providing the required 
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probability of failure and minimise the consequences that result from accidents and failures 
in these projects. 
Although risks, accidents and failures cannot be completely avoided in any type of project, 
they can be controlled and mitigated through using effective risk management strategies 
throughout the lifecycle of a project. Therefore, it is important to understand how to manage 
the risk of OGP projects to avoid loss of life and wealth. Risk management can be defined 
as a process of identifying, analysing and responding to risk factors and controlling risk 
factors throughout the life of a project (Al-Bahar et al. 1990; Chua et al. 2003; Wang and 
Chou, 2003). Risk management focuses on addressing uncertainties and developing a 
suitable plan of proactive actions in order to decrease the probability and/or impact of the 
risk factors that may threaten a project (Al Sabah, 2014).  
OGPs have different diameters, transport different petroleum products between different 
cities in different environments and safety conditions, and are built above or under ground 
and sometimes underwater. This means that the risk factors that affect the safety of these 
projects vary between projects. Therefore, these projects require different risk management 
approaches in various geographical regions. Consequently, adopting and using a practical 
approach to risk management based on trusted data about the risk factors is essential to 
provide safe construction and operational conditions for the pipelines. The next section 
describes the problems and the limitations in the existing risk management methods used in 
OGP projects. 
1.3 Research Problems 
As mentioned by El-Abbasy et al. (2016b), most of the risk assessment methods are not 
comprehensive because they only consider one or two types of Risk Factors (RFs) at a time. 
In addition, after an in-depth review of the literature, it was found that most of the studies 
about risk management in OGP projects are mainly at the local scale, and few studies have 
assessed the RFs in OGP projects in more than one region. For example, it was found that 
OGP projects in European countries mainly suffer from mechanical failures and corrosion 
risks. This is because the pipelines in these countries are underground and European 
countries are relatively safe, which means they are less subject to sabotage RFs 
(Tchórzewska-Cieślak et al. 2018). The stakeholders in OGP projects in the USA focus more 
on the terrorism risk, especially after 9/11, in addition to corrosion, because the USA uses 
underground pipelines (Rowland, 2010). African countries pay more attention to theft risks 
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because of the illegal sale of the stolen products in these countries (Rowland, 2010). On the 
other side, developing countries with low levels of security such as Iraq have different 
situations compared to safe countries. This difference is due to internal wars and malicious 
terrorist attacks on OGPs as well as because the pipeline network is above ground, which 
makes them more affected by the RFs (see Figure 1.4). 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Examples of above ground pipelines in Iraq. Photos of Iraq’s pipelines (Walt, 
2009; Adel, 2013).  
With reference to the previous paragraph, the existing risk assessment methods cannot be 
effectively applied to analyse the impact of the RFs in OGP projects and improve the level 
of safety of these projects elsewhere. This is because these methods focus on different types 
of RFs in the OGP projects in different regions and situations. This means that the strategies 
and the process of the risk management used to manage the RFs in the OGP projects could 
be effective in some geographical areas but ineffective in other areas. Additionally, it is 
difficult to compare the rankings of the RFs with other countries that have different types of 
RFs in their OGP projects.  
Iraq Saudi pipeline Avana Dome pipeline 
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The traditional risk assessment methods used to rank the RFs are based on the product value 
of Risk Probability (RP) and Risk Severity (RS) levels of the RFs associated with the 
projects. The details are explained in item II, section 2.4.4 in Chapter 2: and section 4.4.4 in 
Chapter 4:. Such a method could cause inaccurate ranking of the RFs. For example, an RF 
with a high value of RS could still be considered as a critical RF that needs to be dealt with 
a matter of urgency. However, the same RF could not come at the top of the ranking if it had 
a low RP. This is similar if the RP of the RF is high and the RS is low, which is one of the 
limitations of the traditional risk assessment methods.  
The probability and severity levels of the RFs are often estimated based on a statistical 
analysis of the records about the failure causes and accidents in OGP projects (Chen et al. 
2019; Khakzad et al. 2013). Although accurate values about the RP and RS of the RFs are 
required for risk management studies, these values are still imprecise, deficient and vague 
(Khakzad et al. 2011). As Peng et al. (2016) explained, the RP of the safety-related risk 
factors cannot be calculated using the available risk assessment methods as the historical 
records about them are not available. This means that the existing risk assessments methods 
cannot be used to assess the RFs when the data and records about them are scarce (Yazdani-
Chamzini, 2014). Chen et al., (2020) analysed 598 of the past studies between 1970 and 
2019 which related to the safety and security of OGP projects. The authors have concluded 
that future research is needed regarding pipeline security, environmental sustainability and 
pipeline system resilience in OGP projects. 
This is the case in developing countries such as Iraq; because the documentary and recording 
procedures in these countries are poor (Kraidi et al. 2019a, 2018a). Such data conditions lead 
to a random, vague, uncertain, inaccurate and low reliability assessment of the RFs in OGP 
projects (Kabir et al. 2015). Hence, the lack of data obstructs risk management in OGP 
projects in insecure and developing countries.  
In conditions of data scarcity, the RFs will be mainly identified based on the literature 
review. The impact of the identified RFs will be assessed based on stakeholders’ judgements 
as they have real experience about them in their projects (Lavasani et al. 2011; Sa’idi et al. 
2014). However, there is a potential problem associated with assessing the RFs depending 
on the stakeholders’ judgement only, as they may not always yield to a consistent and 
accurate ranking of the RFs (Tang et al. 2018). This is because the stakeholders have 
different views of the impact levels of the RFs (Lavasani et al. 2015).  
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Furthermore, building new OGPs without identifying and analysing the RFs in their routes 
could cause project delay and have a significant impact on project safety at the construction 
and operation stages, especially if the chosen routes/alignments have a high level of risk. It 
is essential to make an accurate check to quantify the impact of the RFs on the duration of 
new pipeline projects. This is because making the correct reactions and strategies towards 
the RFs during the planning and construction stages of projects will help in avoiding and/or 
minimising the construction delay in these projects. Otherwise, these projects will be subject 
to delay problems, which have a significant impact on a country’s economy. 
Over and above this, it is vital to assess the effectiveness degree of the Risk Mitigation 
Methods (RMMs) that could be used to manage the RFs in the OGP projects in order to 
ensure an adequate response to the RFs if they threaten the pipelines. This will contribute to 
reducing the impact of the RFs in the projects. Such an assessment of the RMMs will be 
helpful in making effective suggestions and adequate responses for the RFs, which will keep 
the hazards at the minimal level as much as possible. However, there is a lack of studies 
about these critical topics in the OGP projects in Iraq.  
Based on the problem statement above, the hypothesis of this research is designed and 
presented below.  
1.4 Research Questions 
The main question of the research study is “Can this research provide a comprehensive and 
accurate way of assessing and managing the RFs in OGP projects, particularly in insecure 
and developing countries?” 
Based on the research background discussed above, six sub-questions are designed in order 
to answer the main research question: 
• Question 1: What are the limitations of the existing risk assessment and management 
methods that make them inapplicable in assessing the RFs in OGP projects? 
• Question 2: What are the RFs and RMMs associated with OGP projects?   
• Question 3: Can this research help in reducing the uncertainty while assessing the 
RFs and ranking them when the data about risk factors in OGP projects is 
insufficient? 
• Question 4: Can this research help with the optimisation of selecting the safest 
pipeline route/alignment for new OGP projects?  
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• Question 5: What are the effective RMMs that could be used to manage the RFs in 
OGP projects?  
• Question 6: What is the impact of the RFs on the project duration of OGP projects? 
The section below outlines the aim and the objectives of the thesis that were developed to 
answer the research questions.  
1.5 Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to develop an integrated and systematic Risk Management 
Framework (RMF) to manage the Risk Factors (RFs) in OGP projects, particularly in 
insecure and developing countries. The RMF will address most of the RFs that affect the 
OGP projects and work with them on one platform, which will help to overcome the 
limitations of the existing RMFs that analyse only one or two types of RFs at a time. In 
addition, the RMF will focus on the unique risks in OGP projects that are caused by acts of 
terrorism, sabotage and other safety-related RFs, in order to make the findings of this 
research more relevant to OGP projects in insecure and developing countries.    
The following objectives were developed to achieve the aim of this research.  
1. To conduct a comprehensive literature review to examine the strengths and the 
limitations of the existing risk management system, the RFs and the RMMs applicable 
in OGP projects.  
Objective 1 provides answers for research questions 1 and 2.  
2. To explore the perceptions of the stakeholders about the impact of the RFs and RMMs 
in OGP projects to provide trusted data/inputs for the process of risk assessment in this 
research. 
3. To use fuzzy theory integrated with MATLAB software to assess and rank the RFs in 
the projects using the findings from items 1 and 2 above.  
Objectives 2 and 3 provide the answers for research question 3.  
4. To optimise the pipeline transmission paths/routes/alignments considering the identified 
influential risk factors in OGP projects. 
Objective 4 provides the answers for research question 4.  
5. To provide recommendations for identifying effective risk mitigation methods in OGP 
projects.   
Objective 5 provides the answers for research question 5.  
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6. To quantify the delay impact caused by relevant IRFs on the duration of OGP projects 
using ASTA risk simulator and @Risk simulator.  
This provides the answers for research question 6.  
The section below explains the research method that was followed and used to achieve the 
aim and objectives of this thesis.    
1.6 Research Methodology and Approach 
This research adopted a systematic research strategy and pragmatic research approach to 
explain the procedure, the sequence, the steps and the techniques used to accomplish the aim 
of this research. The systematic research strategy in this study consists of several research 
methods to provide risk identification, assessment, ranking and management tools. In other 
words, the systematic research strategy adopted in this study explains how to assess, rank 
and manage the RFs in OGP projects by using a combination of both qualitative and 
quantitative research approaches and primary and secondary data to achieve reliable results 
from risk analysis and robust recommendations for identifying effective RMMs in OGP 
projects (Matthews and Ross, 2012). A pragmatic research philosophy is defined as a mixed-
method approach (e.g. qualitative and quantitative approaches, and inductive and deductive 
approaches) to applied research questions and find a solutions for the research problem 
(Giacobbi et al., 2005). In other words, the pragmatic approach provides for the use of both 
qualitative and quantitative research methodologies to collect information and make inquiry 
into complex  social and natural phenomena. Therefore, the pragmatic research philosophy 
provides for the adoption of mixed methods as the data collection method, which opens up 
the opportunity to be objective and subjective in analysing the points of view of the 
participants (Ihuah and Eaton, 2013). 
Pragmatism emphasises the practical problems experienced by people, the research 
questions posited, and the consequences of inquiry. The "people i.e. the population"  of this 
research are the stakeholders in OGP projects and the problem that this research tries to  
solve is how to manage the risk in these projects more effectively.  
This research, therefore, will start with using a qualitative approach to analyse the prior 
studies about the risk factors and the risk management in OGP projects in order to design 
the research questions of this study. At the first stage of this research, the information that 
will be collected from the prior studies will be about providing answers for the main research 
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questions, which are about (i) what type of risks that affect the safety of the pipelines 
worldwide (ii) what is the situation of the pipelines lines in the insure areas, (iii) what are 
the limitations in the existing risk management approached regrades managing the risks in 
the projects, and (iv) how to develop a risk management framework to be used to manage 
the risk in OGP projects more effectively.  
In other words, the literature review of this research will explore the risk factors in OGP 
projects and explain the limitations of the existing approaches that used to manage them. 
The findings of the literature review will be also used to design a questionnaire survey and 
a computer-based model to make a quantitative analysis and assessment of the risk factors 
in OGP projects. Afterwards, the findings of the qualitative and quantitive will be used to 
develop a framework that would be used in managing the risks in the pipeline projects more 
effectively. 
Also, from the philosophical worldview on how research should be done, it is patent to 
deduce that focusing only on the qualitative analyses or the quantitative analysis of the risk 
factors in the projects will not lead to developing an effective risk management framework 
to be used in managing these risk factors. The pragmatic research philosophy uses both 
qualitative and quantitative methods to resolve a real-life world challenge are commended. 
Such a research philosophy is particularly relevant where the research questions do not 
suggest clearly that they are either qualitative or quantitative. This is because the 
combination of methods and approaches would better address the aims and objectives of the 
research (Ihuah and Eaton, 2013). Threfore, the pragmatic research philosophy provides for 
the adoption of mixed methods as the data collection and analysis methods, which opens the 
opportunity to be objective and subjective in analysing the points of view of this research 
about the risk factors that may affect the safety of the pipelines, their degree of impact on 
the project and how to manage them effectively.  
The research methodology in this study, therefore, has two parts, which are the theoretical 
part and the technical part. The theoretical part refers to the literature review, which provides 
theoretical explanations about the OGP projects and the different types of RFs that affect the 
safety of these projects. Meanwhile, the technical part uses an industrial survey, computer 
models and risk simulation to analyse the RFs in OGP projects.  
The methods proposed in this research involve qualitative document analysis and 
quantitative risk analysis using an industrial survey, fuzzy theory and Monte Carlo 
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Simulation (MCS) to analyse the impact of the RFs on the projects and risk optimisation to 
select safest routes/alignments for the new projects. Hence, a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative approach was used in this study to achieve the research aim. The focus of this 
study is to develop a holistic and integrated RMF for the OGP projects, which will be 
developed using the following steps: 
1- Carry out an extensive literature review in order to understand and analyse the 
existing RMFs in OGP projects as well as to highlight their strengths and limitations.  
2- Identify and list the relevant RFs and RMMs associated with the OGP projects via a 
literature review.   
3- Assess and analyse the impact level of the RFs in the OGP projects based on their 
probability and severity levels, which will be calculated via an industrial survey.   
4- The industrial survey will be also used to evaluate the RMMs with regard to their 
usability and effectiveness degrees of managing the RFs in OGP projects.  
5- Reduce the uncertainty associated with analysing the RFs, which results from the 
scarcity of available data about the RFs in the projects, and analyse and rank the RFs 
based on the literature review and the stakeholders’ judgements only. This step will 
be performed using the fuzzy theory provided by MATLAB software.  
6- Identify the safest route/alignment to build new OGP projects by optimising the 
existing risk impact levels in existing routes/alignments. This step will be performed 
using subjective and objective document analysis to identify and allocate the RFs 
with the routes/alignments that are suggested to build the new pipelines. Analysing 
the risk levels in these routes/alignments and suggesting the safest ones will be 
carried out based on the results of risk optimisation. In other words, in this phase of 
the project, risk optimisation based on the algebraic summation of the risk levels in 
the pipeline routes/alignments was used to select the safest ones for the new projects, 
which are the routes that have the fewest risk levels. 
7- Identify the effective RMMs in the OGP projects to mitigate the risk factors found 
in these projects (which will be identified based on the usability and effectiveness of 
the selected RMMs). 
8- Quantify the delay impact caused by the associated IRFs in the new OGP projects 
using Monte Carlo Simulation integrated with ASTA risk simulator and @Risk 
simulator programs.  
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Chapter 3: explains the research methods of this research in more detail and Chapter 6: 
explains the details of designing the RMF. The next section describes the contribution and 
the originality of this research. 
1.7 Research Contributions and Originality 
The novel idea in this research is to develop an integrated and systematic RMF, which will 
enable users to deal with all the types of RFs in the projects on one platform. Moreover, the 
RMF will analyse the safety RFs that affect the safety of pipeline projects in insecure and 
developing countries. By addressing the RFs in OGP projects more comprehensively and 
holistically, such an RMF will be applicable and useful to manage the RFs in OGPs in more 
countries, especially where these projects are suffering from terrorist and sabotage attacks.  
Identifying the RFs and RMMs in OGP projects based on an extensive literature review 
about them in OGP projects worldwide will make the RMF able to overcome the limitations 
of the existing RMFs, which are caused by the lack of data about the RFs in the projects. In 
other words, the RMF will be useful in managing the RFs in OGP projects when the risk 
management in these projects suffers from the problem of data scarcity and the absence of 
records about the RFs, which is the case in developing countries.  
Moreover, as this is the first study in the country, the RMF will actively contribute to 
managing the RFs in OGP projects in Iraq, particularly the safety-related risk factors. The 
findings of the RMF could help decision-makers, policy-makers and researchers to 
understand, identify, analyse, evaluate and control the OGP critical risks in a more 
comprehensive, holistic and effective way. The following are the main contributions of this 
study: 
1- The first contribution of the study is to help in overcoming the problem of data 
scarcity about the RFs and RMMs in OGP projects in developing countries such as 
Iraq. This will also help in providing a wide range of knowledge about risk factors 
and the methods of managing them.  
2- The study will provide a great deal of knowledge about risk factors and the methods 
of managing them in the field of the oil and gas pipeline industry while developing 
an integrated RMF. Hence, it will be enhancing the reliability of the results of risk 
analysis by integrating the risk assessment model with fuzzy theory to reduce the 
uncertainty caused by the lack of data about the RFs and the biases associated with 
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stakeholders’ judgements about their impact. This is the second and key contribution 
in this study. 
3- The third contribution of this research is that it will help in identifying 
safest/optimum transportation path/routes/alignments based on existing risk levels 
for new OGPs considering the existing safety-related RFs.  
4- The fourth contribution of the study is the list of recommendations of the effective 
RMMs to use to design suitable risk management actions and response plans for 
pipeline projects.  
5- The fifth and final contribution of the study is the effective delivery of the OGP 
projects by quantifying the delay impact caused by relevant RFs during their 
planning, design and construction stages.  
6- One of the key findings of this research is an integrated RMF which will help in 
overcoming the limitations of the existing risk management approaches in OGP 
projects. The developed RMF will provide a great deal of knowledge in identifying, 
analysing and managing the RFs in OGP projects. The RMF will help in enhancing 
the culture of risk management in OGP project that will improve the safety level in 
these projects in a developing and insecure country such as Iraq. 
7- Ten publications were produced from this research, three journal articles and seven 
conference papers. These publications have delivered most of the findings of this 
research, which are the common RFs and RMMs in OGP projects worldwide, the 
limitations in the existing approaches to risk management in the projects, the ranking 
of these RFs in OGP projects in Iraq, and the design of an integrated RMF for OGP 
projects. Additionally, the publications that came out of this research have published 
the findings of the designed RMF, which were the safest pipeline route, effective 
RMMs and the delay impact caused by the associated RFs in the case study project, 
which is a new oil and gas export pipeline in the south of Iraq. 
1.8 Research Scope  
The objectives of this study are limited to identify, understand, assess and develop an 
integrated risk management framework for managing the RFs in OGP projects, particularly 
in developing and insecure countries such as Iraq. This research focuses more on the risk 
factors caused by sabotage, terrorism and thefts in insecure countries where data bout the 
risk factors in the projects are limited or unavailable. The lack of sufficient data obstructs 
and limits the development of more effective risk management practices in OGP projects, 
15 
 
particularly in developing countries. This research tries to help in understanding and 
identifying the RFs that threaten the safety of OGP projects in the countries that have a 
similar security situation to that in Iraq. The results of assessing and ranking the RFs in the 
projects were analysed based on an industrial survey carried out in Iraq. This means the 
results of the survey regards ranking the RF in OGP projects are limited to Iraq only. The 
developed RMF is unable to draw failure scenarios to calculate the consequences of any 
hazardous event. It is also unable to compare between the RFs in OGP projects in different 
countries. Since the safety and security risks are dynamic risks and always impacted by the 
political, social, environmental and economic situations, the analysis and management of 
such complicated risk factors are beyond the knowledge of this research. The RMF was 
designed based on an extensive and worldwide literature review about risk management 
approaches in OGP projects, nevertheless, the framework was tested and evaluated using a 
case study project from Iraq, which means the findings and recommendations of this research 
will be suitable for Iraq and other countries with similar security problems. Therefore, it is 
recommended to carry on another case study project before using the RMF and applying the 
findings of this research for assessing and managing the RFs in that country.  
As explained in Figure 1.2 and section 1.2.1 the focus of this research is to identify, analyse 
and manage the RFs in OGPs in the midstream projects. Because the OGPs in Iraq are either 
above or under the ground, the focus of this research, therefore, is to study the RFs in onshore 
pipelines projects in the country. In short, onshore OGPs refer to the pipelines that are built 
under the earth’s surface, which is the type of pipelines that are used to transport the 
petroleum products in Iraq, and it is the focus of this study. Whereas offshore pipelines are 
the pipelines that are built underneath the seabed, which is not used in Iraq. The next section 
details the structure and layout of the chapters of this thesis.  
1.9 Thesis Structure  
This thesis has 10 chapters, which have been written to achieve the research’s aim. Figure 




Figure 1.5: Thesis structure and flowchart. 
Chapter 10: Discussion
Quantify the Delay Impact of the IRFs of the Delivery of a Case Study  Using The RMF
Use the RMF to select safe pipelines routes and recommend effective RMMs in the projects  (chapter 7)
Chapter 5: Computer Modelling and Risk Ranking 
Chapter 4: Industrial Survey 
Chapter 3: Research Method
Chapter 2: Literature ReviewChapter 1:  Introduction
Research Problem & Research Questions 
Aim and Objectives 
Hypotheses 
Past studies about risk management, IRFs and RMMs in OGP Projects
Research Theory and Approach Data Collection MethodsResearch Approach  and Rationale
• The Limitation of the Existing RMFs.
• The IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects. 
Pilot-like survey Final Survey
• The RP and RS levels of the IRFs 
• The Effectiveness Degree of the RMMs
Input (RP & RS)  Fuzzy Logic Theory Output (Risk Index)
Select Safer Routes for the New OGPs Recommend effective RMMs in the projects
Data Analysis
Calculate the delay in the projects using 
ASTA risk simulator (Chapter 8)
Calculate the delay in the projects using 
@Risk simulator (Chapter 9)
Chapter 6: Development of aN RMF)
Use the findings from the above chapters to design an RMF
Allocate the IRFs with the project activities (chapter 8)
Results and Discussion




Inputs of the RMF Process of the RMF Outputs of the RMF
Allocate the IRFs with the routes of the projects
Calculate the risk levels in the routes and select safer routes  
Results and Discussion
Allocate the RMMs to the IRFs in the projects
Rank the RMMs regards their effectiveness degrees
Results and Discussion
Calculate the durations and risk levels of the projects  activities (chapter 8)
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• 0 explains the introduction of the OGP projects, the research problem, research 
questions, and the scope and the structure of the thesis.  
• Chapter 2: provides the background about OGP projects and the RFs and RMMs 
associated with these projects worldwide. In addition, this chapter reviews the prior 
studies about risk management in OGP projects in order to understand and highlight 
the limitations of the existing approaches to risk management in these projects.  
• Chapter 3: explains the conceptual theory, and the design and research approach used 
in this thesis. It also explains the data collection methods, and the rationale of this 
research.   
• Chapter 4: uses the findings of Chapter 2: and Chapter 3: to design an industrial 
survey in order to understand the stakeholders’ perceptions about the RFs and RMMs 
in their projects.  
• Chapter 5: uses the results of Chapter 4: as inputs for a computer-based risk analysis 
model, which uses fuzzy theory to assess and rank the RFs.  
• Chapter 6: is about using the findings of the previous chapters in order to design an 
integrated RMF to analyse and manage the RFs in OGP projects.  
• Chapter 7: describes the case study project of this research. Additionally, it tests the 
functionality of the RMF with regard to selecting safe routes/alignments for the new 
pipelines and making useful recommendations for identifying some of the effective 
RMMs in the projects.  
• Chapter 8: tests the functionality of the RMF with regard to quantifying the 
construction delay caused by the IRFs in the projects using ASTA risk simulator. 
• Chapter 9: uses @Risk simulator to quantify the construction delay caused by the 
IRFs in the projects and to compare the results with the previous chapter to provide 
trusted outcomes. 
• Chapter 10: explains the conclusion of the research. Furthermore, it provides the 
contribution, the limitations and the future work of the research.   
1.10 Summary  
This chapter has: 
• Provided an introduction to the research study, and an overview about the oil and gas 
industry, the importance of petroleum products as a source of energy, the importance 
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of OGP projects (section 1.1), and the importance of risk management in OGP 
projects (see section 1.2). 
• Identified the limitations of the existing RMFs in OGP projects, which were used to 
highlight the research problem of this research (see section 1.3).  
• Outlined the research questions (section 1.4), and research aim and objectives 
(section 1.5).  
• Explained the research methods in sections 1.6 and section 1.7, and demonstrated the 
contribution and the originality of the research. 
• Discussed the scope and the limitations and the structure of this research in sections 
1.8 and 1.9 respectively.  
In this chapter, it was found that it is significant to focus on the security and safety-related 
risk factors that affect OGP projects. The scope of this research is to use the research findings 
with regard to the analysis and ranking of the RFs for the following:   
1- Calculate the impact of the RFs on OGP projects using a more comprehensive and 
accurate way, which could reduce the uncertainty and the biases associated with 
analysing and ranking the RFs in OGP projects based only on the literature review 
and the stakeholders’ judgements. 
2- Develop an optimisation alignment model selecting the routes that have less risk 
impact on OGP projects. Due to the nature of the safety and security risks, which are 
dynamic risk factors and which are always impacted and changed by the political, 
social environmental and economic situations, etc., nobody can guarantee that the 
selected route/alignment is the safest one for the project. However, the research 
findings will be useful in selecting the optimum (i.e. the least risky) route/alignment 
to build new pipelines considering the impact of the RFs on the pipeline projects.  
3- Make effective suggestions and recommendations about identifying some of the 
effective RMMs in OGP projects by suggesting some of the effective RMMs to 
manage the RFs in the projects.    
4- Estimate the duration of projects after considering the impact of the related RFs on 
them. This research, therefore, will quantify the impact of the RFs on the duration of 
new pipeline projects. In other words, it is essential to estimate if the projects could 
be delivered on time after calculating the impact of the RFs on their duration.  
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Iraq is facing many challenges to expand the export rate for oil and gas products; the 
inadequate risk management in OGP projects is the key challenge that hinders the export 
activities. So, this research sought to provide a comprehensive survey about the challenges 
which are facing risk management in OGP projects in Iraq. This research will contribute by 
identifying and analysing the RFs that may hinder the Iraqi government’s planned increase 
in oil and gas export rates after 2003. Understanding and evaluating the IRFs in OGP projects 
will help stakeholders, decision-makers, policy-makers and researchers to adopt a 
sustainable risk management strategy during the different stages of these projects. 
The next chapter critiques the past studies, technical reports and databases about risk 
management in OGP projects in order to understand their limitations and identify the RFs 
and RMMs in OGP projects. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW   
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides an overall review of the Oil and Gas Pipeline (OGP) projects and their 
importance in the world market and global economy, as explained in section 2.2. Section 2.3 
provides an overview of the OGP projects in Iraq including the importance of the oil and gas 
industry to the country and the global market. Section 2.4 reviews the findings of the past 
investigations about understanding, identifying and classifying the Risk Factors (RFs) 
associated with the pipelines in different countries and under different geographical 
locations. In addition, this section describes different types of Risk Mitigation Methods 
(RMMs) that are adopted to manage the RFs in these projects. Section 2.5 identifies the 
seminal works OGP projects and it presents the strengths and limitations of the existing Risk 
Management Frameworks (RMFs) in the OGP projects, and is followed by the summary of 
the chapter in section 2.6.  
The next section provides an overview of the OGP projects.  
2.2 The Production and Transmission System in the Oil and 
Gas Industry 
This section explains the production phases of the petroleum products, the main types of 
pipelines that transport petroleum products and the types of accidents facing these pipelines.  
The production process in the oil and gas industry is usually divided into three phases, which 
are upstream, midstream and downstream. The upstream phase includes the exploration, 
drilling and production activities relating to the crude oil and gas products. The midstream 
phase includes the storage, the transportation and the trading facilities of the extracted oil 
and gas products. In this phase, the extracted products will be transported either to the 
refinery plants or to the export points. The downstream phase includes distributing the 
refined oil and gas products for the final consumers in the local market (De Graaff, 2011).  
As explained earlier, in 00, the OGP projects are the main mode of petroleum product 
transportation. Therefore, this research is focusing on analysing the RFs that affect the safety 
of OGPs in the midstream phase of the oil and gas industry, as justified in section 1.2.1 in 0. 
Johnson (2017) suggested that OGPs are generally categorised into three main types as 
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follows: (i) flow-lines (gathering pipes), (ii) transmission pipelines and (iii) product 
(distribution) pipelines. The definitions of these pipelines are explained below: 
1- Flow-lines (gathering pipes) collect the crude oil or natural gas from the wells to 
transport them to the storage tanks or treatment plants inside the production areas.  
2- Transmission pipelines transport the crude products to the refineries and other 
storage facilities outside the production areas. They also transport crude oil or the 
refined products between cities, states, countries and sometimes continents. 
3- Product (distribution) pipelines transport refined products to the storage tanks and 
final consumers. 
Figure 2.1 provides an integrated view of the gathering, transmission and distribution 
pipelines and other key components in OGPs.   
 
Figure 2.1: Integrated view of gathering, transmission and distribution OGPs (SSVSC, 
2020). 
The figure above shows the main types of pipelines used to transport petroleum products 
from the production points to the processing planets (refineries) or to the end users, such as 
commercial customers, electricity generation stations, export points and storage facilities, 
etc. This research, therefore, focuses on the RFs that affect the safety of the transmission 
pipelines as they run for thousands of kilometres outside the production areas, which makes 
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them more subject to the RFs that affect their safety. Additionally, these pipelines have a 
significant social and economic impact on countries and nations, as any failure in them could 
obstruct the transmission, export and import activities of the petroleum products. Moreover, 
any disruption in the pipeline networks that transport the oil and gas products to the electrical 
power generators or refinery units has a significant impact on the supply chain of the electric 
power and petroleum products that are required by nations. The next paragraph describes the 
main types of accidents facing OGPs. 
Briggs (2010) says, “Despite the indisputable successes achieved by the modern technology 
of pipeline construction and exploitation under different natural conditions, including the 
extreme ones, pipeline oil transportation does not eliminate the possibility of serious 
accidents and consequences”, p.95. For example, some of these pipes are beyond their 
estimated engineering life (Epstein et al. 2002); suffering from human-related RFs; material 
defects (e.g. pipe corrosion and ground erosion); soil movements (Kraidi et al. 2019a); or, 
with regard to underwater pipelines, encountering ship anchors and bottom trawls. These 
RFs could cause accidents and failures in OGPs and damage them, which would obstruct the 
transportation system of petroleum products. Meanwhile, pipeline failures have a grave 
economic and environmental impact on countries. For instance, the database of the US 
Office of Pipeline Safety shows that 316 million gallons of crude oil, gasoline and other 
petroleum products dripped and poured from damaged pipes during the period between 1980 
and 2010 (Briggs, 2010). This obviously caused massive economic losses for the country 
and had a severe environmental impact on the surrounding areas.  
Guo et al. (2018) classified the failure in OGP projects into three types depending on who is 
damaging the pipelines, as follows.  
I. First-party disruption, which is failure in a pipeline caused by the pipeline’s company 
itself;  
II. Second-party disruption, which is failure in a pipeline caused by the companies or 
individuals that work for the pipeline’s company; and 
III. Third-Party Disruption (TPD), which is failure in a pipeline caused by companies or 
individuals not related to the pipeline’s company such as farming, digging or 
construction activities of other projects.  
Even though countries have different forms of accidents in their projects, the focus nowadays 
in the oil and gas industry is on TPD (Lambrechts and Blomquist, 2017; Rezazadeh et al. 
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2018). This is because TPD is one of the major causes of OGP failure in European countries 
and the USA (Hopkins et al. 1999), in African countries (Rowland, 2010), and globally 
(Minsner and Leffler, 2006; Wan and Mita, 2010).  
Day (1998) and Muhlbauer (2004) define TPD as any individual or group action that 
obstructs the functionality of the infrastructures’ systems in any direct or indirect manner, 
such as theft, sabotage and terrorist attacks. This research classifies such kinds of risks as 
“intentional TPDs”. Intentional TPD refers to the deliberate and illegal intrusion into OGPs 
without consent or permission from the stakeholders. The activities of intentional TPD 
include vandalism; smuggling; trespass; conspiracy; pilfering; sabotage and terrorism; 
guerrilla warfare; mechanical equipment, firearms, explosives; and cyber (internet) attacks 
on the operating system to cause physical damage (Watts, 2008). Therefore, the main focus 
in the global oil and gas industry is on the intentional TPD (Parfomak, 2008). Such disruption 
is strongly affected by the environmental, social and economic conditions of the areas in 
which the pipelines are situated.  
Peng et al. (2016) added that TPD results from any action that accidentally damages the 
OGPs. This includes human errors (e.g. operational errors that result from using the wrong 
information), natural phenomena (e.g. floods and earthquakes), soil movement (e.g. 
foundation collapse, landslides and mudslides), and surface loads (e.g. illegal building, blast 
construction and live ground loads that compress pipelines). This research classifies such 
kinds of risks as “unintentional TPDs”. Unintentional TPD refers to any unexpected events 
and activities that cause accidental damage to OGPs. This includes pipeline failure caused 
by mechanical failure; operation error; control system failure; human and natural hazards 
(e.g. road construction, farming and drilling), landslides, erosion and earthquakes (Rowland, 
2010). 
In this study, TPD refers to all intentional and unintentional individual and group actions 
that result in expected or unexpected damage to a pipeline at any stage of a pipeline project. 
As TPD is the main cause of pipeline failure, it is worthwhile and important to understand 
and analyse the TPD in OGPs to minimise the causes of failure and accident in these projects. 
As the scope of this research is to analyse the RFs in OGP projects in insecure environments, 
the case study of this research should be carried out in a country in which the OGPs are 
subject to the TPD more often. Iraq has been selected as a case study for this research because 
it is a developing country with security issues that affect the safety of OGP projects. In order 
to increase the oil and gas export rate, Iraq after 2003 had a strong and rapid development in 
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oil and gas infrastructures with a massive number of pipeline projects under construction, 
which were obstructed by the risk management in the country. Also, Iraq is one of the most 
important petroleum countries that has a strong impact on the global economy. The next 
section provides an overview of the OGP projects in Iraq.  
2.3 Overview of Oil and Gas Pipeline Projects in Iraq  
In Iraq, oil exploration and production activities were started in 1920 by several international 
oil companies, and, by 1975, the process of oil production was ultimately under the control 
of Iraqi oil companies (Crocker, 2004). Iraq was a founding member of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which was established at a conference held in 
Baghdad in 1960 (Danielsen, 2015). Subsequently, Iraq was amongst the first crude oil-
producing and exporting countries in OPEC (Mikdashi, 1974; Al‐Rashed and León, 2015).  
With regard to exporting Iraqi oil to other countries, the first shipment of Iraqi crude oil was 
exported via Haifa port through the Haifa pipeline, which has been obsolete since 1934. 
During 1943, Iraqi crude oil was exported via Banias port in Syria, through the Iraqi-Syrian 
pipeline. The first port in the south of Iraq was Al Faw, which has been used for exporting 
the Iraqi crude oil through the Persian Gulf since 1951. In the north of Iraq, the Iraqi-Turkish 
pipeline was used to transport the crude oil extracted from the north of Iraq to the Ceyhan 
port in Turkey. Another exporting pipeline was constructed in 1985 to export Iraqi crude oil 
through the Red Sea, which has been out of service since 1990. Table 2.1 shows the main 
pipelines in Iraq.  
Table 2.1: The main OGPs in Iraq (Moosa, 2013; Danielsen, 2015). 
Connection Owner or operator Length 
(Miles) 
Diameter 
(inches) From To 
Kirkuk Salah el-Dien Oil Pipeline Company 83 26 
Baiju (K2) Daura Oil Pipeline Company 213 12/16 
East Baghdad/ Daura refinery Oil Pipeline Company 60 16 
Naft Khaneh Daura Oil Pipeline Company 130 12 
Strategic Pipeline Nasiriyah refinery Oil Pipeline Company 32 20 
Strategic pipeline Daura refinery (2) Oil Pipeline Company 108/110 18/26 
Strategic Pipeline Musaiab PWR st Oil Pipeline Company 48 16 
Strategic Pipeline Al-Khairat PWR st Oil Pipeline Company 29.5 14 
Al-Ahdeb Al-Zubaydia PWR st Oil Pipeline Company 73 10 
North Rumaila PS Basrah port South Oil Company 115 48 
Zubair Khor Al Amayah port South Oil Company 114 42 
Zubair Basrah port South Oil Company 99 42 
Tuba Zubair 1 South Oil Company 9.5 48 
Tuba Zubair 2 South Oil Company 13.3 30/ 32/ 36 
Faw Khor AlAmea (naval) X3 South Oil Company 28.1 42/32/32 
Zubair 1 Saudi South Oil Company 28.1 48 
Tuba Basrah SPM: 2 and 3 (2) South Oil Company 95/99 2 * 48 
Faw Basrah SPM: 2 and 3 (2) South Oil Company 95/99 2 * 48 
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Figure 2.2 shows the main units of oil and gas infrastructures in Iraq on the map. 
 
Figure 2.2: A map showing the main infrastructure units of OGP projects in Iraq (Jamie 
McDuell, 2014).  
The next section shows the importance of Iraqi oil and gas products to the global and local 
markets. 
2.3.1 The Importance of Iraq’s Oil and Gas Industry in the Global Market  
Iraq has been selected as the case study in this research because its oil reserves are about 112 
billion barrels (Chalabi, 2000; Kumins, 2003; Luft, 2005), which is the fifth largest in the 
world (EIA, 2015). Iraqi crude oil reserves represent 10% to 11% of the total global oil 
reservoir (Muttitt, 2006; OPEC, 2017). Moreover, Iraq has the lowest cost of crude oil 
production in the world, which can break the price of crude oil in the global market (Gunter, 
2013). Furthermore, it is estimated that Iraq’s gas reserves are amongst the 10th to 13th largest 
reserves globally, which represents about 1.7% of the total gas reserves in the world, in 
addition to the possibility of the country having a vast number of undiscovered reserves 
(IEA, 2013).  
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Iraq has a significant impact on the growth of the global oil market (IEA, 2012). This is 
because the country was providing 18% of the crude oil produced in the Middle East (IEA, 
2015). Additionally, Iraq is forecast to be the key supplier to fast-growing Asian markets, 
mainly China, up to 2030 (OPEC, 2017). Figure 2.3 shows the exported Iraqi oil by 








Figure 2.3: The exported Iraqi crude oil by destination in 2014 (A) by continent and (B) by 
country (EIA, 2015). 
The next section outlines the importance of Iraqi oil and gas products for the country’s 
economy. 
2.3.2 The Contribution of the Oil and Gas Industry to Iraq’s Economy  
The population in Iraq increased from approximately 13.7 million in 1980 to approximately 
31 million in 2010; the population today is approximately 34 million, and it will have grown 
to almost 50 million by the end of 2030 (Figure 2.4). It is estimated that the population will 




Figure 2.4: Population size in Iraq (1980-2050) (UN, 2019). 
The population growth rate in Iraq increased from 2.64 % in 1980-1985 to 3.12% in 1995-
2000. Then it decreased to 2.46 % in 2005-2010 and rose again by 2.89% in 2010-2015. It 
was expected to keep rising by 3.6% between 2015 and 2019 and from then on to start 







Figure 2.5: Population growth rate in Iraq (1980-2050) (UN, 2019). 
The export of crude oil products has had a significant impact on the economic situation in 
Iraq because it is the cornerstone of the economy and the key source for the future 
development of the country. The oil export business provides Iraq’s main resources of 
income because it represents 99% of total government revenues, as shown in Figure 2.6. In 
addition, oil exports make up 95% to 99% of the country’s exported goods and provide 80% 








































































Figure 2.6: Oil export value to total export (2009 to 2013) (Crocker, 2004; Squalli, 2007). 
 
Figure 2.7: Iraqi government total revenues between 2009- 2013 (The Revenue Watch 
Institute, 2014; Mansour, 2018). 
The business of oil exporting in Iraq makes up 70% to 75% of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of the country (The Revenue Watch Institute, 2014). During the period between 1980 
and 2003, the living standard in Iraq dropped sharply because of the first Gulf War (1980 to 
1988) and the second Gulf War in 1990. In that period of time, Iraq’s GDP declined by more 
than 20% in real terms. After 2003, Iraq started to recover from three decades punctuated by 
wars and conflict and sought to gain a chance to change its future (as shown in Figure 2.8 
and Figure 2.9) (Mansour, 2018). Also, the internal conflict was even worse for a number of 
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Figure 2.8: Iraq’s GDP per capita (1980-2014) (UN, 2019). 
 
Figure 2.9: Iraq’s GDP per capita growth (%) (1980-2014) (UN, 2019). 
After 2003, Iraq had three continuous plans with regard to increasing the export rates of oil 
and gas products. Since then, it has been increasingly accepted that the development of the 
infrastructures in the oil and gas industry needs to be at the top of the agenda when 
contemplating the development of the country’s infrastructures in the country. Figure 2.10 
shows the three scenarios of increasing the oil export rate in Iraq until 2035. Meanwhile, 




Figure 2.10: Iraqi oil output compounds the average annual growth rates between 2000 and 
2035 (IEA, 2012).  
 
Figure 2.11: Iraqi GDP compounds the average annual growth rates (2000 to 2035) (IEA, 
2012). 
As explained in the figures above, the oil and gas industry is the most important and critical 
source of revenue in Iraq, which means that the development of the oil and gas resources in 
Iraq underpins the reconstruction and the social and economic development of the country. 
So, it is vital to support a quick and acceptable development rate for OGP projects to match 
the requirements of increasing the exports rates of Iraqi oil and gas products rapidly. This is 
because the business from these export activities is required to rebuild the country and 
provide the required economic resources for the nation. One of the requirements for 




















This is because enhancing the safety levels of the projects helps in reducing their failure rate, 
which helps to: (i) enhance the safety level of the transportation system for the petroleum 
products; (ii) reduce the economic losses that result from repairing the damaged pipes and 
losing the leaked products; and (iii) reduce the environmental impact caused by the spilt 
products.  
The aim of this research, therefore, is to develop an integrated RMF, which could be used to 
understand, identify, analyse and manage the RFs in OGP projects in Iraq in a 
comprehensive way. Such an RMF will be useful to stakeholders in OGP projects to improve 
the safety level of OGPs in Iraq during the planning, design, construction and operational 
stages of these projects. In other words, the RMF will contribute to enhancing the 
development of OGPs in Iraq, which will help in improving the oil and gas export activities 
that represent an important source of revenue to the country.    
The next section details the situation regarding OGP projects in Iraq.  
2.3.3 The Current Situation of the OGP Projects in Iraq  
The wars in 1980-1989, 1991 and 2003 had a harmful impact on Iraq’s oil and gas industry 
because most of the oil and gas infrastructures suffered from direct and indirect attacks that 
damaged the pipelines. Oil production, therefore, explicitly declined specifically after 2003, 
due to the damage that occurred in many depots and pipelines, which reduced the capacity 
of the storage and transportation facilities and obstructed the oil-exporting activities. After 
2003, Iraq started to re-develop its oil and gas infrastructures to increase the production and 
export of the crude oil. Thus, the production of crude oil in Iraq rose from 0.95 Million 
Barrels Per day (MMbbl/day) in 2003 to 2.4 MMbbl/day in 2010 and to 3.4 MMbbl/day in 
2014 (EIA, 2015). The crude oil production in 2015 was 3.6 MMbbl/day, and the Iraqi 
government aimed to reach up to 8.3 MMbbl/day of crude oil in 2035 (De Graaff, 2011; 
EIA, 2015), (see Figure 2.10 and section 2.3.2). However, this plan has been renegotiated to 
lower levels because the capacity of the transportation system is low (Ali, 2015; EIA, 2015). 
Meanwhile, the revised targets are still overly optimistic because of the ongoing delays in 
the development of the oil and gas infrastructures in the country. Furthermore, the militant 
activity and the poor security situation during the recent years with regard to ISIS have 
impeded these projects (IEA, 2012; Moosa, 2013; EIA, 2015). Table 2.2 shows the status of 


























Two parallel pipelines (a 40-
inch and 46-inch) transport the 
oil produced in northern fields 
in Iraq to Ceyhan port in 
Turkey. The 46-inch line has 
been out of service since late 
2014 due to the unsafe security 
situation in the area. The 40-
inch line has a usable capacity 
of 500,000 MMbbl/day and it is 
connected to the two main 












300 operating It carries the crude oil produced 
at the Khurmala Dome, Taq Taq 
and the nearby fields to the 
export points. The local 
government in the KRG region 
is working to increase the 









100 operating This pipeline transports the oil 
produced at Tawke field to 
Fishkhabur, then to the export 
point: Ceyhan port in Turkey.  
Iraq (Baghdad) 









This pipeline was a target for 
sabotage by ISIS. It has been out 













This pipeline has two branches; 
one goes to Syria, and the other 
one goes to Lebanon. The 
pipeline was out of service 
between 1980 and 2000. And it 











This is a reversible pipeline, 
which transports crude oil 
between Kirkuk in the top north 
of Iraq to Basra in the bottom 
south of the country, and vice 
versa. The pipeline section from 
Basra to Karbala transports the 
crude oil from Basra to the 
refineries in Baghdad. The other 
section (from Baghdad to 
Kirkuk) is out of service. 
Iraq Pipeline to 
Saudi Arabia  
southern Iraq 
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transport crude oil to the Red 




The table above shows the majority of the main export pipelines in Iraq (five out of seven) 
are not in operation, particularly the pipelines in the north of the country. This is because of 
the security situation in the north after ISIS occupied Mosul city in 2014. This means that 
there is a vital need to have a practical and effective risk management system in these 
projects, which is the main aim of this research.  
The next section details the impact on the scenarios of oil export until 2035 in Iraq and the 
challenges that obstruct the pipeline projects in the country.  
2.3.4 The Impact of OGP Projects in Oil Export until 2035 in Iraq 
Iraq has the resources and plans to increase the oil and gas production and export rate rapidly. 
However, the scenario of increasing oil export rates by 2035 (explained in Figure 2.10) is 
going slow because of many challenges. In 2008, after the first and second oil licensing 
rounds in Iraq, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil (MoO) and the international oil companies actively 
recovered and developed the upstream phase of oil production, i.e. the active producing 














Figure 2.12 The active rigs, completed wells and oil-producing wells in Iraq (OPEC, 2017). 
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Additionally, the capacity of the downstream projects was increased by adding new export 
points to Al-Basra and Khor al-Amaya ports in the south of Iraq. However, the capacity of 
the production and export projects was increased at a faster rate than the increment rate of 
the capacity of the midstream projects, which is the main reason obstructing the oil export 
activities in the country (Jaffe, 2007; Jaffe and Soligo, 2007; Moosa, 2013; Ismael, 2018). 
Iraq has an extensive pipeline network to transport oil and gas products for local 
consumption, and exports through ports and neighbouring countries. However, a substantial 
number of new pipelines have to be built, both inside and outside of Iraq, to increase oil and 
gas production and exports rates in the country. The scenarios of oil exports rate by 2035 
(see Figure 2.10) were changed for a lower export rate because of the low capacity of the 
transportation system and the slow development in that system (i.e. OGP projects). In other 
words, the successful development of OGP projects in Iraq and an effective management 
system in these projects will have a strong impact on the social and economic development 
in the country. On the other hand, the slow development and ineffective risk management 
system in these projects are hindering Iraq’s reconstruction, development and economic 
growth. At the same time, there is an urgent need for the country to overcome the many 
formidable challenges and RFs that work to obstruct the performance of the current pipelines 
and the development of new projects. 
At the present time, a vast range of RFs is threatening the OGP projects in Iraq, and the 
inadequacy of mitigating these factors is hindering the oil export business, which has been 
in high demand since 2003. Although risks, accidents and failures cannot be completely 
avoided in any projects, they can be controlled and mitigated through using effective risk 
management strategies throughout the lifecycle of a project. Reliable risk assessment and an 
effective risk protection system are providing proactive actions minimising the impact of the 
RFs in the projects continuously (Torabi et al. 2016; Zafra-Cabeza et al. 2007). Therefore, 
there are enormous valid reasons for conducting this research in order to contribute to 
improving the safety level of OGP projects in Iraq by proposing a very robust framework of 
risk management, which could be used to analyse and manage the RFs in these projects. In 
other words, this research will contribute to enhancing the development of OGPs in Iraq, 
which will help in improving the oil and gas export activities that represent an important 
source of revenue to the country. 
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The next section explains the definition of “risk management”, which is the process of 
managing the RFs in the projects. In other words, the next section discusses the application 
and the importance of risk management in OGP projects.  
2.4 The Risk Management Process in the OGP Projects 
This section explains the definition of RFs in the projects (see section 2.4.1) and how to 
manage them (see section 2.4.2). In addition, this section will identify and classify the RFs 
associated with OGP projects based on an extensive literature review about them, as 
described in section 2.4.4 and 2.4.5, respectively. Similarly, section 2.4.6 provides an 
identification and classification of the RMMs used to manage the RFs in OGP projects. 
2.4.1 What is Risk? 
Fishburn (1984) defined risk as a bad event. The word risk generally means negative results 
caused by a bad or an unexpected event (Perminova et al. 2008, as cited by Alali, 2010). 
Williams et al. (1997) defined risk as the possibility of suffering harm, loss or danger. Risk 
has also been considered as a future problem affecting the management and/or the control 
systems in projects (Cervone, 2006). Risk is an uncertain incident or situation, which has a 
positive or negative effect on the project’s goals if it happens (Project Management Institute, 
2013, as cited by Almadhlouh, 2019). Ahmed et al. (2007) defined risk as any unexpected 
or unplanned event that affects a project in either a positive or a negative way. Raz et al. 
(2002) defined risk as any unplanned event that affects the success of a project as it may 
cause time and/or cost overrun, safety accidents, environmental hazards, property failure, 
etc. In this study, the authors concluded, “there is no risk free project”, p. 101. In other words, 
any uncertain event that leads to not achieving any of the project goals is defined as a project 
risk (Nieto-Morote and Ruz-Vila, 2011). Kaplan (1997) gave a more comprehensive 
definition of risk. He stated that, when talking about risk, we are asking three questions: 
What can go wrong? How likely is that? What are the consequences?  
The next section provides the definitions of risk management in projects and the answers to 
these three questions.  
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2.4.2 What is Risk Management?  
The process of managing and dealing with the risk in projects is called “Risk Management” 
(Al-Bahar et al. 1990). NASA defined project risk management as follows: "Project risk 
management seeks to anticipate and address uncertainties that threaten the goals and 
timetables of a project" (Wu et al. 2006, p. 708 as cited by (Alali, 2010, p. 14). Risk 
management is about providing the policies, strategies and actions required in managing and 
coping with the RFs in projects in order to control and minimise their impact (Hillson, 2002; 
Carbone and Tippett, 2004). The goal of corporate risk management is to create a reference 
framework that will allow companies to handle risk and uncertainty (Dionne, 2013). The 
premise of risk management is that risk to a system, as well as its vulnerability and resilience, 
can be understood, defined, and possibly quantified most effectively through a systems-based 
philosophical and methodological approach, and by recognising the roles and actions 
required in this process (Haimes, 2009). The objective of risk management is to maximise 
the chance of a project’s success via the reduction of the impact of different risks associated 
with that project. Risk management is considered as one of the main processes in project 
management (PMI, 2000). This is because reasonable and accurate risk evaluation measures 
and an effective risk management system can contribute to the reduction of the overall risks 
in projects (Guo et al. 2016).  
Risk management addresses each risk factor and its consequences and the different 
mitigation policy options that may be addressed to reduce these consequences more 
effectively. Haimes (2009) explained in his/her study that each risk has a scenario that must 
be addressed and analysed using the following as risk assessment questions: What can go 
wrong? What is the likelihood? What are the consequences? and What is the time frame? 
Then the risk management process asks: What can be done and what options are available? 
What are the trade offs in terms of all relevant costs, benefits, and risks? and What are the 
impacts of current decisions on future options?  
The next section explains some of the approaches of risk management used in the projects.  
2.4.3 Risk Management Approaches  
Risk management strategies include risk avoidance; loss reduction and risk prevention; risk 
retention and assumption; risk transfer (non-insurance or contractual); and insurance (Al-
Bahar et al., 1990). The definitions of these risk management strategies are as follows. 
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• Risk avoidance means avoiding risk exposure to the projects, which is a useful, 
fairly common risk management strategy. Using risk avoidance risk management 
strategy will make the projects not experience the potential losses that the risks 
exposure may generate. However, the stakeholders of the projects (e.g. the 
contractor) loses the potential gains (opportunity) that may have been derived from 
assuming that risk exposure. To illustrate, if a contractor is concerned about potential 
liability losses associated with an asbestos material or hazardous waste, he/she could 
avoid the risk by never acquiring any project that involves operations with such 
materials. Similarly, a contractor may avoid the political and financial risks 
associated with a project in a particular unstable country by not bidding on projects 
in this country. 
• Loss reduction and risk prevention mean working on reducing the potential risk 
exposure to projects in two ways, which are reducing the probability of a risk; and 
reducing the consequences of risk if it does occur.  For example, the installation of 
the anti-theft devices on construction equipment may reduce the chances of theft. A 
building sprinkler system, on the other hand, may reduce the financial severity 
caused by fire. The success of risk reduction and prevention strategy leads to a direct 
action of preventing the potential risks in the projects and reducing their 
consequences. Also, it is found that by adopting a loss-prevention program, the 
insurance premiums are reduced significantly. 
• Risk retention and assumption mean making internal assumptions, partially or 
completely, of the impact of the risks on the projects by using one of the two different 
types of retention, which are planned or unplanned risk retention. The planned risk 
retention is a conscious and deliberate assumption of recognised or identified risks 
by the stakeholders. Under such a plan, risks can be retained in any number of ways, 
depending upon the philosophy, the particular needs, and the financial and risk 
management capabilities of the stakeholders. For some projects, the task of risk 
identification has been so poorly performed that far too much risk is being passively 
retained. On the other hand, unplanned risk retention exists when the stakeholders do 
not recognise or identify the existence of a risk and unwittingly or unconsciously 
assume the consequences of a risk that could occur.  A related form of unplanned 
retention occurs when the stakeholders have properly recognised the risk exposure 
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but have underestimated the magnitude of the potential consequences of the risk 
factors. 
• Risk transfer means risk transfers are possible, through negotiations, whenever the 
stakeholders enter into a contractual arrangement with various parties such as 
owners,  contractors, subcontractors, or material and equipment suppliers. There are 
two ways of risk transfer, which are insured and non-insured transfer. These non-
insurance transfers differ from insurance in that the transferees (i) are not insurers, 
and  (2) due to inadequate historical data or their inability to adequately evaluate risk 
exposure, transferees usually do not accept enough exposure units for their losses. 
Most non-insurance risk transfers are accomplished through provisions in contracts 
such as hold-harmless agreements and indemnity clauses or contractual adjustments. 
For example, an adjustment in price where an extra compensation will be granted to 
the contractor if different subsurface conditions are encountered. The essential 
characteristic of the contractual transfer is that the potential consequences of the risk, 
if the risk does occur, are shared with or totally carried by a party other than the 
contractor. 
• Insurance. The difference between the response option of insurance and transfer is 
that insurance only shifts the financial potential consequences of the risk, whereas 
risk transfer, also involves shifting responsibility for the risk. For that reason (the 
coverage of the financial consequences of the risk), commercial insurance is 
probably the most important and frequently used method of handling risk that is 
employed by the stakeholders (e.g. the contractors). In fact, many contractors think 
of risk management as insurance management. Therefore, the majority of contractors 
rely upon insurance for the more serious loss exposures through the purchase of an 
insurance policy with certain deductibles. Regardless of the form of deductibles, the 
obvious effect is a reduction in the premiums for a given amount of insurance 
protection. Loss-adjustment expenses are also reduced for the insurer. These two 
reasons explain why deductibles are usually used, especially when the frequency of 
small losses is fairly high. However, the insurance policies and companies are not 
active in developing and insecure countries such as Iraq due to the security situation 
and problems. Also, the aim of this study is to contribute in managing the risk factors 
in OGP projects in Iraq in a way that enhances the performance of the pipeline 
projects and reduces the time loss and delay in the projects caused by the risk factors. 
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Also, developing countries suffer from fundamental weaknesses in their financial 
structures, namely, the absence of prudent supervision, rudimentary regulatory 
structures of financial intermediaries, corrupt lending practices, insufficient bank 
capital, poor regulatory experience, and the absence of sound deposit insurance 
schemes, and these and other factors contribute to the result with a rapid 
accumulation of useless loans resulting in banking crises in these countries (Salman 
and Mohammed, 2020). These limitations in the insurance policies and companies in 
Iraq make "Insurance" not an effective risk management strategy in the country. 
The oil and gas industry is complex by nature (Lameda and Van den Berg, 2009). Oil and 
gas projects are recognised as highly technical projects by nature which are complex, have 
a high level of uncertainty, demand careful risk assessment and require appropriate risk 
management strategies (Almadhlouh, 2019; Aseeri et al. 2004; Bowers and Khorakian, 
2014; Durney and Donnelly, 2015; Rolstadås and Schiefloe, 2017). Oil and gas projects are 
usually costly, and the associated RFs in these projects are enormous (Marshall, 2016). 
Managing the RFs in such complex projects is difficult (Laufer et al. 2008) and requires a 
high level of experience in risk management (Aarseth et al. 2013).  
The current trend in risk management is to take a holistic and comprehensive view of the 
RFs in the projects (Zhao and Singhaputtangkul, 2016). The process of risk management 
includes the following main steps, which are: (I) risk identification and registration; (II) risk 
assessment and ranking; (III) risk response and mitigation; and (IV) risk monitoring and 
control (Fang and Marle, 2012; X. yu Peng et al. 2016; Rezakhani, 2012; Sohrabinejad and 
Rahimi, 2015). The purpose of these steps is explained as follows.  
I. Risk identification and registration are about identifying the RFs that affect the 
success of a project. Risk management is based on the premise that the RFs are 
identifiable, as defending a system from an unknown risk is impossible (Labaka et 
al. 2016). Therefore, risk identification and registration is the first step of the process 
in risk management. Risk identification and registration, therefore, should contain all 
the RFs that may affect the success of a project in order to prioritise the areas that 
require managerial attention (Filippina and Dreherb, 2004; Whipple and Pitblado, 
2009). 
Accordingly, risk identification and registration must be based on appropriate 
knowledge, a trusted database and accurate historical records about the accident and 
failure causes in OGP projects (Anifowose et al. 2012; Balfe et al. 2014). These 
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historical records are a valuable source of information that could be used to ensure 
adequate ‘risk registration’ and ‘risk assessment’ facilities, which are essentially 
required for risk management studies (Whipple and Pitblado, 2009; Ruijsscher, 
2016). In other words, ideally, real and trusted historical data about the causes of 
failures and accidents in OGP projects provides reliable results of risk assessment 
(Okaro, 2017b).  
Hopkins et al. (1999) defined a database as one that contains the pipeline records, 
such as the pipeline’s designs sheets; maps; failure causes; operational pressure; 
inspections, tests and maintenance records; surveillance and modifications, etc. This 
means that the lack of such data is hindering the process of identifying the potential 
RFs that might affect the safety of the projects at any stage. However, the absence of 
data and historical reports makes providing observations about the RFs a challenging 
task, which harms the risk management system in the projects.  
II. Risk assessment and ranking are about evaluating the degree of influence of the 
RFs on a project concerning their chances of happening (i.e. their probability, 
frequency or likelihood levels) and their degree of impact on the project (i.e. their 
severity levels) (Fang and Marle, 2012; Hopkins et al. 1999; Jamshidi et al. 2013; 
Miri Lavasani et al. 2011). Assessing and ranking the RFs regarding their degree of 
influence on a project is significant because dealing with each RF as if it is the most 
critical one results in substantial losses in terms of resources (Srivastava and Gupta, 
2010). Therefore, it is vital to analyse the RFs in a project in an accurate way, as 
providing accurate results about the degree of impact of the RFs enhances the 
outcomes of the project’s risk management system.  
III. Risk response and mitigation are about making responses to the risk events and 
choosing actions that could reduce the hazards and minimise the consequences of 
that risk. Therefore, the project stakeholders must follow an effective risk 
management system in their project. In other words, this step focuses on applying 
suitable policies, strategies and actions of risk management to mitigate the RFs in a 
project using effective RMMs.  
IV. Risk monitoring and control are continuous processes of identifying and analysing 
the newly arising RFs in a project, and re-evaluating the current RFs and improving 
the existing responses to the RFs to ensure adequate risk management during the 
project's stages, and to improve the project’s safety levels continuously. In summary, 
the questions in the risk management process address the policy options, their trade-
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offs, the future dynamics of the system and its environment, and the emergent forced 
changes. These cannot be addressed correctly and effectively without adhering to and 
tracking the evolution of the states of the system as functions of the risk management 
decisions and time (Haimes, 2009).  
The next section explains the identification of RFs in OGP projects based on an extensive 
literature review about them. 
2.4.4 The Risk Factors (RFs) in OGP Projects  
Extensive investigations were carried out to identify the RFs in OGP projects in different 
circumstances, countries and geographical regions worldwide. More attention was paid to 
understand and identify the RFs in OGP projects in developing and insecure countries where 
these projects are suffering security problems similar to those in Iraq. The scope of this study 
is about analysing the RFs that affect the safety of OGP projects during the construction and 
operation stages.  In order to meet with the scope of this research, therefore, this research 
has identified RFs associated with OGPs at construction and operation stages of these 
projects based on a worldwide literature review. The investigations of the literature review 
were extended to identify the RFs that are associated with OGP projects at the planning and 
design stage in order to provide a good estimation about their impact on the construction 
duration of the projects. In summary, the investigations of the literature review were about 
identifying the RFs associated with OGP projects at the planning, design, construction and 
maintenance stages of the projects, which might affect the construction duration and the 
safety of OGP projects. The decommissioning issues were not considered in this study 
because they are beyond the scope of this research. 
This section provides some examples of the RFs that affected the safety of OGP projects in 
different countries, such as Nigeria, India, China and Pakistan. Nnadi et al. (2014) found that 
many RFs affected the safety of OGPs in Nigeria: terrorism & sabotage attacks; official 
corruption; theft; corrosion and lack of protection against it; improper inspection and 
maintenance; weak ability to identify and monitor the risks; stakeholders not paying  
appropriate attention; lack of appropriate training, shortage of modern IT services; limited 
warning signs; lack of risk registration; little research on this topic; public poverty and 
education level; operational errors; inadequate risk management; natural disasters and 
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weather conditions. Moreover, Rowland (2010) stated that the exposed pipelines and threats 
to staff were affecting the safety of OGPs in Nigeria.  
Srivastava and Gupta (2010) draw a scenario about a terrorist attack that might happen in 
India and they expect RFs such as insecure areas, easy access to pipeline, and hacker attacks 
on the operating or control systems might affect the safety of OGPs in their country.  
Studies from China identified more RFs in the projects such as lawlessness, low public legal 
and moral awareness, vehicular accident (X. Peng et al. 2016), improper safety regulations, 
design, construction and material defects, geological risks (Guo et al. 2016), conflicts over 
land ownership (Macdonald and Cosham, 2005), and leakage of sensitive information (Wu 
et al. 2015).  
Over and above, in addition to the mentioned RFs, animal accidents were added as a kind of 
RF affecting pipeline projects in Pakistan (Mubin and Mubin, 2008).  
Table 2.3 shows the list of the potential and influential RFs in OGP projects based on an 
extensive literate review about them in different countries across the world.  
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 Table 2.3: The identified risk factors in the OGP projects based on the literature review. 
Potential Risk Factors (RFs) Authors 
Low levels of the general public’s legal and moral 
awareness about OGPs  
Li et al. (2016), X. yu Peng et al. (2016) and Olujobi, 
(2017) 
Socio-political factors such as poverty and 
education level in the project areas  
Anifowose et al. (2012), Guo et al. (2016), Nnadi et al. 
(2014), X. yu Peng et al. (2016) and  Chinonyerem, 
(2017) 
Theft Li et al. (2016), Lu et al. (2015), Nnadi et al. (2014), 
Onuoha, (2008) and Adishi and Hunga, (2017) 
Terrorism & sabotage  Dawotola et al. (2010), Anifowose et al. (2012), Lu et 
al. (2015), Nnadi et al. (2014), Onuoha, (2008), 
Komarov et al. (2018) and Onyi-Ogelle, (2020) 
Threats to staff (kidnap and/or murder) Rowland, (2010), Adebayo and Adeniyi, (2019) and 
Mai-Bornu, (2017) 
Leakage of sensitive information (e.g. the location 
of the valves, the location of the hidden units, etc.)  
Wu et al. (2015), Urquhart and McAuley, (2018) and 
Ballentine et al. (2019) 
Geographical location such as ‘Insecure Zones’ Srivastava and Gupta (2010) and Lommer, (2018) 
Conflicts over land ownership Macdonald and Cosham (2005), Mather et al. (2001),  
Spice, (2018), EZE, (2019) and Adunbi, (2017) 
Accessibility of pipelines Srivastava and Gupta (2010), Sun et al. (2017) and 
Wang et al. (2019) 
Geological risks such as erosion, soil movement 
and landslides   
Guo et al. (2016), Riegert (2011), Zhirov et al. (2017) 
and Monaldi, (2017) 
Vehicle accidents X. Peng et al. (2016) and Galli and Khizar, (2019) 
Animal accidents Rowland (2010) and Kraidi et al. (2019b) 
Lack of compliance with the safety regulations Guo et al. (2016), Carroll and Hayes, (2018) and 
Manouchehri, (2017) 
Non-availability of warning signs Guo et al. (2016), Kabir et al. (2015), Li et al. 2020) 
and Guo et al. (2018) 
Sabotage opportunities arising due to the exposed 
pipeline, e.g. above ground pipeline and not 
enough safety barriers  
Rowland (2010) and Kraidi et al. (2019b) 
Lack of regular inspection and  appropriate 
maintenance 
Guo et al. (2016), Lu et al. (2015), Nnadi et al. 
(2014),Wu et al. (2015) and  Yang et al. (2017) 
Inadequate risk management methods Balfe et al. (2014) and Ogulu et al. (2019) 
Natural disasters and weather conditions Nnadi et al. (2014) and Badida et al. (2019) 
Shortage of high-quality IT services and modern 
equipment 
Nnadi et al. (2014) and Grüger and Schneider, (2019) 
Weak ability to identify and monitor the threats Nnadi et al. (2014) and Holdsworth et al. (2021) 
Corrosion: lack of cathodic protection and 
anticorrosive coating 
Guo et al. (2016) Lu et al. (2015), Nnadi et al. (2014), 
Riegert (2011), Sulaiman and Tan (2014),  Wu et al. 
(2015) and Danylov et al. (2017) 
Design, construction, material and manufacturing 
defects 
Guo et al. (2016), Lu et al. (2015), Riegert (2011), 
Sulaiman and Tan (2014), Wu et al. (2015), Bai and 
Bai, (2017) and Koduru and Nessim, (2017) 
Operational errors such as human errors and 
equipment failure  
Balfe et al. (2014), Guo et al. (2015), Lu et al. (2015), 
Wu et al. (2015) and Hou et al. (2017) 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control system Srivastava and Gupta (2010), Veilleux and Dinar, 
(2019) and Style and Maglaras, (2020) 
The law not applying to saboteurs (lawlessness)  X. Peng et al. (2016) and Kraidi et al. (2019b) 
Stakeholders are not paying appropriate attention Nnadi et al. (2014) and Kraidi et al. (2019b) 
Few researchers are dealing with this problem Nnadi et al. (2014) and Kraidi et al. (2019b) 
Lack of historical records about accidents and lack 
of risk registration 
Balfe et al. (2014) and Kraidi et al. (2019b) 
Lack of appropriate training schemes Balfe et al. (2014) and Galli and Khizar, (2019) 
Corruption Nnadi et al. (2014) and Johnson, (2017) 
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From the table above, it can be seen that different types of risks affect the safety of OGPs in 
different countries across the world. For example, OGPs in European countries mainly suffer 
from mechanical failures and corrosion RFs (Tchórzewska-Cieślak et al. 2018) because their 
pipelines are underground and they are less subject to sabotage RFs. The USA focuses more 
on the terrorism risk, especially after 9/11, in addition to corrosion, because the USA uses 
underground pipelines (Rowland, 2010). African countries pay more attention to theft risks 
because there is a strong illegal market for selling the stolen products in these countries 
(Rowland, 2010). Therefore, it is difficult to compare the ranking of the RFs with other 
countries that have different types of RFs in their projects. Moreover, there is no available 
study analysing the RFs in OGP projects in developing and insecure countries such as Iraq 
(Kraidi et al. 2019b, 2019a, 2019c, 2018b).  
The finding of the above investigations will help in overcoming the problem of the shortage 
of data about the potential RFs that might affect the safety of OGP projects in Iraq. This is 
because the investigations of this research have identified the RFs associated with OGP 
projects worldwide. Therefore, the findings of this research will be suitable for and 
applicable to manage the RFs in OGP projects in many countries as the RFs were identified 
from OGP projects in different countries and environments. 
As the identified RFs in the table above are influencing the safety of OGP projects, the RFs 
in this research are named Influencing Risk Factors (IRFs). The identified IRFs in the OGP 
projects will be used to design a questionnaire survey, which is discussed in Chapter 4:, in 
order to analyse their degree of probability and consequences in the OGP projects. The next 
section describes how the RFs are classified based on their types and characters.  
2.4.5 The Classification of Influencing Risk Factors (IRFs)  
Several studies were found to be useful for classifying the IRFs in the oil and gas industry. 
For example, Mubin and Manna (2013) classified the IRFs that affected pipeline projects in 
Pakistan during the construction and operation stages into eight types, which are socio-
economic, technical, natural catastrophic, organisational, financial, environmental, safety 
and security IRFs. El-Abbasy et al. (2014, 2016a and 2016) classified the IRFs that affect 
pipeline conditions in Qatar and Canada into three main groups, namely physical factors 
(e.g. pipes, age, diameter, metal loss, and coating conditions); operational factors (e.g. 
corrosion, operating pressure, and flow rate); and external IRFs resulting from the 
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environment surrounding the OGP projects (e.g. traffic, weather conditions, TPD, and soil 
properties). Li et al. (2016) classified IRFs that influence global investment in shale gas into 
five types: economic, political, geological, technological, and internal RFs.  
However, these IRF classifications were broad and needed to be more specific. Moreover, 
they also missed out certain IRFs that may affect the safety of OGP projects, which will be 
covered in this study. In this study, the IRFs that affect the general safety of the OGPs in 
addition to the economic challenges are classified into five types depending on their 
characteristics: (1) Security and Societal (S&S); (2) Pipeline Location (PL); (3) Health, 
Safety and Environment (HSE); (4) Operational Risk (OR); and (5) Rules and Regulations 
(R&R). Table 2.4 shows the five classifications of the IRFs associated with the OGP 
projects. 
Table 2.4: The list of IRFs found in the OGP projects with relevant classification. 
IRFs  Type 
Terrorism, sabotage and security risk  
 
 
Security and Safety (S&S) 
 
Theft of the products. 
Public awareness 
Threats to staff 
Socio-political effects  




Rules and Regulations (R&R) 
 
The absence of the law on TPD 
Lack of risk management practice 
Lack of appropriatetraining 
Lack of risk registration   
Little research on this topic 
The geographical location 
 
Pipeline Location (PL) 
 
The pipeline is easy to access 
Land ownership conflicts 
Geological risks  
Vehicle accidents 
Animal accidents  
Improper safety regulations 
 
Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) 
Improper inspection and maintenance 
The risk related to the above ground pipeline  
Limited warning signs 
Inadequate risk management 
Natural disasters  
Corrosion  
 
Operations Risks (OR) 
 
 
The weak ability to manage the risk 
Shortage of modern equipment 
Design, construction and material defects 
Operational errors 
Hacker attacks on the system 
The next section provides the findings of the investigations about identifying and classifying 
the RMMs which could be used to manage the IRFs in OGP projects.  
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2.4.6 Identification and Classification of RMMs in OGP Projects  
In order to make some suggestions about managing the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq, the 
investigations of the literature review were extended to identify some of the RMMs which 
are used to manage the IRFs in OGP projects in different countries and geographical regions. 
The RMMs were classified according to project stages, depending on an estimate of when 
these RMMs could be applied during the project stages as follows: planning and design; 
construction; and operation and maintenance stages (see Table 2.5). 
Table 2.5: The identified RMMs in the OGP projects based on the literature review. 






Anti-corrosion such as isolation & cathodic 
protection 
 √ √ 
Move to an underground pipeline √   
Advanced technological & professional 
remote monitoring 
√ √ √ 
Proper inspection, tests & maintenance   √ 
Proper training √ √ √ 
Avoid insecure areas √   
Anti-terrorism design √   
Avoid registered risks & threats √ √ √ 
Protective barriers & perimeter fencing √ √ √ 
Government/public cooperation √ √ √ 
Warning signs & marker tape above the 
pipeline 
 √ √ 
The RMMs mentioned in the above table are some of the methods used to manage the IRFs 
in OGP projects. These methods were identified based on the literature review about them 
worldwide. The findings of the investigations about the RMMs in OGP projects will make 
the findings of this research suitable for and applicable to many countries as the RMMS were 
identified from OGP projects in different countries and environments. The identified RMMs 
in OGP projects will be used to design an industrial survey Chapter 4:) in order to test their 
degree of effectiveness in managing the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq. In addition, these 
methods will be discussed and used to make effective suggestions about risk management in 
OGP projects in Iraq, as discussed in Chapter 6: and Chapter 7:.  
The next section reviews the existing RMFs in OGP projects in order to understand them 
and highlight their strengths and limitations. 
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2.5 The Seminal Works in OGP Projects 
Section 2.4 explained the process of risk management in the projects in general and identified 
the term “Risk” in section 2.4.1 and “Risk Management” in section 2.4.2. It also explained 
the process of risk management in the projects, which includes the main four steps of (i) risk 
identification and registration, (ii) risk assessment and ranking, (iii) risk response and 
mitigation, and (iv) risk monitoring and control. With regards to the seminal work on risk 
management in OGP projects, section 2.4.4 identified the IRFs in OGP projects based on the 
literature review and section 2.4.5 classified them by their types. Then, section 2.4.6 has 
identified some of the applied RMMs in OGP projects based on the investigations of the 
literature review. In addition to the past studies is also about identifying and classifying the 
RFS and RMMs in OGP projects mentioned in section 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6 . This section is 
about analysing and criticising the past studies and the seminal works about risk management 
in OGP projects. It analyses the existing RMFs in the projects mentioned in the past studies 
as follows. Section 2.5.1 makes a review of the existing RMFs or systems in OGP projects 
in order to understand their theories and highlight their limitations and strengthens. Carrying 
on with the criticism of the existing RMFs, section 2.5.2 reviews some of the past studies 
about selecting safe pipeline routes of the new projects. Section 2.5.3 reviews some of the 
past studies about analysing the impact of the IRFs on the construction duration of the new 
pipeline projects.  
2.5.1 Review of Existing Risk Management Frameworks (RMFs) or Systems in OGP 
Projects  
There have been many studies conducted in the past about developing a risk management 
system with the aim of managing the IRFs in OGP projects in a specific country or 
geographical region. For instance, Mubin and Mubin (2008) developed a risk management 
system that identified and classified the IRFs in gas pipeline projects in Pakistan. This system 
identified the IRFs based on analysing a number of local projects and reviews from local 
clients and contractors. The authors used the Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) method to 
simulate the IRFs and provide recommendations for risk management in these projects. 
Schwarz et al. (2015) proposed a risk management procedure to support decision-making 
processes in construction projects. The authors started with defining the scope of the projects 
and the criteria of risk management, and they identified the IRFs in the projects using 
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checklists. They used experts’ judgements and the Artificial Neural Network (ANN) 
technique to analyse the IRFs and provide some recommendations to support the 
stakeholders regarding risk management. In these two studies, the IRFs were identified only 
from local review and during the construction stage of these projects. El-Abbasy et al. 
(2016a) assessed the performance of water distribution networks in Qatar and Canada using 
a fuzzy analytical network. El-Abbasy et al. (2015, 2016b) carried out similar work in order 
to assess the conditions of the OGP network in Canada and Qatar. These four studies used 
available databases to identify the IRFs in the projects. 
El-Abbasy et al. (2014) used a historical database and ANN to predict the conditions of 
offshore OGPs in Qatar and to prioritise the maintenance work in these projects. Li et al., 
(2019) analysed the IRFs in the subsea OGPs via analysing the precursor data and the fuzzy 
theory in order to reduce the uncertainty associated with assessing the IFRs and their 
consequences in the projects. The authors have reduced the uncertainty of analysing the 
impact of the IRFs on the projects and their scenarios and consequences in the project using 
the Bayesian analysis. Cheliyan and Bhattacharyya, (2018) and Arzaghi et al., (2018) used 
the fuzzy fault tree analysis of oil and gas leakage in subsea production systems. However, 
the authors of the last three mentioned studies did not make suggestions for risk management 
in the projects. Jiang and Dong, (2020) used the finite elements and machine learning scheme 
to analyse the impact of the falling objects on the offshore pipelines. In this study, the authors 
have analysed the correlation between some of the design variables and the safety of the 
offshore pipelines and they concluded increasing the depth of the pipelines will enhance the 
safety levels of the pipelines. This study has tried to find the design variables that provide 
the best performance of the pipelines. However, it did not make suggestions of risk 
management in term of the actions and recondensations that are required to manage the RFs 
in the projects. Hameed et al., (2020) and Schjølberg et al., (2016) made a risk-based 
inspection plan to prioritise the maintenance activities in a way that reduces the time and 
cost of pipelines repairs. These studies focused on stress-strain risk factors such as corrosion 
but it did not consider TPD IRFs such as security-related risks. Fuad et al., (2020) developed 
a risk matrix in order to assess the impact of the fishing trawl activities on the subsea oil and 
gas pipelines at Sabah and Labuan offshore. The recommendations of this study are 
applicable to reduce the risk in the offshore OGP projects which results from fishing 
activities. A study was done by Marcjan et al., (2017) in order to analyse the criteria of 
accidental damage by shipping anchors of subsea gas pipelines in the Gdańsk bay area. 
Kawsar et al., (2015) made an assessment of dropped object risk on the corroded subsea 
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pipeline. The measures and recommendations of these two studies were applicable to reduce 
the damage in the offshore pipelines, which results from dropped objects and ships' anchors.   
The studies that are mentioned in the above paragraphs would not be effective to manage the 
IRFs in OGP projects elsewhere because of the following gaps in knowledge. 
1- These studies are based on only a local review of identifying the IRFs in the projects, 
while the types and characters of the IRFs that affect the safety of the projects in 
other countries or geographical regions are different.  
2- These RMFs are limited to analysing the IRFs during the operation stage of OGP 
projects. Meanwhile, there is an enormous number of IRFs that affect the safety of 
the projects during the planning, design and construction stages too.  
3- The lack of data about the IRFs in the projects is making the existing RMFs not 
effectively applicable elsewhere, particularly in the developing countries. This is 
because unfortunately, there is no good database about the IRFs that affect the safety 
of OGP projects in the developing countries, where the documentation is not in the 
best conditions, and there are no appropriate records about the accidents in the 
projects.  
4- These frameworks have not tried to overcome the uncertainty that results from 
analysing the IRFs based only on the experts’ judgements. This means that the results 
of risk analysis of these frameworks have a low reliability level.  
5- As explained in Chapter 1: the focus of this research is to identify, analyse and 
manage the RFs in onshore OGPs projects because the OGPs in Iraq are either above 
or under the ground. In short, onshore OGPs refer to the pipelines that are built under 
the earth’s surface, which is the type of pipelines that are used to transport the 
petroleum products in Iraq, and it is the focus of this study. Whereas offshore 
pipelines are the pipelines that are built underneath the seabed, which are not used in 
Iraq. 
Therefore, it means that the existing RMFs do not have a holistic and comprehensive view 
about the IRFs in OGP projects. Hence, in order to develop a more integrated RMF, the 
developed framework must identify the IRFs in the projects based on a comprehensive and 
worldwide view about them. Additionally, the framework has to address the IRFs that affect 
the safety of OGP projects during the entire life of the pipeline projects (e.g. during the 
planning, design, construction and operation stages of the projects). In doing so, the 
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developed RMF will be more applicable and suitable for managing the IRFs in OGP projects 
in different countries and circumstances across the world.  
2.5.2 The Limitations of Using the Existing RMFs for Optimising Safest Pipeline 
Routes Based on the Impact of the Associated IRFs 
Selecting appropriate routes for the new OGP projects during the planning and design stage 
is essential for obtaining efficient, cost-effective and successful projects (Balogun et al. 
2012; Hutson, 2006; Saaty and Özdemir, 2014). The process of analysing the routes of OGPs 
to select the best ones for the new projects includes analysing many parameters such as the 
size and the material of the pipes, coating, wall thickness, topography and cathodic 
protection, and other similar factors Chakrabarti, (2005). In other studies such as Feldman 
et al. (1995), Montemurro et al. (1998) and Matori and Lee (2009), the authors have 
considered more parameters to select the best route for the new OGP project, such as 
environmental, physical, societal, political, regulatory, technical and economic issues.  
With regard to selecting optimal locations for oil and gas projects, Çetin Demirel et al. (2017) 
have used the fuzzy theory in order to choose a good location for a gas depository in Turkey. 
The criteria that were suggested to compare between the locations to build the gas depository 
were (i) cost (e.g. step up, manufacturing and operation costs); (ii) time (e.g. materials 
delivery time, and facilities lifetime); (iii) risks (e.g. earthquake, ecological effects, and 
security); (iv) social factors (e.g. local policy, political situations, and other social factors); 
and (v) environmental factors (e.g. nature areas, roads, water resources, etc...). The 
mentioned criteria were suggested based on communications between the authors and one 
of the staff members in the project, which is one of the limitations of this study. This is 
because even such communications could provide data for the study; this data will be limited 
to the personal thinking of both the staff member and the authors. In such a case, the data 
will not provide extensive knowledge about the IRFs that might affect the safety of the gas 
depository. Moreover, the criteria of the study were evaluated based on the review of five 
decision-makers, which is not enhancing the reliability level of the findings of that study, as 
the size of the participants’ sample of the study is small. Additionally, selecting a good 
location for a gas depository is easier than selecting the safest pipeline route from the safety 
aspect in OGPs, as these pipelines are stretching over thousands of kilometres, which makes 
them more vulnerable to safety hazards and supply reliability.  
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With regard to selecting optimal routes of pipeline in the OGP projects, Kang and Lee, 
(2017) have designed an automated obstacles avoidance method to select a route with lower 
cost for subsea offshore pipelines. Balogun et al. (2017) have used the fuzzy theory and the 
Geographical Information System (GIS) to choose optimum routes of subsea oil pipelines. 
They have assessed the pipeline routes based on the environmental impact, cost-
effectiveness, and engineering constructability. The subsea oil pipelines are underwater, 
which means they are subject to different types of IRFs compared to the above ground 
pipelines.  
Mundia and Macharia (2018) developed a GIS model in order to select optimal routes for 
the oil pipeline projects in Isiolo Nakuru. This study has considered several criteria such as 
the length of the pipeline; the topography, geology and soil types and pollution in the routes; 
the environmental impact of the pipelines (e.g. crossing forests, rivers, wetlands, and 
groundwater); and the clash with other projects (e.g. parks, rail-line and roads) to identify 
optimal routes for these projects. The criteria were weighted via engaging with a number of 
experts in the field using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) technique. The fuzzy theory 
was used to reduce the uncertainty associated with using the experts’ judgements to weight 
the criteria of the study. Abudu and Williams (2015) used a GIS-based methodology to select 
optimal routes for OGP projects in Uganda. The routes were evaluated after considering the 
environmental, economic and security concerns associated with the projects. One of the 
recommendations of this study is to make further studies about the socio-political, socio-
economic and religious related IRFs because the data about such kinds of risk are often 
unavailable, unreliable or recommended to be considered in the future work of the past 
studies.  
Risk avoidance is one of the vital things that have to be considered during the process of 
route selection of OGPs. In troubled regions, OGPs are frequently suffering from a massive 
number of sabotage and terrorist attacks. Therefore, selecting the safest routes for the new 
pipelines in these regions is vital. However, the past studies (as explained in the paragraphs 
above) have mainly focused on considering the technical factors (e.g. cost and environmental 
aspects) while selecting the routes for the new OGP projects. Which means in most cases, 
the past studies were selecting the pipeline routes that have less cost and environmental 
impact for the new pipeline projects. In other words, the majority of the past studies have 
not analysed or considered the impact of the external IRFs such as TPD on the routes of the 
pipelines projects. Also, due to the limitations of these studied that result from being based 
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on local reviews and using local scales about assessing the IRFS in the pipelines routes, the 
existing models about analysing the routes of OGPs will not be effectively applicable 
elsewhere. The selection of the pipes’ routes, therefore, requires more human investigations 
by skilled engineers with good experience in this field, which is time-consuming (Kang and 
Lee, 2017). Due to the mentioned limitations of the existing RMFs in OGP projects and the 
lack of data about the IRFs in OGP projects in the developing and insecure countries, a 
questionnaire survey with a good number of responses and appropriate data sampling is 
required to provide trusted data for analysing the pipeline routes see Chapter 4:, Chapter 6: 
and Chapter 7:. 
The next section shows the limitations of using the existing RMFs to analyse the impact of 
the IRFs on the duration of OGP projects. 
2.5.3 The Limitations of Using the Existing RMFs to Quantify the Impact of the IRFs 
on OGP Projects  
Project management involves making schedules for the project activities in order to monitor 
the project’s time progress (Shah and Dawood, 2007). Delay is one of the most common 
problems in the majority of construction projects in both developed and developing countries 
(Ahmed et al. 2003; Shebob et al. 2012; Enshassi et al. 2009). Delay may happen in every 
project during the construction stage, but it varies between the different projects and the 
different countries (Alaghbari et al. 2007; A. Shebob et al. 2012). Understanding the delay 
factors and their level of impact on a project may help to avoid or minimise the project delay 
(A. Shebob et al. 2012; Abdulhamid Shebob et al. 2012). Providing good knowledge about 
the IRFs and using analytical or simulation techniques are the most effective methods of risk 
assessment (Ruwanpura et al. 2004). Morano et al. (2006) explained that several techniques 
could be used to analyse the risks in construction projects. For instance, checklists, 
interviews with the stakeholders, brainstorming, surveys and the Delphi technique, as 
discussed below.  
Morano et al. (2006) identified the main delay factors in construction projects in Jordan via 
examining the records of 130 public projects in the country. Choong Kog (2018) identified 
and ranked the delay factors in construction projects in Portugal, the UK, and the US via 
examining 13 studies about the problem of construction delay in these countries. These two 
studies were limited to analysing the delay factors in construction projects in the mentioned 
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countries only. Kim et al. (2005) analysed the delay in construction projects via dividing the 
projects into sections and calculating the delay in each section. Eizakshiri et al. (2015) 
analysed the delay factors in construction projects internationally. These studies did not 
make any assessment about the delay factors or quantify their impact on the projects. For 
example, they did not use any kind of survey, computer modelling or simulation methods to 
analyse the delay factors and quantify their impact on project duration.  
Shah (2016) identified the comparative delay factors in construction projects in countries 
such as Australia, Ghana and Malaysia via a questionnaire survey and recommended the 
potential measures to reduce their impact on the projects. This study has analysed the 
possible minimum, the mean and the maximum duration of construction projects and the 
sensitivity of the work activities in these projects in the mentioned countries. Prasad et al. 
(2019) used a questionnaire survey to identify and analyse the delay factors in transportation, 
power and water projects in India. Another questionnaire survey was carried out by Chiu 
and Lai (2017) to analyse the frequency and the severity levels of the delay factors in the 
construction of electrical projects in Hong Kong. Mpofu et al. (2017) analysed the delay 
factors in construction projects in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) via exploring the 
perceptions of the clients, the contractors and the consultants about the delay problem in 
their projects. Alaghbari et al. (2007) distributed a questionnaire survey to analyse the delay 
factors in construction projects in Malaysia. Kadry et al. (2017) analysed the delay factors 
in construction projects in 16 countries with a high geopolitical risk. The delay factors 
considered in this study were analysed using qualitative document analysis and quantitative 
risk analysis via engaging with a number of experts in these countries. (A. Shebob et al. 
2012) analysed the possible minimum, the mean and the maximum duration of a construction 
project in Libya and the UK using Monte Carlo Simulation. However, the risk assessment 
methods used in these studies are limited to their regions of study, which means they cannot 
be effectively applied to analyse the impact of the delay factors in oil and gas projects and 
improve the level of safety of these projects elsewhere.  
Fallahnejad (2013) used document analysis and a questionnaire survey to identify the main 
delay factors and analyse their impact on pipeline projects in Iran. Similarly, Sweis et al. 
(2019) used a questionnaire survey to identify the root causes of the delay factors in gas 
pipeline projects in Iran. Ruqaishi and Bashir (2015) investigated the delay factors in the 
construction of oil and gas projects in Oman as a case study for the countries of GCC (Gulf 
Cooperation Council): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Rui et 
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al. (2018) carried out a comprehensive study to identify the IRFs that affect the schedule of 
oil and gas projects in Nigeria. However, the risk assessment methods used in these studies 
are limited to their regions of study, which means they cannot be effectively applied to 
analyse the impact of the delay factors in oil and gas projects and improve the level of safety 
of these projects elsewhere. 
Analysing the impact of the IRFs on the duration of the projects at the planning and design 
stage could help the stakeholders to make sound decisions in response to risk management 
to keep the delay interruption in the projects to a minimum, as much as possible. However, 
there is a lack of studies analysing and quantifying the impact of the IRFs on the duration of 
OGP projects in developing countries such as Iraq. In addition, oil and gas projects have a 
unique characterisation compared to the other types of projects; this is because of their 
massive interface, large investments and complex engineering endeavours (Ruqaishi and 
Bashir, 2015; Sweis et al. 2019). Hence, there is a need to develop a research methodology 
that overcomes the highlighted limitations of the previous studies with regard to analysing 
and quantifying the impact of the IRFs on the duration of OGP projects, which is the main 
aim of this research study.  
In summary, the methods of delay assessment methods as discussed above (e.g. using the 
records, checklists, interviews, and surveys) are inadequate to make an accurate estimation 
of the delay impact caused by the IRFs in OGP project elsewhere. In other words, these 
methods can not be used to analyse the delay in a developing and insecure country similar 
to Iraq because of a number of the following gaps in knowledge. For example, the records 
about delay and risk factors are either not available or not accessible in OGP projects in Iraq 
and the security level in iraq is low, which makes the projects subject to different types of 
RFs particularly, the risks related to third-party disruption. 
2.6 Summary and Research Gap 
This chapter presented an overview explanation of the OGP projects. It also described the 
importance of the oil and gas industry and the importance of the OGP projects to the global 
market and local economy in Iraq.  
After an in-depth review of the literature about the risk management processes and systems 
in OGP projects, this research explains the research gap by summarising the limitations of 
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the prior studies regards identifying, analysing, assessing and ranking the IRFs in the 
projects, as follows.  
• Most of the studies about risk management in OGP projects are mainly at the local 
scale, and only a few studies have analysed the pipeline projects in more than one 
region. In other words, the risk management methods in these projects are focusing 
on different types of IRFs in different regions and situations. This means that the 
existing risk management methods are not effectively applicable in OGP projects 
elsewhere. 
• The existing risk management methods are not active in managing the IRFs in OGP 
projects when the data and records about them are scarce, which is the case in 
developing countries such as Iraq. This is because the documentary and recording 
procedures in these countries are poor. Such data conditions lead to random, vague, 
uncertain, inaccurate and low reliability assessment results of the IRFs in OGP 
projects.  
• There is a lack of studies about evaluating the risk mitigation methods which could 
be used to manage the IRFs in OGP projects with regard to their degree of 
effectiveness in managing the IRFs in these projects, which leads to inadequate 
responses for these risk factors.  
A risk table that identifies the IRFs and RMMs in a project is the first and most fundamental 
step for any risk evaluation and assessment procedure. This chapter, therefore, provides a 
comprehensive view about identifying the IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects worldwide. The 
findings of this chapter provide a list of the potential IRFs and RMMs associated with OGP 
projects worldwide, in addition to the pros and cons of the existing methodologies of risk 
management systems used in these projects. These findings will be used to design an 
integrated RMF, which is the main aim of this research. Moving forward with the study, the 
findings of this chapter will be used in the next chapter of this research as follows.  
• The identified IRFs (Table 2.3 and Table 2.4) and RMMs (Table 2.5) in the OGP 
projects will be used to design an industrial questionnaire survey in Chapter 4: in 
order to analyse their effect on OGP projects in Iraq. 
• This chapter has highlighted the limitations of using the existing RMFs to manage 
the IRFs, select safe routes/alignments and analyse the impact of the IRFs on the 
construction duration in OGP projects in Iraq, see section 2.5. The findings of this 
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section, along with the findings of the questionnaire survey in Chapter 4: and the 
findings of the computer model in Chapter 5:, will be used later on in this study to 
develop the RMF as shown in Chapter 6:.  
The RMF will be used in this research to analyse the time impact of the IRFs on the 
duration and the routes/alignments of the new OGP projects in Iraq. Additionally, 
the RMF will be used to provide useful recommendations about risk management for 
OGP projects in the country.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the research philosophy, research approach/theory and research design 
followed by this study. This research aims to develop an effective Risk Management 
Framework (RMF), which will be designed based on the results of investigating the impact 
of the Influencing Risk Factors (IRFs) associated with Oil and Gas Pipeline (OGP) projects 
in order to ensure safer design and construction for these projects.  
This chapter is organised under different sections as follows. Section 3.2 explains a general 
view of the research philosophy, approaches, theories and design which are normally used 
in research studies in the construction industry. Section 3.3 explains the data sampling 
methods used to collect research data in research studies and section 3.4 explains the design 
of the questionnaire survey used to collect the research data of this study. Section 3.5 
explains the sources and the types of the collected research data in this study. Section 3.6 
explains the data analysis methods used to analyse the data collected from the survey and 
the process of evaluating the results of the survey. The research strategy explains the 
procedure, the sequence, the steps and the techniques used to accomplish the aim of a piece 
of research (Babbie, 2016). In order to achieve the aim of this research, section 3.7, therefore, 
will use the findings of the previous section in order to explain how the survey data were 
used for designing the structure of this research study and it explains the contents of the 
following chapters as well. Section 3.8 presents the chapter summary and the link between 
the study chapters.  
3.2 Research Method and Methodology  
3.2.1 Research Philosophies 
Paradigms are constituted by sets of interconnected philosophical assumptions regarding 
the reality, knowledge, methodology, and values. The assumptive sets of different paradigms 
are different in important ways, but paradigms themselves are historical and social 
constructions and so are not inviolate or sacrosanct. Paradigmatic assumptions importantly 
guide and direct practical inquiry decisions, along with context and theory. Important 
paradigm differences should be respectfully and intentionally used together to engage 
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meaningfully with a difference and, through the tensions created by juxtaposing different 
paradigms, to achieve the dialectical discovery of enhanced, reframed, or new 
understandings” (Greene, 2007, p. 69 cited in Schoonenboom, 2019, p. 285). In addition to 
the exploitation in section 1.6, the pragmatic research philosophy was used to make research 
assumptions of this study; for example, (I) Third-Party Disruption (TPD) is the most 
influencing risk on the pipeline projects in Iraq. (II) It is more challenging to manage the 
risks in the projects in the situation of a low level of security and poor documentation about 
the risks. (III) The existing RMFs would not be effective in managing the risks in the pipeline 
projects in a country such as Iraq, in which the pipelines are suffering from the frequent 
attacks of sabotage. (IV) Developing an integrated and holistic RMF could be used to 
enhance the culture of risk management in the projects. For the purpose of risk identification, 
risk assessment and the design of the RMF, its research, therefore, tried different research 
philosophies such as the pragmatism research philosophy as discussed below. 
The pragmatist paradigm is adopted when mixed methods and approaches are required to 
design research studies (Brierley, 2017). The pragmatism philosophy can provide support 
for mixed methods approaches to design the methodology of a research study (Tashakkori 
and Teddlie, 2010). In other words, when mixed methods of data collection and analysis are 
required to design research studies, then a pragmatist paradigm philosophy will be used to 
achieve their aims. Different methods were needed in this research to identify and assess the 
risk factors and risk mitigation methods in oil and gas pipeline projects as follows. The 
literature review was used to identify and classify the risk factors and risk mitigation 
methods in the projects, and inductive and deductive research approaches and qualitative 
and quantitative research methods were used to assess the risk factors and design the RMF. 
In summary, according to the justification presented above, the pragmatist paradigm 
philosophy is adopted in this study to design the RMF in this research. The strategy of the 
literature review use in this research is explained in section 3.2.2. The applications and 
findings of the inductive and deductive research approaches were explained in section 3.2.3. 
The applications and findings of the qualitative and quantitative research methods were 
explained in section 3.2.4. Section 3.2.5 explains different mehods used in research studies. 
The findings of this section will be used to design the methodology of this research, see 
section 3.7.   
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3.2.2 Literature Review Strategy 
The literature review was conducted according to the standard stages of review, as follows: 
(i) setting the review question; (ii) making exhaustive searches for studies from different 
environments and geographical regions; (iii) applying inclusion and exclusion criteria (the 
RFs that threaten the safety of the pipelines); extracting data; and (iv) synthesizing findings, 
as explained in the following sentences. This study tries to analyse and evaluate the existing 
approaches of risk management in OGP projects based on pieces of evidence extracted from 
peer-reviewed published papers about the risk management of these projects. The review 
questions were (i) what are the RFs that threaten the safety of OGPs in different 
environments and geographical regions? (ii) what are the limitations of the existing RMFs 
regards identifying, assessing, ranking and managing the RFS in OGP projects. The way 
forward is the development of a systematic literature review started by analysing the 
secondary data about identifying the RFs based on the analyses of the 22 publications 
mentioned in Table 2.3. In the second stage of the systematic literature review, this study 
has analysed the publications about RMFs in OGP projects to understand the theories and 
highlight the limitations and strengths of the existing RMFs in OGP projects. Similarly, the 
third, fourth and fifth stages of the literature review were about analysing the theories and 
highlighting the limitations and strengths of the past publications with regards to identifying 
safe routes for the new OGP projects, making suggestions of RMMs and analysing the delay 
in the projects caused by the associated RFs, respectively. In summary, the literature review 
has addressed the questions beyond the impact of the RFs and the effectiveness of the RMFs 
in OGP projects. Also, it has highlighted the theories, the limitations and the strengths of the 
existing RMFs, which were used to develop an integrated RMF that was used in this study 
to understand, identify, assess, rank and manage the RFs in OGP projects.  
The next section explains the different approaches to data collection that are mainly used by 
research studies.   
3.2.3 Research Approaches (Inductive and Deductive Approaches) 
The section provides a definition of the inductive and deductive research approaches. 
1- The inductive approach is defined as "a study in which the research theory is 
developed from the observation of empirical reality" (Alali, 2010) p. 169. The 
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inductive research approach is used to compare data and create themes for a research 
study (Almadhlouh, 2019). Feibleman (1954) first stated that an inductive research 
study serves three main objectives, which are discovering the research hypotheses, 
finding supportive evidence and predicting the future. He also explained other 
features of inductive study, such as it starts with subjective data analysis, it requires 
less data compared to the deductive approach, it is not self-corrective, it seeks 
timeless generality and it discovers new ideas as a hypothesis (Feibleman, 1954; 
Alali, 2010).  
A qualitative research approach is an inductive approach to data analysis (Creswell, 
2009). Qualitative research uses inductive data analysis, whereby researchers build 
from the bottom up (Creswell and Creswell, 2017). In other words, an inductive 
research study builds the hypothesis, then deduces the approach used to test the 
answers to the research questions and deduces the results from data analysis (Alali, 
2010).  
2- The deductive approach is used to move the research from the general concept to 
the practical test of the problem (Collis and Hussey, 2013). This means that the 
research is moving to test a specific problem, which was identified based on general 
observations made on the reach topic based on the literature review (Alali, 2010). 
The deductive research approach discovers pieces of evidence that support each 
theme and determines whether or not they require more information (Taylor et al. 
2015). The deductive research study, therefore, uses empirical observation to test the 
conceptual and theoretical research structure developed in research studies (Collis 
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Results
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Examine and analyse the available documents (e.g. research articles, databases, technical 
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approaches in OGP projects
Statistical analyses of the survey and the computer-based risk analyses model
The probability and severity levels of the IRFs 
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Computer-based risk assessment and ranking model  
Develop a Risk Management Framework (RMF)
Suggest some of the effective RMMs to manage the IRFs 
in OGP projects in Iraq
























Figure 3.1: The inductive and deductive parts of this research. 
As shown in the figure above, the inductive part of this research was the investigation of the 
literature review about IRFs and risk management in OGP projects, where the research 
problem has been highlighted. Additionally, this research started with an inductive approach 
to data analysis of the literature in order to understand the limitations in the existing Risk 
Management Frameworks (RMFs) in OGP projects, which is where the hypothesis of this 
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research has emerged from. The hypothesis of this research was based on “overcoming the 
limitations in the existing RMFs and providing a good culture about risk management will 
help in improving the level of safety in OGP projects”. Meanwhile, the deductive part is to 
analyse the impact of the IRFs on OGP projects using an industrial survey, statistical 
analysis, fuzzy theory and Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS). For that, a mix between inductive 
and deductive research approaches was used.  
The findings of this section will be used to design the research methodology, see section 3.7. 
Both qualitative and quantitative methods are used for research data collection and analysis 
in this research study. The definition and difference between the qualitative and quantitative 
methods are explained in the next section.  
3.2.4 Qualitative and Quantitative Methods 
This section provides a definition of the qualitative and quantitative methods used in research 
studies as explained below. 
1- The qualitative method: the descriptive qualitative method examines the available 
documents and studies to understand the situation and define the problem of a 
particular phenomenon (Davey, 1991; Leedy and Ormrod, 2005; Burns and Grove, 
2010). Additionally, this approach uses observations to analyse and collect 
information from expert individuals (Amaratunga et al. 2002; Dzudie, 2013; Fischer, 
2005). A qualitative method approach uses subjective judgement, attitudes, opinions 
and behaviour analysis to understand and analyse research data (Shah, 2011). This 
approach uses an exploratory and descriptive rather than a quantitative, interpretive 
approach to understand an issue without judgement (Dowling, 2007). This approach 
is an appropriate approach for understanding the features of an observed 
phenomenon (Dzudie, 2013). A qualitative research method, therefore, is preferred 
when the available literature regarding the topic of research is limited (Creswell and 
Poth, 2016). The qualitative research approach involves using several techniques, for 
example, phenomenological, grounded theory ethnography, narrative, and case study 
are the main techniques used in the qualitative research approach (McCaslin and 
Scott, 2003). The definition of each technique is explained below. 
• Phenomenological technique. Phenomenology is described as the study of 
the shared meaning of experience of a phenomenon for several individuals.  
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“The understanding of meaningful concrete relations implicit in the original 
description of experience in the context of a particular situation is the primary 
target of phenomenological knowledge”.  
• Grounded theory. In grounded theory, the researcher generates an abstract 
analytical schema of a phenomenon, a theory that explains some action, 
interaction, or process.  This analysis occurs primarily through collecting 
interview data, making multiple visits to the field (theoretical sampling), 
attempting to develop and interrelate categories of information via constant 
comparison, and writing a substantive or context-specific theory. 
• Ethnography. Ethnography is described as a study of an intact culture or 
social group (or an individual or individuals within a group) based primarily 
on observations and a prolonged period of time spent by the researcher in the 
field. The ethnographer listens and records the voices of the informants with 
the intent of generating a cultural portrait. 
• Narrative Approach. Narrative research or inquiry is rooted in several social 
and humanities disciplines such as anthropology, and sociology. Narrative 
researchers are seeking "experiences as expressed in lived and told stories of 
individuals. 
• Case studies. Case studies in qualitative research are investigations of 
“bounded systems” with the focus being either the case or an issue illustrated 
by the case(s). A qualitative case study provides an in-depth study of this 
“system,” based on a diverse array of data collection materials. The 
researcher situates this system within its larger “context” or setting.  
In this research, the IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects were identified based on 
analysing researches, studies, reports and databases about risk management in OGP 
projects. Therefore, the phenomenological, grounded theory, ethnography and 
narrative techniques of qualitative research have not been used in this research. In 
other words, due to the limitations of data about the IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects 
in the developing countries, the IRFs and RMMs were identified via analysing prior 
studies and reports about assessing and managing the IRFs in OGP projects in 
different parts of th worlds rather than making interviews, which also enhances the 
outcomes of this research by making them applicable in more counties. Which means 
this research has used a case studies technique of qualitative research because the 
outcomes of the literature review (i.e. the IRFs, the RMMs and the limitations of the 
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existing RMFs) have been identified after reviewing and analysing the prior studies 
of risk management in OGP projects. 
2- The quantitative method: the quantitative approach uses statistical analysis of the 
collected data (e.g. questionnaires) to understand and measure the studied 
phenomenon (Blaikie and Priest, 2019). The quantitative approach involves using a 
questionnaire survey and simulation (Shah, 2011) to assess and rank the risk factors 
in the projects.  
However, in many studies, the qualitative and quantitative methods could be combined to 
provide the required data for the researches (Miller and Brewer, 2003). After defining the 
qualitative, quantitative and mixed research methods, this research has used a mixed research 
approach to achieve the aim of the study, as shown in Figure 3.2.   
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The quantitative part of the research
The qualitative part of the research
Literature review 
Examine and analyse the available documents (e.g. research articles, 
databases, technical reports, etc.) about risk management, risk factors and 
risk mitigation methods in OGP projects 
The limitations of the existing risk 
management approaches in OGP projects
The Influencing Risk Factors (IRFs) 
associated with OGP projects
The Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs) applied  
in OGP projects
Design an industrial questionnaire survey in order to analyse and evaluate the 
IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects in Iraq based on the perception of the 
stakeholders of these projects  
Statistical analyses of the Survey
The probability and severity levels of the IRFs 
The usability and effectiveness degrees of the 
RMMs
Computer-based risk assessment and ranking model  
Select safe routes for the new OGP projects
Quantify the impact of the IRFs on the duration of the new projects
(Results)
Suggest some of the effective RMMs to manage the 














Figure 3.2: The qualitative and quantitative methods of this research.  
The qualitative and quantitative methods of this research, as presented in Figure 3.2 above, 
are detailed below.    
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1- The purpose of the qualitative part of this research is to identify the IRFs, the Risk 
Mitigation Methods (RMMs) and the limitations in the existing systems of risk 
management in OGP projects based on qualitative document analyses of the literature 
review. This means that no measurements have been made in this part of the study 
related to assessing, ranking and quantifying the impact of the IRFs in the projects. 
The advantages of using a qualitative method in this research are: (i) overcoming the 
problem of data scarcity about risk management, and (ii) identifying the IRFs and 
RMMs in OGP projects in Iraq. In other words, the findings of the qualitative 
approach of this research have helped in providing the essential data for this research, 
which were used to design a questionnaire survey, as explained in Chapter 4:. 
However, these data could not be used to analyse the impact of the IRFs and the 
effectiveness of the RMMs in OGP projects.   
2- The purpose of the quantitative part of this research is to analyse the impact of the 
IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects in Iraq. Furthermore, subjective and objective 
document analysis and fuzzy theory (in Chapter 5:), MCS, LHS (in Chapter 8: and 
Chapter 9:) were used in this research to analyse and rank the IRFs in the OGP 
projects and optimise the IRFs in OGP projects using a real case study project. 
In summary, the findings of the qualitative approach of this research are the IRFs and the 
RMMs in OGP projects and the theory, the limitations and the strengths of the existing 
RMFs, which were identified based on the investigations of the literature review. These 
findings were used to design a questionnaire survey to analyse the IRFs and RMMs in OGP 
projects in Iraq and design an RMF, which are some of the outcomes of this research. On 
the other side, the findings of the quantitative approach of this research are the probability, 
severity and impact levels of the IRFs, and the effectiveness and usability degrees of the 
RMMs in the projects; the safest pipeline routes for the new projects (based on the results of 
risk optimisation); the effective RMMs in the projects; and the delay impact in the projects 
caused by the associated IRFs (based on the results of MCS and LHS). All of the qualitative, 
quantitative and mixed methods were meant to continuously improve the safety level of 
OGPs during the lifecycle of these projects. The next section provides an overview of the 
research methods mainly used in research studies.  
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3.2.5 Research Methods  
Chu (2015) qualitatively analysed 1,162 research articles, published from 2001 to 2010 in 
three major journals of library and information, to address some recurring themes about 
research methods selected and applied in studies in the scholarly domain. In this study, the 
author identified the main research methods used in these studies, which are questionnaire 
survey, analysing the historical method previously held, content analysis, experiment, and 
theoretical approaches. The definitions of these research methods are as follows.  
1- A survey can be defined as a method of collecting data or information through 
collecting the perception of the targeted population about a certain phenomenon 
(Content Creation Agency, 2016). Questionnaire surveys offer a systematic way of 
collecting information from individuals and groups via answering a set of questions 
prepared by the author(s) to collect the research data. These questions might be multi-
choice questions, open-ended questions or a mixture of these two types (NFER, 
2020).  
The questionnaire is commonly used to ask participants questions prepared by the 
researcher(s) (i.e. the surveyor(s)) to collect baseline data to be used for analysing a 
certain phenomenon later on (Gosling and Edwards, 1995, cited in P.E.T.C.P. 2020).  
2- Historical data include statistically analysing the available historical data about a 
certain phenomenon, which is commonly used in economics studies (McDonald, 
2006).  
3- Content analysis has been conducted by researchers in past research studies to 
analyse the available documents (e.g. annual reports and historical data) to collect 
the research data. Content analysis is a highly flexible research method that has been 
widely used in science research studies, which have varying research goals and 
objectives. This method uses qualitative, quantitative and sometimes mixed modes 
of research approaches to analyse the research data to obtain the findings from the 
research findings (White and Marsh, 2006). Content analysis is a research method 
for analysing the written verbal or visual data using a relevant strategy for conducting 
the research data (Cole, 1988).  
4- Experiment research is defined as a research method for testing different assumptions 
(hypotheses) by trial and error under conditions constructed and controlled by the 
researcher(s). During the experiment, one or more conditions (called independent 
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variables) are allowed to change in an organised manner and the effects of these 
changes on associated conditions (called dependent variables) are measured, 
recorded validated, and analysed for arriving at a conclusion (Winston, 2018).   
5- Chu (2015) has also added two recurring themes regarding research methods, which 
have also been used in past research studies, which are: (i) the use of multiple 
methods in one study, and (ii) education, training and advocacy, which are used by 
researchers in research studies to gain a better understanding of research methods 
and make more informed decisions on research method selection and implementation 
in their scholarly endeavours. 
Based on the explanation above, a questionnaire survey was used as the research method to 
analyse the IRFs and RMMs in Iraq. This is because the available data about them in OGP 
projects in Iraq is limited (Kraidi et al. 2020). Moreover, more methods such as statistical 
analysis of the data collected from the survey and computer modelling (e.g. fuzzy theory and 
MCS) were used to calculate the degree of impact of the IRFs on the projects.  
The next section explains the different methods of sampling the research data.  
3.3 Data Sampling  
A sampling method is a procedure that is followed for selecting participants from the 
targeted populations to represent them in a research study (Almadhlouh, 2019). In other 
words, since it is impossible to study entire populations, research studies need to take 
samples of these populations, which will work as subsets of the targeted larger populations 
to represent them in the study (Acharya et al. 2013). In doing so, the research studies can 
provide and/or use a representative sample to study and analyse a certain phenomenon in a 
large population with less manpower, less time and less cost.  
There is a need in any survey to select the right sample from the targeted population. This is 
because, in general, questionnaire surveys create many non-respondents. Therefore, getting 
the right people to participate in the survey is extremely important. Dzudie (2013) explains 
the main sampling methods in research studies include convenience, purposive, cluster, 
volunteers, random, surveys (e.g. questionnaire, Delphi, focus group and interviews), and 
snowball. Bloomberg and Volpe (2008) clarified that sampling methods are either 
“purposeful” or “random” methods. According to Bloomberg and Volpe (2018) “The logic 
of purposeful sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases with the objective of 
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understanding the studied phenomenon”. Cited by (Dzudie 2013, p. 75). The purposeful 
sampling method is useful when the size of the sample is small, such as 20 persons, as done 
in Dzudie (2013). Meanwhile, a random sample is typically used to enable data gathering 
from a big group of responses. 
Acharya et al. (2013) used a more general way to classify the data sampling methods in 
research studies. The authors explained that the data sampling methods are either probability 
or non-probability sampling methods, which are defined as follows.  
1. Probability sampling methods, which allow the researcher to generalise the findings of 
the samples to the targeted populations, such as simple random, systematic random, 
stratified random, cluster, multiphase and multistage sampling methods. The definitions 
of these sampling methods are provided below. 
1.1. Simple random sampling, which uses tables, lottery, currency notes, or computer 
programs, etc., to select a random number of elements/individuals to represent the 
targeted population. In this sampling method, all of the elements/individuals have 
the same chance of being selected. This method ensures the minimum number of the 
sample that represents the population. However, it requires a framework and it might 
tend to have a large sampling error, which are some of the limitations of this method 
(Daniel, 2012). 
1.2. Systematic random sampling, which is similar to the simple random sampling. 
However, the size of the sample (the number of the selected elements/individuals) 
will be decided from the beginning. This sampling method has a moderate usage, 
moderate cost, high internal and external validity, and it is easy to verify. However, 
in this sampling method, the first element/individual is always selected, which 
means that the elements/individuals do not have the same chance of being selected 
(Acharya et al. 2013). 
1.3. Stratified random sampling is a stereological data sampling method that provides 
a framework to quickly build an accurate estimation of the distribution of the 
elements/individuals within the targeted population with a minimum number of 
observations required. This method allows accurate, unbiased and appropriate sizes 
of samples within the population. However, it is used mainly in laboratory-based 
research studies. Additionally, it is laborious, which means it requires the user to 
make hundreds of samples to get the  appropriate sample to use in the research. And 
it has a high chance of errors being easily made during the sampling work, and it is 
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difficult to pause and recommence work (Gundersen et al. 1988; Wright et al. 2015). 
This method is widely used in scientific research studies such as examining the 
effect of a nuclear station on the surrounding area, DNA analysis, web-based design 
and virtual analysis tools.  
1.4. Cluster sampling: this method can be used to conduct rapid assessment and 
sampling from the targeted populations that are wanted/needed to be studied. This 
method is useful when rapid assessment/sampling is needed to only estimate the 
proportion of the population with specific needs (Malilay et al. 1996).  
1.5. Multiphase sampling: in this sampling method the population is divided into 
groups. The groups are randomly selected and then the members are randomly 
selected within these groups (an equal number is selected from each group). This 
sampling method is mostly carried out to increase precision, reduce costs and reduce 
non-response. However, it is a complex sampling method and needs different stages 
to select the samples that represent the targeted population (Acharya et al. 2013). 
1.6. Multistage sampling: this method involves three main stages, as follows. The first 
stage of sampling is called ‘primary sampling data”, the second stage is called 
“secondary sampling data”, and the third stage is known as “tertiary sampling data”. 
These stages will be followed by the “final” or “ultimate” sampling stages until one 
sample that represents the targeted population is reached (Acharya et al. 2013). 
However, it is time consuming and needs different stages to select the sample that 
represents the targeted population. 
2. Non-probability sampling methods, such as convenience/purposive, quota, and 
snowball sampling. These sampling methods are defined below. 
2.1. Convenience/purposive sampling: this sampling method depends on selecting the 
elements/individuals when they are in the right place at the right time, such as 
patients coming out of hospital and meeting the surveyors. This is a widely used 
method in research studies. However, the variability and the bias of this sampling 
method cannot be measured or controlled. And, the results from the collected data 
cannot be generalised to represent the targeted population. 
2.2. Quota sampling: the sampling procedure ensures that a certain characteristic of a 




2.3. Snowball sampling: the survey is initially distributed to a number of previously 
identified participants who are also asked to forward it to others until the required 
number of responses is reached (Dragan and Isaic-Maniu, 2013).  
In this research, the sampling method that will be used should recruit as many participants 
from the planners, designers, members of construction teams, operators and clients working 
on the projects as possible. This is because the analysis and evaluation of the IRFs and 
RMMs must be based on a wide range of experience and number of perceptions of the 
stakeholders in these projects. Ensuring a wide range of experience and participation from 
the stakeholders in the survey enhances the results of the survey and provides trusted and 
valid information about the IRFs and RMMs, which enhances the findings of the RMFs and 
the findings of this research. Therefore, in order to enhance the research outcomes and recruit 
a large number of participants in this research, the data were collected using an industrial 
survey and snowball sampling method, see Chapter 4:. The survey, therefore, was distributed 
using an online webpage in order to collect the perceptions of the OGPs’ stakeholders with 
regard to the issues in their projects, as explained below.  
3.4 Questionnaire Survey  
The literature shows different types of surveys with regard to the distribution methods. For 
example, face-to-face survey (by giving the participants the paper forms of the survey in 
person), phone survey (by asking the participants about the survey questions via phone calls), 
postal survey (by sending the survey forms to the participants via the post), email survey (by 
sending the survey forms to the participants via email) and online surveys (by distributing 
the survey forms using online link/webpage). The differences between using these methods 
to distribute and collect the research are as follows.   
• In the face-to-face survey, the researchers are going physically (in person) to 
distribute the survey and collect data from the participants. Such a survey is costly, 
time-consuming, and it might be applicable if the size of the targeted population is 
small and they are limited to one or two geographical locations, which are nearby 
and accessible/reachable by the surveyors.  
• Asking the participants via phone calls is difficult for both sides, the researchers and 
the participants. This is because it is difficult to set up appointments with so many 
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participants depending on their availability, and it is even more complicated if the 
participants are located in different time zones. 
• The postal survey requires the sending of too much postal mail (probably thousands) 
to the participants, which is costly and time-consuming.  
Moreover, none of these survey types are environmentally friendly as paper, ink and 
electricity are consumed in printing the forms and distributing them. 
• Email survey is similar to the mail survey, but it does not consume paper, which is 
one of its advantages. 
Additionally, collecting the participants’ answers on individual forms (e.g. post, 
emails) makes data entry and analysis difficult for the researchers, and it increases 
the chances of errors and mistakes during transferring the answers to the digital-
based platforms (such as SPSS or Excel) to analyse them.  
Furthermore, one of the disadvantages of these methods of survey distribution is that 
they require collecting identical and personal information about the participants. For 
instance, their names, organisations, addresses, phone numbers emails, etc. The 
answers of the participants, therefore, would not be anonymised. Such information 
reduces the confidentiality of the survey and reduces its response rates. Moreover, 
the direct contact between the researchers (i.e. the surveyors) and the participants 
might influence the perceptions of the participants and make biased answers. Further 
and above, storing the collected data from the above-mentioned surveys safely is 
difficult, as there will be too many papers that need a secure place, which will cause 
difficulty to the researcher to work on the collected data elsewhere. Additionally, it 
is difficult to destroy the physical copies of the collected data after finishing the 
research studies.  
• An online questionnaire survey was used in this research as it easy to manage, less 
costly, quick and environmentally friendly (Kumar, 2019; Dolnicar et al. 2009). 
There are, however, some disadvantages/limitations associated with online services 
that could result in a low response rate such as a lack of accessibility to the internet, 
issues regarding computer literacy, web security and anonymity and knowledge 
about the website. That said, authors such as Bertot (2009) and Czaja and Blair 
(2005) have concluded that online surveys are the easiest form of data collection as 
the open-ended questions provide a chance to the participants to cooperate and write 
their ideas about the topic of the survey. Additionally, the participants in the online 
surveys would not need to provide their personal information (if they have not been 
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asked for it), which makes the data of the survey anonymised and confidential; and 
there will be no direct contact between the researchers (i.e. the surveyors) and the 
participants, which reduces the chances of collecting biased answers. Moreover, 
using a secured digital platform for storing the collected data helps in ensuring the 
confidentiality of the collected data and allows the researchers flexibility to access 
the data from different locations. Furthermore, destroying the digital forms of data 
after finishing the research studies is easier than destroying the physical copies of the 
collected data.  
The next section explains the different sources and types of research data used in this 
research.  
3.5 Types of Research Data   
The data in research studies are mainly defined as secondary and primary and research data. 
The types of data that were collected in this research are as follows. 
1- The secondary data: Hair (2007) defined secondary data as the data used to 
complete the missing essential data and information required by research studies. 
After extensive investigations about the IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects, it was 
found that there is not enough available data about them, which means there were 
no available data about the IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects in Iraq. Moreover, 
the past studies about risk management in OGP projects in insecure and 
developing countries such as Iraq contained very little information with regard to 
the IRFs and RMMs in these projects. This research, therefore, collected the 
secondary data from a review of research articles, journal papers, surveys, books, 
and internet sources and databases (e.g. pipeline accidents, pipeline failure causes 
and the IRFs in the projects worldwide). 
2- The primary data: the aim of primary data in research studies is to enhance the 
studies’ originality (Okaro, 2017a). The primary data in this research, therefore, 
were obtained from an industrial survey about the IRFs and RMMs in OGP 
projects in Iraq. The industrial survey was designed based on the findings of the 
literature review (i.e. the findings of the inductive approach of this research). In 
this research, the industrial survey was designed and distributed in order to 
understand the stakeholders’ perceptions about the impact of the IRFs and the 
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effectiveness of the RMMs in OGP projects in Iraq. In addition, the industrial 
survey was used to add IRFs and RMMs to the worklist which had not been 
mentioned in the survey.  




Examine and analyse the available documents (e.g. research articles, databases, technical 
reports, etc.) about the existing risk management frameworks in OGP projects 
The IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects. 
Primary Research Data
Statistical analyses of the survey and the computer-based risk analyses model
The probability and severity levels of the IRFs 
Research hypothesis and research problem
Design a questionnaire survey 
























Figure 3.3: The primary and secondary research data of this research. 
As shown in the figure above, the findings of the literature review were considered as the 
secondary source of data because they helped in overcoming the problem of data scarcity in 
OGP projects in Iraq. Moreover, the findings of the literature review (the secondary data) 
helped in designing an industrial survey about the issues in OGP projects in Iraq, as will be 
explained in Chapter 4:. Therefore, the findings of the literature review represented the first 
contribution of this research because they provide the starting point of this research. 
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However, the secondary data of this research were not used to analyse the impact of the IRFs 
and the effectiveness of the RMMs in OGP projects in Iraq.   
The main contributions of the primary data in this research (i.e. the results of the industrial 
survey) were the numerical values of the probability and severity levels of the IRFs and the 
usability and the effectiveness degree of the RMMs. These values were used as inputs for 
the models and tools that were developed to assess and rank the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq 
(see Chapter 5:), select safe pipeline routes/alignments (Chapter 6:) and quantify the impact 
of the IRFs on the duration of new pipeline projects (Chapter 8: and Chapter 9:). This 
represents the main objectives of this research. The survey data, therefore, were representing 
the primary research data in this study as they helped in achieving the study’s objectives, 
which are about analysing and ranking the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq. In other words, the 
survey results have contributed to the originality of the finds of this research.  
The next section explains the different methods used to evaluate and validate the research 
findings and the method used to evaluate and validate the findings.  
3.6 Types of Validity Methods for Research Data and Results 
Using certain processes to check the accuracy of the research findings is called “Validity” 
(Creswell and Creswell, 2017). Validity is extended to test the procedures that were followed 
for data collection and analysis used in research studies (Almadhlouh, 2019), which is 
necessary for qualitative studies (Wisdom et al. 2012). Creswell (2009) supposed that 
qualitative research studies are reliable if the researcher’s approach was consistent compared 
with different researchers and projects. Alali (2010) listed the methods of testing the validity 
in research studies, which are:  
1- Internal validity, which tests the logical relations between the dependent and 
independent variables, which is recommended for experiment-based studies 
(Crowther and Lancaster, 2012).  
2- Statistical validity, which is similar to internal validity, and tests the cause-effect 
relationships between dependant and independent variables. Statistical validity tests 
if the outcomes of the research confirm the cause-effect relationships between the 
variables (Crowther and Lancaster, 2012).  
3- Criterion validity, which tests the internal reliability and the functionality of the 
scales used in a questionnaire survey (Jenkinson et al. 1994; Taylor et al. 1988). 
76 
 
4- Pilot validation, which tests the feasibility and the reliability of a survey’s questions; 
additionally, it examines the assumptions and the design of the survey (Brooks et al. 
2016).  
5- Construct validity, which tests if the research questions were answered and the 
research problem was solved (Dzudie, 2013). It tests the behaviour and the 
theoretical ideas that were used in the research (Crowther and Lancaster, 2012). 
Moreover, Whitely (1983) added that construct validity is concerned with identifying 
the theoretical mechanisms that underlie responses, such as information processes, 
strategies and knowledge stores. This approach of data validity is used to test the 
validity of the methodical and psychometric models of the research.   
6- External validity, which tests the findings of research studies by applying their 
results to other situations with different dimensions such as time, location, setting 
and subject. Additionally, external judgements could be obtained by interviewing 
experts in the field to validate the results and findings of a research study (Dzudie, 
2013). 
7- Face validity, which uses characteristics, psychological, sensibility or relevant tests 
to test the participants’ answers and the views while answering the survey questions 
(Holden, 2010). This is not relevant to the scope and the nature of this study. 
8- Case study, as cited by Allen (2018), Yin (2003) proposed five types of case study, 
although they are not mutually exclusive but could be used in research. The first is 
identified as a critical case. This is when the research seeks to gain a better 
understanding of an existing theory, which means that the findings of the case would 
be critical to the theory that is tested. This is also known as testing existing theory. 
A single case study is a valid research approach, when the case study provides a wide 
demographic background and information for the research. Which what could the 
case study project provides for this study (Puomisto, 2020). The second is a unique 
case. This is when the research seeks to investigate a case that has not previously 
been researched and used in clinical studies. The third type of case is a revelatory 
case, which means new findings are sought. The fourth type of case study is a 
typical/representative case that investigates a common everyday situation or form of 
organisation. The fifth type is a longitudinal case, which means the researcher 
investigates a case over time. These categories of case study types have been 
challenged as narrow with a positivist perspective (Lee et al., 2007). However, the 
categories are useful for identifying the types of case study used in this research. A 
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single case study is used in this research to evaluate the RMF that developed in this 
research. 
During the process of designing the industrial survey, a pilot-like test was carried out in order 
to test the overall design of the survey, the contingency and the clarity of the questions, and 
the reliability and the functionality of the used scales, see section 4.2.1. Cronbach's alpha 
correlation coefficient (α) has been calculated to assess the reliability level of the industrial 
survey, see section 4.2.2. It measures the average correlation and the internal consistency of 
the survey items and between the respondents’ answers (Cronbach, 1951; Webb et al. 2006). 
This test covers the statistical and internal validity of the results. 
Moreover, a real case study project was used to test the RMF developed in this research. A 
comparison between two risk simulation algorithms and two risk analysis and modelling 
software packages was used to test the final findings of the RMF, which are about the time 
impact of the IRFs on the duration of the new pipeline projects, see Chapter 8: and Chapter 
9:. Moreover, the researcher has used peer-reviewed journals and conference publications to 
obtain feedback from expert reviewers in the field, which validated the findings of this 
research.  
3.7 The Proposed Research Strategy for This Study  
This section has used the definitions, explanations and justifications of the above sections 
related to research methodology, philosophy, approach, methods, sampling methods, 
questionnaire survey, data types and validation methods to design this study. Research 
strategy explains the procedure, the sequence, the steps and techniques used to accomplish 
the aim of a piece of research (Babbie, 2016). A research design is the structure of the 
research that developed the methodology used to answer the research questions (Okaro, 
2017a; Almadhlouh, 2019). In other words, the logical structure developed in research 
studies in order to reach valid conclusions is called the research design (Okaro, 2017a).  
The relevant studies with regard to analysing the IRFs in OGP projects show that the 
deterministic approach and the simulation approach are the two main approaches used to 
calculate the pipelines’ probability of failure (El-Abbasy et al. 2016b). The difference 
between these two approaches is as follows. 
1. The deterministic approach utilises analysing the related data (e.g. the pipelines’ 
failure causes and the maintenance records) to assess the IRFs and calculate their 
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degree of influence on the pipelines. As such data are not available to assess the IRFs 
in OGP projects in Iraq (see section 1.3 in 0), the document analysis of the literature 
review, therefore, was used to identify the IRFs and RMMs associated with OGP 
projects (see sections 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6 in Chapter 2:). Such an approach mainly 
uses qualitative and deductive research methods to analyse the collected documents 
and collect the research data. 
2. The simulation approach utilises correlation analysis with the age and the other 
conditions of the pipes to assess the likelihood of pipe failure based on the pipes’ 
historical records (Elsawah et al. 2016). However, in a situation of lack of data about 
the pipeline conditions and in a hazardous environment similar to that in Iraq, risk 
management requires further investigations to understand the IRFs in OGP projects. 
Such investigations are required to provide numerical data about the IRFs and RMMs 
in the projects based on the perceptions of the stakeholders who are in touch with the 
problems in these projects. Such an approach mainly uses quantitative and deductive 
analysis such as statistical analyses, computer modelling and programming and 
simulation software, etc.  
Figure 3.4 shows the research design flow diagram. 
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Research s Problem Research s Questions Aim and Objectives
Risk Management in OGP Projects
Influencing Risk Factors (IRFs) and Risk Mitigation  Methods (RMMs)  in 
OGP Projects
• The Limitation of the Existing Risk Management Frameworks
• The IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects. 
Design of an industrial survey
The Probability and Severity levels of the IRFs and 
the Effectiveness and Usability Degree of the RMMs
 Fuzzy Logic Theory
Output 
(Risk Index) values of the IRFs
Develop the (RMF)
Select safe routes for the new pipelines 
projects
Calculate the impact of IRFs on the 
delivery time of OGP projects 
Recommendations of Risk management 
Data Analysis
 
Figure 3.4: Research design flow diagram. 
As explained in  
Figure 3.4 above, the design of this research includes analysing the literature review in order 
to understand the existing risk management approaches in OGP projects.  The findings of 
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the literature review were the limitations of the existing RMFs and the IRFs and RMMs 
associated with these projects, see Chapter 2:. Chapter 4: uses the findings of the literature 
review to design an industry-wide questionnaire survey to analyse and evaluate the identified 
IRFs and RMMs based on the perceptions of the stakeholders in these projects.  
The numerical results of the survey are used in Chapter 4: as input for a computer-based risk 
analysis model, which uses fuzzy theory to assess and rank the IRFs based on their degree 
of impact on the projects. To this end, Chapter 5: uses the findings of this research (e.g. the 
list of the identified IRFs and their degree of impact on the projects, the strengths and 
limitations of the existing RMFs and the RMMs used in the projects) to design an integrated 
RMF for OGP projects. The RMF will be used to select safe routes/alignments for the new 
pipeline projects (as done in Chapter 5:) and quantify the time impact of the IRFs on the 
duration of these projects (as done in Chapter 8: and Chapter 9:). Chapter 8: and Chapter 9: 
use MCS to analyse the potential delay caused by the IRFs in a real case study project from 
Iraq. The real case study project helped to evaluate/validate the functionality of the 
developed RMF. In addition, the findings of the RMF will be evaluated/validated by 
comparing the results of two different risk simulation software packages (which are ASTA 
risk simulator and @Risk simulator) as done in Chapter 8: and Chapter 9:, respectively. 
Chapter 10: discusses the research findings, the limitations and the future work of this 
research.  
3.8 Summary  
This chapter has explained the philosophies, research approaches, research method, data 
sampling and collection methods used in this research as follows. 
•  Section 3.1 has explained  the philosophies used by past research studies, and the 
justification of why a pragmatist paradigm philosophy is adopted in this study to 
design the RMF in this research (section 3.2.1). Section  3.1 has also explained the 
following 
• The strategy of the literature review of this research, section 3.2.2.  
• The inductive and deductive approaches and the qualitative and quantitative 
methods used in this research, as per section 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, respectively.  
• The research methods used in past research studies and why a questionnaire 
survey was the chosen data collection method in this study, section 3.2.5. 
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• Section 3.3 Explained the data sampling methods used in this research.  
• Section 3.4 explained the data distribution and collection methods used in this 
research (i.e. the questionnaire survey). 
• Eection 3.5 explained the secondary and primary research data used in this 
research,.  
• Section 3.6 explained the methods of validating the research findings. 
• Section 3.7 explained the research design and structure.  
A pragmatist paradigm is adopted to obtain meaningful results from both the qualitative and 
quantitative methods that were used in this research in order to: 
1- Identify the IRFs and RMMs that affect the safety of OGP projects worldwide. 
Additionally, to understand the limitations of the existing RMFs used in these 
projects. 
2- Rank the IRFs in OGP projects with regard to their degree of influence on the 
projects. 
3- Select the optimum safe pipeline routes/alignments for the new OGPs projects.  
4- Quantify the impact of the IRFs on the duration of the new pipeline projects, and 
estimate whether or not the projects could be delivered on time; and suggest some of 
the effective RMMs which could be used to manage the IRFs in OGP projects. 
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CHAPTER 4: INDUSTRY SURVEY  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the overview and the process of conducting an industry survey to 
analyse the Influencing Risk Factors (IRFs) associated with Oil and Gas Pipeline (OGP) 
projects and examines the potential Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs) which could be 
suitable and valuable for these projects.  
The chapter explains the designing of a questionnaire survey, which was used to analyse and 
rank the critical IRFs associated with OGP projects. The recognised lists of IRFs and RMMs 
were identified through a comprehensive review of the existing literature. This research has 
used this information (i.e. the IRFs and RMMs) to design a questionnaire survey. The 
questionnaire was used to collect the perceptions of the stakeholders about the IRFs and 
RMMs in OGP projects in Iraq 
The chapter is structured under five sections. The design of the questionnaire survey is 
discussed in detail in section 4.2. Section 4.3 explains the method of distributing the 
questionnaire amongst the targeted stakeholders, and section 4.4 presents the analyses of 
survey data and discusses the results of the industrial survey. Section 4.5 presents the chapter 
summary. 
4.2 Questionnaire Design  
Predicting and recognising the IRFs in a project depends on the personal style of thinking 
and the cognition and processing capability of the stakeholders because these risk factors are 
characteristically uncertain, vague and random (Guo et al. 2016). This research, therefore, 
seeks to engage with stakeholders who have a better understanding of the oil and gas industry 
and have a piece of real knowledge about the problems, risks and challenges associated with 
OGPs. Most importantly, the survey aims to obtain consensus views and perceptions from 
the relevant stakeholders in a way that reflects the reality of the IRFs in OGP projects.  
Questionnaire survey is one of the most widely used research methods for data collection, 
which helps in engaging with respondents or participants in the survey who are eager to 
engage and understand an attitude or a behaviour of a certain phenomenon (Blaxter, 2010; 
Creswell and Creswell, 2017). A previous study by Alali (2010) found that around 61% of 
the research studies in the field of project management normally used surveys and 
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questionnaires to collect research data for their studies. They are also used to collect 
desirable research data from the participants/stakeholders which might be unavailable 
elsewhere (Fowler and Cosenza, 2009). Thus, the questionnaire survey is utilised in this 
research to collect the primary research data about the probability and severity impact of the 
IRFs and the potentially effective RMMs in the OGP projects based on the perceptions of 
the relevant stakeholders. 
Three types of questionnaires are widely used in the literature, which are structured, open-
ended, and semi-structured questionnaire. Polit and Beck (2008) explained the difference 
between these three types of questionnaires as follows.  
• In the structured questionnaire survey (i.e. one with pre-defined and designed 
questions), the participants have to answer a set of fixed questions only, with no 
opportunity to comment on the questions. Such a questionnaire does not give the 
respondents the opportunity to respond to the questions in detail and add comments 
when some clarification is needed.  
• In the survey with only open-ended questions, the respondents have an open space 
to write their answers to the survey questions. This kind of survey provides the 
respondents with the opportunity to ask questions and write comments in the survey, 
which enhances the surveyors’ knowledge. However, a survey with only open-ended 
questions will enable the participants to give a very wide range of answers, and they 
will use different scales and terminologies to answer the questions based on their 
personal perspectives, which will make the survey difficult to analyse and will lead 
to uncertain results.  
• The semi-structured questionnaire survey includes both types of questions, fixed and 
open-ended questions. This survey format uses scales defined by the surveyors to 
answer the survey questions, and it allows flexibility in data collection by collecting 
comments from the survey participants.  
Considering the above statements and justifications, a semi-structured questionnaire survey 
is adopted in this study. In this context, the qualitative document analyses of this research 
(e.g.Table 2.1, Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 in Chapter 2:) were conducted in order to design a 
semi-structured questionnaire survey. The survey helps to analyse the impact of the IRFs 
and to discover the effective RMMs in the OGP projects, particularly in developing countries 
such as Iraq. The University Research Ethics Committee (UREC) at Liverpool John Moores 
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University (LJMU) reviewed and approved the designed questionnaire before the industrial 
survey was conducted. The ethical approval is shown in Figure A.1 in APPENDIX A:.   
I. The survey was written in English and Arabic languages, and it was up to the 
respondents to choose the language they wished to use. This survey used the Likert 
rating scale to assess the IRFs and evaluate the RMMs in OGP projects because it is 
one of the most widely used scales in the literature (Matell and Jacoby, 1972; Mearns 
and Yule, 2009). A Likert scale was used despite some negative opinions about the 
scale which state that respondents can provide biased views based more on their 
personal perspective to answer the questions. This scale is sensitive and has  small 
standard deviations, which make the results of the survey profoundly meaningful 
(Cummins and Gullone, 2000). Figure 4.1 presents the process of designing the semi-
structured questionnaire survey. This process was conducted in two stages. First, a 
pilot-like survey was conducted to improve the quality and reliability of the 
questionnaire, see section 4.2.1, and then the final stage of the questionnaire survey 
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Figure 4.1: Flowchart showing the design process of the questionnaire survey. 
4.2.1 Pilot-Like Survey  
Testing the survey before distributing it is recommended in the literature (Blaxter, 2010). 
Pilot-like surveys are used in the literature in order to pre-test surveys and predict the factors 
that might affect their validity in order to avoid them in the final surveys (Bernard and 
Bernard, 2013). Bhate (2014) has recommended making a pilot-like survey with a small 
sample of participants to test and confirm the suitability of the questions and the data 
collected from the survey. Creswell and Poth (2016) assumed that using external members 
to check the survey ensures valid responses, which enhances the credibility, accuracy and 
transferability of the study. Also, the pilot-like survey is used in the literature to estimate the 
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length of the survey and determine the best environment for the participants (Brooks et al. 
2016). Additionally, pilot-like surveys were used in research studies to estimate the response 
rate of the targeted population in participating in the survey.  
The survey was designed under three sections as follows. 
• Section I introduced the research topic and the aim of the survey to the participants. 
Additionally, in this section, the participants were asked about their degree of education, 
their occupations, roles and experience in OGP projects.  
• In section II, the participants were asked to  
o Assess the probability of the IRFs on a scale (Certainly, Very often, Often, 
Sometimes, Seldom, Do not happen at all, Undecided), which means a seven-point 
Likert scale was used in this question.  
o Rank the five groups of the IRFs with regard to their degree of impact on the 
projects. 
o Add more IRFs to the worklist which have not been mentioned in the survey. 
• In section III, the participants were asked to  
o Evaluate the RMMs with regard to their frequency of application in the projects’ 
“usability” on a scale (Certainly, Very often, Often, Sometimes, Seldom, Did not 
use at all, Undecided), (i.e. seven-point Likert scale).  
o Compare between the underground and above ground pipelines subject to the IRFs 
that affect the safety of these pipelines.  
o Rank the stages of the projects with regard to the priority of applying the RMMs in 
the projects.  
o Add more RMMs to the worklist which have not been mentioned in the survey.  
An online tool survey, “Google Forms”, was used to distribute the pilot-like survey. The 
pilot-like survey was sent to 10 experts in OGP projects in Iraq to answer the survey 
questions and provide comments on the survey. The respondents were notified that their 
answers would be treated anonymously. After one week, six of these experts had completed 
their forms and sent their feedback and comments to the surveyors. The general information 





Table 4.1: Experts’ general information. 
Education Occupation  Experience (years) 
Provisional degree (diploma) 2 A member of a construction team 5 6 to 10 1 
Bachelor’s degree or Higher diploma 2 A researcher or student 1 11 to 15 3 
Master’s or PhD 2   > 15 2 
Total 6 Total 6 Total 6 
The pilot-like survey was used to assess: 
1- The clarity of the questions, and the overall language, consistency and design of the 
questionnaire.  
2- The functionality of the used rating scales. 
3- The functionality of the online tool survey used to collect the data from the 
participants.  
The experts made the following comments about the pilot-like survey.  
• They felt that the survey was long. Therefore, the whole survey was revised to be 
shorter.  
• The survey has missed assessing the severity levels of the IRFs. Therefore, a question 
was added to the final survey to assess the severity of the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq.  
• The survey has missed evaluating the effectiveness degrees of the RMMs. Therefore, a 
question was added to the final survey to evaluate the effectiveness of the RMMs in 
OGP projects in Iraq.  
• The participants complained that the seven-point Likert scale was confusing to them 
and made the questions difficult to answer. Thus, a five-point Likert scale was used in 
the final survey, which is easier to follow, as they suggested. Moreover, the five-point 
scale is widely used in the literature to assess the IRFs (Elsawah et al. 2016). 
• After making phone calls to the participants, the overall clarity of the survey was 
improved; questions that were found to be vague were revised or discarded; and the lists 
of IRFs and RMM methods were revised for better clarity.  
• Some of the IRFs and RMMs have been paraphrased to make sure that they fit with the 
aim of this research and the situation of OGP projects in Iraq.  
• Some typos, spelling and grammar mistakes were spotted in the pilot survey and 
changed in the final draft.  
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• The functionality of the Google Forms online survey tool was found to be limited. 
Therefore, there was a need to use another online survey tool to distribute the final 
survey. 
• The statistical analysis of the pilot-like survey was used to test the functionality of the 
survey for the research. 
A draft of the pilot-like survey is shown in Table A.1 in 00 . The next section uses the 
feedback from the pilot-like survey in order to design the final draft of the survey.    
4.2.2 Final Design of the Questionnaire Survey  
The final draft of the survey had 13 questions divided into three sections, as follows.  
I. Section I was similar to section I in the pilot-like survey, but the introduction was 
revised to be shorter.  
II. Section II comprised four questions to analyse the IRFs as follows.  
o Question 4 asked the respondents to assess the probability levels of the IRFs on a 
scale [almost certain, likely, possible, unlikely, and rare] (Stephan and Badr, 2007; 
Alali, 2010). In other words, a five-point Likert scale was used in this question.  
o Question 5 asked the respondents to assess the severity levels of the IRFs on a scale 
[catastrophic, major, moderate, minor, and negligible] (Stephan and Badr, 2007; 
Alali, 2010). That is, a five-point Likert scale was used in this question. 
o Question 6 asked the respondents to rank the five types of IRFs (S&S, PL, HSE, 
OR, and R&R) regarding their degree of impact on OGPs, where rank (1) means the 
IRF has the highest impact and (5) means the lowest.  
o Question 7 was an open-ended question that asked the participants if they could add 
more IRFs to the survey which have not been mentioned by the surveyors.  
III. Section III had five questions to evaluate the RMMs.  
o Question 8 asked the participants to evaluate the usability degree of the RMMs on a 
scale [almost certainly used, likely used, possibly used, unlikely used, and rarely 
used]. That is, a five-point Likert scale was used in this question. 
o Question 9 asked them to evaluate the effectiveness degree of the RMMs on a scale 
[extremely effective, very effective, moderately effective, slightly effective, and 
insignificant]. I.e. five-point Likert scale was used in this question. 
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o Question 10 was an open-ended question asking the participants if they could add 
more RMMs to the survey which have not been mentioned by the surveyors.  
o Question 11 asked them to rank the stages of pipeline projects regarding the priority 
of managing the IRFs and applying the RMMs in the projects. 
o Question 12 was about an overall comparison between above ground and 
underground pipelines with regard to the IRFs in each one of these pipelines.  
o The final question was to collect the participants’ contact details if they were willing 
to share them with the authors.  
A draft of the final survey is shown in Table A.2 in APPENDIX A:. The next section shows 
the method used to distribute the survey between the stakeholders in the OGP project in Iraq.  
4.3 Questionnaire Distribution and Data Sampling Methods 
The survey was conducted using an online survey tool called “SoGoSurvey” to recruit 
respondents from government organisations, international companies and private agencies 
who have relevant experience with OGP projects, for example, consultants, planners, 
designers, construction workers, operators, maintenance workers, owners, clients and 
researchers. The justification for using an online survey tool compared to existing tools of 
distribution methods is discussed in detail in section 3.4 in Chapter 3:.  
Section 3.3 in Chapter 3: explained the different methods of data sampling which are 
normally used to select participants in a survey and the justification for using the snowball-
sampling method in this study. Snowball sampling is utilised in this survey to ensure 
widespread distribution of the questionnaires amongst the OGP stakeholders. The industry 
survey was distributed via an online survey tool to potential participants via social networks 
and emails. The survey lasted for four months to collect sufficient responses from the 
targeted population. The next section presents the types of research data that were collected 
via the industry survey in Iraq and the details of the data analysis. The justification for using 
OGP projects in Iraq as the area of research in this study is explained in sections 1.2 and 1.3 
of 0Chapter 1: and section 2.3 of Chapter 2:.  
4.4 Collection and Analysis of the Survey Data  
The data collected from the survey in this research were divided into three types as follows. 
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1. The demographic information of the participants (e.g. their occupations and experience 
level in the projects and educational degree) from the first three questions. 
2. The perceptions of the participants regarding the impact of IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq 
as follows. 
2.1.  The probability of the identified risk factors affecting the projects, from question 4.  
2.2. The severity levels of the IRFs on the projects, from question 5. 
2.3. The ranking of the five groups of the IRFs with regard to their degree of influence 
on the projects, from question 6. 
2.4. The comments of the participants with regard to adding more IRFs to the work list 
which have not been mentioned in the survey, from question 7.  
3. The perceptions of the participants regarding the applications of the RMMs in OGP 
projects in Iraq as follows. 
3.1. The usability degree of the RMMs in the projects, i.e. the chance of these RMMs 
being used to manage the IRFs in the projects, from question 8.  
3.2. The effectiveness degree of the RMMs with regard to managing the IRFs in the 
projects, from question 9. 
3.3. The comments of the participants with regard to adding more RMMs to the work 
list which have not been mentioned in the survey, question 10. 
3.4. The priority of applying the RMMs to manage the IRFs in OGPs during the different 
stages of the projects, from question 11. 
3.5. A comparison between the above ground and underground pipelines based on the 
subjected risk factors in each type of these pipelines, from question 12.  
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 23 (SPSS 23) was used to statistically analyse 
the survey data collected through the questionnaire. The next sections provide the results of 
the survey. 
4.4.1 Response Rate of the Survey 
The questionnaire survey was sent to 400 potential participants. The response rate was 49.5% 
since 198 participants responded. The response rate in this research was high compared to 
past studies. For example, Bennett and Nair (2010) and Nair, (2013) put the average response 
rate for online surveys at about 30% to 36%, which means the response rate in this research 
is more than the expected rate. This rate is good compared to Okaro (2017) with a response 
rate of 33% and 82 participants, and Rowland (2010) with a response rate of 23% and 151 
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participants. One of the reasons for achieving a high response rate to the survey is that the 
researcher had been working in different OGP projects in Iraq for approximately three years, 
and used networking to recruit participants to the survey. Additionally, the appropriate 
design of the survey, the clear questions and addressing the feedback of the pilot-like survey 
have helped in obtaining a high response rate to this survey. Additionally, the confidentiality 
of data has helped in reaching such a response rate to this survey. The next section presents 
the survey results about the demographic information of the participants in the survey, which 
are some of the stakeholders in OGP projects in Iraq.   
4.4.2 Participants’ Demographic Information 
The participants were working either for (I) governmental companies, which belong to the 
Ministry of Oil (MoO), such as the State Company of Oil Projects (SCOP), Oil Pipelines 
Company (OPC), Basra Oil Company (BOC), Midland Oil Company (MDOC), Basrah Gas 
Company (BGC) and other governmental companies. (II) International companies (e.g. 
British Petroleum, Gazprom, Shell, Samsung, and Petrofac). Or (III) Private companies (e.g. 
MSK Iraq for oil and gas services). However, due to data confidentiality, participants were 
not asked to provide the names of their organisations. Figure 4.2 shows the demographic 




Figure 4.2 Participants’ demographic information. 
According to the participants’ occupations, as recorded in the survey, 14 participants were 
consultants, planners or designers, 71 were members of construction teams, which means 
executive engineers, 41 were operators, 39 were owners or clients, and 33 were either 
researchers or postgraduate students associated with the OGP projects. The students are 
employed in the OGP projects and at the same time studying for their master’s or PhD, which 
means they have experience of working on these projects.  
In terms of participants’ experience, 74 have between one and five years of experience in 
OGP projects, 67 have five to 10 years, 29 participants have 10 to 15 years, and 28 of them 
have more than 15 years of experience.  
In respect of the participants’ education, three of them were vocational or crafts-based, 28 
have a high school or a diploma degree, 106 have a bachelor’s degree (engineers), and 61 
have a master’s or a PhD degree.  
The appropriate sampling of the targeted population, as shown above, enhances the results 
of this research because all the stakeholder categories during all stages of a project were 
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order to understand the analysis of the IRFs and RMMs from different perspectives. 
Understanding the experience levels of the participants helps to estimate the reliability of the 
survey. As shown in Figure 4.2, the percentage of participants who have more than five years 
of experience in the projects is more than 62.6%. The case is similar when asking the 
participants about their degree of education, which helps in estimating how many engineers 
participated in the survey. In this survey, 106 out of 198 participants were engineers with a 
B.Sc. degree, and 61 participants were engineers with a master’s or PhD degree. These 
numbers enhance the results of the survey. 
The next section presents the reliability and validity test of the survey data. 
4.4.3 Reliability and Validity of the Survey Data 
Due to the nature of human observations and responses, surveys may come with a range of 
errors. Therefore, testing the reliability levels of the data collected from research surveys is 
important. Keeping the data of the survey confidential reduces personal biases during data 
collection, which helps in avoiding any threats to the reliability and validation levels of the 
survey (Dzudie, 2013). Cronbach's alpha correlation coefficient (α) has been calculated to 
assess the reliability level of the questionnaire survey. It measures the average correlation 
and the internal consistency of the survey items and between the respondents’ answers 
(Cronbach, 1951; Webb et al. 2006). Different levels of reliability are required depending 
on the purpose and the nature of the study. Meanwhile, if the value of the α was equal to 0.7, 
it means the results of the survey are above the minimum level of reliability (Pallant, 2001; 
Kline, 1999; Mpofu et al. 2017; Nunnally, 1994; Prasad et al. 2019; Ruqaishi and Bashir, 
2015 and Santos, 1999). In this research, reliability testing was carried out for questions 4, 
5, 8 and 9 of the survey as these were rated on a Likert rating scale. Table 4.2 shows the 
values of α, which are above the acceptable value of 0.7. 
Table 4.2: Cronbach’s alpha coefficient factor (α) case processing summary of the survey. 
The reliability levels of: Valid % Items α 
the questionnaire overall 100 95 0.910 
question 4, which is about risk probability   100 30 0.919 
question 5, which is about risk severity  100 30 0.863 
question 8, which is about the usability of RMMs 100 12 0.867 
question 9, which is about the effectiveness of RMMs  100 12 0.867 
answers of the participants who are consultants, planners or designers 100 95 0.863 
answers of the participants who are members of construction teams 100 95 0.892 
answers of the participants who are operators 100 95 0.927 
answers of the participants who are owners or clients 100 95 0.917 
answers of the participants who are researchers or students 100 95 0.899 
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The reliability testing is not applicable for the rest of the questions for the following reasons. 
Questions 1, 2 and 3 asked about the participants’ demographic information. Question 6 
asked the participants about their opinions in ranking the five groups of IRFs based on their 
degree of impact on the projects. Questions 10 and 11 asked about ranking the priority of 
the project stages with regard to applying the RMMs in the projects and comparing between 
the above and underground pipelines, respectively. There was no scale used in these 
questions. Therefore, reliability testing does not apply to them.  
The next section explains the analysis of the probability and severity levels of the IRFs in 
the OGP projects based on the survey conducted in Iraq. 
4.4.4 Risk Probability (RP) and Risk Severity (RS) of the IRFs 
A descriptive statistical analysis method is used to analyse the IRFs in the survey. The mean 
of the five-point Likert scale was calculated to determine the numerical values of probability 
and the severity levels of the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq. This research has analysed the 
IRFs based on the overall results of the survey as well as based on the occupations of the 
stakeholders in the projects. Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 show the probability and severity levels 
of the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq, respectively.
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Table 4.3: The probability levels of the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq based on the results of 
the survey. 
IRFs Risk Probability (RP) 
Total I II III IV V 
Terrorism & sabotage  3.995 3.357 3.958 4.195 4.000 4.091 
Corruption  3.980 4.000 3.986 3.878 3.846 4.242 
Insecure areas  3.717 3.286 3.634 3.805 3.769 3.909 
Low public legal & moral awareness  3.712 4.000 3.761 3.561 3.513 3.909 
Theft 3.692 3.214 3.845 3.659 3.564 3.758 
Corrosion & lack of protection against it  3.687 3.429 3.648 3.390 3.795 4.121 
Improper safety regulations  3.687 3.643 3.662 3.561 3.872 3.697 
Exposed pipelines  3.667 3.429 3.437 3.854 3.897 3.758 
Shortage of IT services & modern 
equipment  
3.667 3.643 3.592 3.585 3.615 4.000 
Improper inspection & maintenance  3.657 3.571 3.606 3.537 3.769 3.818 
Lack of  appropriate training  3.646 3.571 3.761 3.439 3.462 3.909 
Weak ability to identify & monitor the 
threats  
3.631 3.571 3.577 3.561 3.692 3.788 
The pipeline is easy to access  3.631 3.571 3.563 3.732 3.538 3.788 
Limited warning signs  3.626 3.429 3.648 3.341 3.974 3.606 
Little research on this topic  3.621 3.429 3.789 3.366 3.359 3.970 
Lawlessness  3.606 3.786 3.676 3.268 3.795 3.576 
Lack of risk registration  3.566 3.214 3.606 3.390 3.615 3.788 
Stakeholders are not paying  appropriate 
attention  
3.530 3.286 3.676 3.439 3.462 3.960 
Conflicts over land ownership  3.495 3.571 3.451 3.659 3.667 3.152 
Public’s poverty & education level  3.449 3.357 3.521 3.439 3.256 3.576 
Design, construction & material defects  3.333 2.429 3.254 3.293 3.385 3.879 
Threats to staff   3.323 2.714 3.394 3.268 3.410 3.394 
Inadequate risk management  3.227 2.929 3.183 2.976 3.436 3.515 
Operational errors  3.101 2.857 3.042 2.878 3.205 3.485 
Leakage of sensitive information  2.980 2.643 3.070 2.707 2.949 3.303 
Geological risks  2.747 2.714 2.662 2.537 2.795 3.152 
Natural disasters & weather conditions  2.652 2.429 2.606 2.537 2.692 2.939 
Vehicle accidents  2.465 2.357 2.380 2.293 2.333 3.061 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control 
system  
2.237 1.929 2.268 2.024 2.179 2.636 
Animal accidents  1.894 1.929 1.986 1.561 1.821 2.182 
Note: Total means the overall results of the survey, (I) means the consultants, planners and designers; (II) 
means the construction workers; (III) means the operators; (IV) means the owners and clients; and (V) 
means the researchers. 
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Table 4.4: The severity levels of the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq based on the results of the 
survey. 
IRFs Risk Severity (RS) 
Total I II III IV V 
Terrorism & sabotage  4.490 3.571 3.732 3.829 3.718 3.939 
Corruption  4.192 3.286 3.732 3.512 3.769 3.939 
Insecure areas  4.106 3.286 3.634 3.659 4.000 3.606 
Low public legal & moral awareness  3.859 3.357 3.535 3.244 3.590 3.727 
Theft 4.081 3.000 3.662 3.585 3.846 3.818 
Corrosion & lack of protection against it  3.990 3.357 3.676 3.683 3.641 3.697 
Improper safety regulations  3.949 3.214 3.592 3.488 3.872 3.667 
Exposed pipelines  3.682 2.500 3.042 2.951 3.000 3.000 
Shortage of IT services & modern 
equipment  
3.652 1.714 2.155 1.951 2.000 1.970 
Improper inspection & maintenance  3.924 3.357 3.746 3.610 3.641 3.394 
Lack of  appropriate training  3.773 3.500 3.408 3.098 3.410 3.697 
Weak ability to identify & monitor the 
threats  
3.899 3.000 3.690 3.488 3.487 3.758 
The pipeline is easy to access  3.646 3.571 3.732 3.829 3.718 3.939 
Limited warning signs  3.571 3.286 3.634 3.659 4.000 3.606 
Little research on this topic  3.697 2.857 3.042 2.854 3.077 3.455 
Lawlessness  3.682 2.500 3.042 2.951 3.000 3.000 
Lack of risk registration  3.697 2.857 3.042 2.854 3.077 3.455 
Stakeholders are not paying  appropriate 
attention  
3.143 3.577 3.829 3.692 3.727 3.960 
Conflicts over land ownership  3.611 3.286 3.732 3.512 3.769 3.939 
Public’s poverty & education level  3.409 3.357 3.676 3.683 3.641 3.697 
Design, construction & material defects  3.848 3.571 3.549 3.390 3.179 3.333 
Threats to staff   3.399 3.143 3.577 3.829 3.692 3.727 
Inadequate risk management  3.505 3.000 3.662 3.585 3.846 3.818 
Operational errors  3.611 3.500 3.958 3.537 3.692 3.636 
Leakage of sensitive information  3.505 3.000 3.662 3.585 3.846 3.818 
Geological risks  3.182 3.214 3.592 3.488 3.872 3.667 
Natural disasters & weather conditions  3.066 3.357 3.746 3.610 3.641 3.394 
Vehicle accidents  2.712 3.357 3.535 3.244 3.590 3.727 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control 
system  
2.970 3.000 3.690 3.488 3.487 3.758 
Animal accidents  2.020 3.571 3.549 3.390 3.179 3.333 
Note: Total means the overall results of the survey, (I) means the consultants, planners and designers; 
(II) means the construction workers; (III) means the operators; (IV) means the owners and clients; and 
(V) means the researchers. 
The findings of the two tables above, which are the Risk Probability (RP) and Risk Severity 
(RS) of the IRFs, will be used as inputs for a computer-based risk analysis model, which is 
developed in Chapter 5: to assess and rank the IRFs with regard to their degree of impact on 
OGP projects.  
The next section uses the results of Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 in order to calculate the degree 
of impact of the IRFs on OGP projects in Iraq based on the results of the survey. 
Additionally, the next section shows the differences in analysing the IRFs in OGP projects 
97 
 
in Iraq based on the occupations and different perceptions of the stakeholders and 
participants. 
4.4.5 Ranking the IRFs  
This research has used the Risk Importance Impact (RII), which has been used by a number 
of past researchers (e.g. Jamshidi et al. 2013; Julie Pallant, 2001; Yadav et al. 2003 and 
Yazdani-Chamzini, 2014) in order to calculate the degree of impact of the IRFs on the OGP 
projects in Iraq based on the results of the survey. The values of RII of the IRFs were 
calculated based on the results of the Risk Impact Equation (RIE) equation, see equation 4.1.  
𝑅𝐼𝐼 = [𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑅𝑃) × 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑅𝑆)]/5 … 4.1 
Table 4.5 shows the results of calculating the RII values of the IRFs using the RII. 
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RII (The results of RII) 
Total I II III IV V 
Terrorism & sabotage  S&S 3.587* 3.021 3.579 3.909 3.405 3.669 
Corruption  R&R 3.441 3.314 3.537 3.254 3.314 3.677 
Insecure areas  PL 3.053 2.722 2.928 3.267 3.035 3.222 
Low public legal & moral awareness  S&S 3.023 2.812 3.210 2.583 3.211 3.056 
Theft  S&S 3.013 2.388 3.206 2.998 2.906 3.029 
Corrosion & lack of protection 
against it  
OR 2.942 2.498 2.918 2.696 3.172 3.222 
Improper safety regulations  HSE 2.912 2.810 2.899 2.797 2.958 3.070 
Exposed pipelines  HSE 2.870 2.755 2.742 2.829 3.015 3.078 
Shortage of IT services & modern 
equipment  
OR 2.865 3.086 2.934 2.588 2.738 3.127 
Improper inspection & maintenance  HSE 2.832 2.551 2.802 2.831 2.878 2.961 
Lack of  appropriate training  R&R 2.796 2.629 2.972 2.583 2.716 2.855 
Weak ability to identify & monitor 
the threats  
OR 2.751 2.551 2.807 2.634 2.574 3.080 
The pipeline is easy to access  PL 2.700 2.253 2.498 2.820 3.118 2.710 
Limited warning signs  HSE 2.678 2.446 2.641 2.641 2.633 2.958 
Little research on this topic  R&R 2.656 2.057 2.672 2.396 3.057 2.754 
Lawlessness  R&R 2.648 2.245 2.550 2.858 2.613 2.824 
Lack of risk registration  R&R 2.636 2.112 2.692 2.381 2.725 2.984 
Stakeholders are not paying  
appropriate attention  
R&R 2.586 2.057 2.796 2.348 2.343 2.983 
Conflicts over land ownership  PL 2.566 1.839 2.410 2.538 2.760 3.033 
Public’s poverty & education level  S&S 2.524 2.398 2.586 2.641 2.670 2.139 
Design, construction & material 
defects  
OR 2.481 1.900 2.687 2.312 2.518 2.468 
Threats to staff   S&S 2.352 2.398 2.500 2.332 2.071 2.384 
Inadequate risk management  HSE 2.240 1.837 2.185 2.008 2.482 2.556 
Operational errors  OR 2.194 2.050 2.170 1.843 2.343 2.599 
Leakage of sensitive information  S&S 2.089 1.774 2.171 1.756 2.117 2.462 
Geological risks  PL 1.748 1.551 1.605 1.670 1.749 2.273 
Natural disasters & weather 
conditions  
HSE 1.626 1.388 1.585 1.448 1.657 2.031 
Vehicle accidents  PL 1.337 1.010 1.274 1.275 1.328 1.707 
Hacker attacks on the operating or 
control system  
OR 1.329 0.964 1.380 1.195 1.308 1.582 
Animal accidents  PL 0.765 0.661 0.856 0.609 0.728 0.860 
*for example the RI of the Terrorism & sabotage = [3.99 X 4.49]/5=3.58 
Note: Total means the overall results of the survey, (I) means the consultants, planners and designers; (II) 
means the construction workers; (III) means the operators; (IV) means the owners and clients; and (V) 
means the researchers. 
The IRFs were ranked based on their degree of impact on the projects, which was calculated 








The ranking of the IRFs 
Total I II III IV V 
Terrorism & sabotage  S&S 1 3 1 1 1 2 
Corrosion & lack of protection against it  OR 2 1 2 3 2 1 
Theft  S&S 3 7 7 2 7 4 
Lawlessness  R&R 4 4 3 16 3 9 
Shortage of IT services & modern equipment  OR 5 15 4 4 10 11 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control system  OR 6 11 8 10 4 3 
Natural disasters & weather conditions  HSE 7 5 9 9 9 8 
Threats to staff   S&S 8 6 13 7 8 7 
Inadequate risk management  HSE 9 2 6 14 13 5 
Insecure areas  PL 10 10 11 6 11 14 
Limited warning signs  HSE 11 8 5 15 15 16 
Operational errors  OR 12 9 10 13 19 6 
Improper inspection & maintenance  HSE 13 16 21 8 5 19 
Low public legal & moral awareness  S&S 14 12 17 12 17 15 
Leakage of sensitive information  S&S 15 20 16 18 6 18 
Design, construction & material defects  OR 16 17 19 5 18 17 
Corruption  R&R 17 18 14 19 14 12 
Improper safety regulations  HSE 18 19 12 20 23 13 
Geological risks  PL 19 23 22 17 12 10 
Little research on this topic  R&R 20 14 18 11 16 26 
Lack of risk registration  R&R 21 22 15 22 20 22 
Lack of  appropriate training  R&R 22 13 20 21 25 24 
Exposed pipelines  HSE 23 24 23 23 21 21 
Vehicle accidents  PL 24 21 25 24 22 20 
The pipeline is easy to access  PL 25 25 24 25 24 23 
Weak ability to identify & monitor the threats  OR 26 26 26 26 26 25 
Public’s poverty & education level  S&S 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Conflicts over land ownership  PL 28 28 29 28 28 28 
Animal accidents  PL 29 29 28 29 29 29 
Stakeholders are not paying  appropriate attention  R&R 30 30 30 30 30 30 
*The classification of the IRFs was done in section 2.4.5 of Chapter 2:. The ranking of the IRFs by their 
types is presented in section 4.4.5 
Note: Total means the overall results of the survey, (I) means the consultants, planners and designers; (II) 
means the construction workers; (III) means the operators; (IV) means the owners and clients; and (V) means 
the researchers. 
4.4.5.1 Ranking the IRFs based on the occupation of the project stakeholders  
As shown in the table above, the overall results of the survey show the most influencing RFs 
on OGP projects, which are terrorism & sabotage, corrosion & lack of protection against it, 
theft, lawlessness, and shortage of IT services & modern equipment. On the other hand, weak 
ability to identify & monitor the threats, public’s poverty & education level, conflicts over 
land ownership, animal accidents, and stakeholders are not paying  appropriate attention are 
the IRFs that have less impact on the projects. 
The ranking of the IRFs is quite varied, depending on the occupations of the stakeholders, 
as shown in Table 4.6. For example, three groups (construction workers, operators, and 
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owners and clients) ranked terrorism & sabotage actions first, whilst the consultants, 
planners and designers group ranked it third, and the academic group ranked it second, with 
both of these groups ranking corruption first. The construction workers and owners and 
clients ranked corruption second, while the operators ranked it third. The consultants, 
planners and designers, construction workers and owners and clients ranked the insecure 
areas seventh, while it was ranked second and fourth from the operators’ and researchers' 
point of view, respectively. Lawlessness was ranked third based on construction workers’, 
and owners’ and clients’ perceptions. It ranked fourth, ninth and 16th regarding consultants, 
planners and designers’, researchers’, and operators’ perceptions, respectively. Thefts were 
ranked fourth by both the construction workers and operators, 10th by owners and clients, 
11th by researchers, and 15th by consultants, planners and designers. Regarding the less 
influential RFs, researchers ranked the leakage of sensitive information 23rd, construction 
workers and owners and clients ranked it 24th, and the consultants, planners and designers, 
and operators ranked it 25th. All the stakeholders ranked the geological risk 26th, apart from 
researchers, who ranked it 25th. All the stakeholders ranked natural disasters and weather 
conditions 27th and vehicle accidents 28th, apart from construction workers, who ranked 
vehicle accidents 29th. The ranking of IRFs indicated that the hacker attack on the operating 
or control system and animal accidents were ranked 29th and 30th, respectively. Only the 
construction worker group ranked hacker attack on the operating system differently, at 28th. 
At the same time, to highlight the top five IRFs by each group of stakeholders (as highlighted 
in yellow in Table 4.6), it is worth noting that the lawlessness and corrosion were the first 
and second-highest IRFs from the consultants, planners and designers’ point of view. 
Corrosion and lawlessness were the top IRFs from the construction workers’ point of view. 
From the perception of the operators, the top IRFs were terrorism & sabotage, and improper 
inspection & maintenance. Corruption and terrorism & sabotage were the top IRFs according 
to the perceptions of the owners and clients in the projects. Terrorism & sabotage and 
corruption were the main IRFs in OGP projects according to the researchers who participated 
in the survey.  
Form the previous discussion and results in Table 4.3,Table 4.4, and Table 4.6, it is obvious 
that the analysis and the ranking of the IRFs is significantly influenced by the occupations 
of the stakeholders in OGP projects. The staff who are working on-site considered terrorism 
& sabotage as the most severe IRF. This consideration might be because they are the people 
who are suffering from these threats directly, while this kind of risk is only threatening other 
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staff such as consultants, planners and designers, and researchers in an indirect way, as these 
people are office-based workers and might not work at the site. Thus, the staff who are 
working on-site see that terrorism & sabotage is the IRF that has the most effect. However, 
office-based staff (i.e. consultants, planners and designers, and researchers) considered 
corruption to be the most severe IRF, as these people usually check the work procedures 
(e.g. welding) and the quality of the final work. This might give them a chance to compare 
the designs and work procedures developed in the design offices with the real work being 
carried out at the project site. If they identify a difference between the project on research 
and on-site, they may conclude that the final check and acceptance of the work has been 
affected by some kind of corruption; so they are the ones who perceive that corruption is the 
IRF that has the most effect.  
4.4.5.2 Ranking the IRFs based on their types  
As shown in Table 4.6 above, ranking the IRFs based on their types was as follows.  
1- With regard to ranking the S&S IRFs terrorism & sabotage has come first followed 
by theft, threats to staff, low public legal & moral awareness, leakage of sensitive 
information and public’s poverty & education level. 
2- The ranking of the CR IRFs was as follows: corrosion & lack of protection against 
it, shortage of IT services & modern equipment, hacker attacks on the operating or 
control system, operational errors, design, construction & material defects, and weak 
ability to identify & monitor the threats. 
3- Natural disasters & weather conditions was the first HSE IRF, followed by 
inadequate risk management, limited warning signs, improper inspection & 
maintenance, improper safety regulations and exposed pipelines. 
4- Lawlessness was the first IRF related to R&R, followed by corruption, little research 
on this topic, lack of risk registration, lack of  appropriate training, and stakeholders 
are not paying  appropriate attention. 
5- The ranking of the IRFs related to PL was as follows: insecure areas, geological risks, 
vehicle accidents, the pipeline is easy to access, conflicts over land ownership, and 
animal accidents.  
The next section shows the ranking of the five groups of IRFs with regard to their degree of 
impact on OGP projects in Iraq based on the survey. 
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4.4.6 The Results of Ranking the Five Groups of IRFs 
According to the survey results, the five types of IRFs have been ranked as follows. S&S 
type of IRF is the most critical factor followed by PL, HSE, R&R and OR. Table 4.7 shows 
the difference in ranking the IRFs by participants' occupation. In the survey, rank 1 was 
represented as the highest impact and 5 the lowest impact amongst IRF types. Therefore, the 
lowest value in the table means the highest tank.  




Total  I II III IV V 
Mean R* Mean R* Mean R* Mean R* Mean R* Mean R* 
S&S 2.155 1 1.857 1 2.014 1 2.244 1 2.359 1 2.273 1 
PL 2.634 2 2.929 2 2.465 2 2.780 2 2.410 2 2.939 2 
OR 3.134 3 4.000 5 3.676 5 3.561 5 3.538 4 3.091 3 
HSE 3.536 4 3.143 4 3.254 3 2.854 3 3.051 3 3.182 4 
R&R 3.541 5 3.071 3 3.592 4 3.561 4 3.641 5 3.515 5 
Note: Total means the overall results of the survey, (I) means the consultants, planners and designers; (II) 
means the construction workers; (III) means the operators; (IV) means the owners and clients; and (V) 
means the researchers. 
R* means Ranking  
From the table above, it is clear that all the groups of participants were agreed that S&S IRFs 
are the most influential groups or risks that affect the OGP projects in Iraq, followed by the 
IRFs related to the location of the pipelines (PL). The rest of the groups were ranked as 
follows. The planners and designers said the HSE, R&R and OR are the third, fourth and 
fifth groups of IRFs, respectively. The HSE, R&R and OR IRFs were the third, fourth and 
fifth groups of IRFs, respectively, as per the construction workers and operators. With regard 
to the ranking of the groups of the IRFs based on the perspective of the owners and clients, 
the HSE IRFs come third, the OR IRFs come fourth and the R&R come fifth. The academics 
said the third, fourth and fifth groups of the IRFs are OR, HSE, and R&R, respectively. The 
next section discusses the participants’ comments with regard to adding additional risk 
factors to the survey.  
4.4.7 Participant Responses with Regard to Addition of New IRFs  
In question 7, which was an open-ended question, the participants wrote several comments 





Table 4.8: The summary of the participants’ comments about adding IRFs to the survey.   
IRFs Type of the IRFs 
Not taking into account the future of urban planning. PL & R&R 
External oil spots that negatively affect the pipes. PL & HSE 
The internal corrosion due to the transported products (e.g. pumping more than one 
type of petroleum product and crude oil from different fields in the same pipe). Product type 
Salt and metal contents in the transported products such as silver. Product type 
The pipes are older than the design age. Material 
Unqualified, less experienced and not well-educated staff with regard to risk 
management.  Labour 
Poor quality pipes and material defects. Material 
Construction defects (e.g. welding defects and damage to the pipes during the 
construction of new ones). 
Construction 
Defects 
Table B.1 and Table B.2 in APPENDIX B:  explain all the participants’ comments about 
adding IRFs to the survey. As these IRFs were not mentioned in the literature review, the 
highlighted IRFs in the table above expand the knowledge of the risks that affect the safety 
of the pipeline projects in Iraq. This could be counted as one of the contributions of this 
research with regard to identifying a list of the IRFs that reflects the problems in OGP 
projects more realistically and specifically in Iraq. The results of this section will be used in 
the future work of this research, as discussed in the future work section in the last chapter of 
this thesis. The next section evaluates the effectiveness degree of the RMMs with regard to 
managing the IRFs in the OGP projects based on the survey in Iraq. 
4.4.8 Evaluating the Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs) 
As explained earlier, in section 4.2, part of the survey conducted in this research is to analyse 
and evaluate the RMMs with regard to their degree of effectiveness in managing the IRFs in 
OGPs in Iraq based on the perceptions of the stakeholders in these projects. Question 8 and 
9, therefore, asked about the usability and effectiveness degree of these RMMs, respectively 
(see item number III in section 4.2.2, and items 3.1 and 3.2 in point number 3 in section 4.4).  
In other words, in order to make useful suggestions about risk management, the RMMs were 
evaluated based on (I) their chance of being used in OGP project in Iraq, i.e. “their usability 
degree”, and (II) their effectiveness degree with regard to managing the IRFs in these 
projects, i.e. “their effectiveness degree”. Below are the two tables that show the results of 
the survey with regard to evaluating the usability and the effectiveness of the RMMs. 
A descriptive statistical analysis method is used to analyse the RMMs in the survey. The 
mean of the five-point Likert scale was calculated to determine the numerical values of 
usability and effectiveness degrees of the RMMs in OGP projects in Iraq. The results of 
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analysing the RMMs in the survey are presented in Table 4.9, which shows the results of the 
survey with regard to evaluating the usability degree of the RMMs, and  
Table 4.10, which shows the results of the survey with regard to evaluating the effectiveness 
degree of the RMMs. 




Total I II III IV V 
Avoid ’Insecure Zones’ 3.652 2.929 3.789 3.829 3.385 3.758 
Anti-terrorism design 3.475 2.643 3.676 3.268 3.564 3.545 
Avoid the registered risks and threats 3.616 3.357 3.662 3.634 3.513 3.727 
Proper training 3.768 3.643 3.634 3.854 3.769 4.000 
Move to an underground pipeline 4.051 3.857 4.085 4.390 3.846 3.879 
Anti-corrosion such as isolation and cathodic protection 4.247 4.000 4.282 4.512 4.103 4.121 
Protective barriers and perimeter fencing 3.783 3.214 3.732 3.878 3.872 3.909 
Warning signs and marker tape above the pipeline 3.727 3.143 3.732 3.683 3.846 3.879 
Foot and vehicle patrols 3.606 3.143 3.648 3.683 3.590 3.636 
High technology and professional remote monitoring 3.480 2.643 3.606 3.415 3.359 3.788 
Government-public cooperation 3.278 3.000 3.183 3.463 3.205 3.455 
Proper inspection, tests and maintenance 3.677 3.429 3.549 3.805 3.769 3.788 
Note: Total means the overall results of the survey, (I) means the consultants, planners and designers; (II) 
means the construction workers; (III) means the operators; (IV) means the owners and clients; and (V) means 
the researchers. 
As shown in the table above, the overall results of the survey indicate anti-corrosion 
measures (such as isolation and cathodic protection), moving to an underground pipeline, 
and protective barriers and perimeter fencing are the RMMs with the highest chance of being 
used in OGP projects in Iraq. The stakeholders have a similar point of view, which is that 
anti-corrosion measures such as isolation and cathodic protection is the RMM with the 
highest chance of usability. The second-highest RMM, according to the planners, consultants 
and designers, construction members and operators, is moving the pipelines underground. 
However, this method was only third highest for owners and clients. Protective barriers and 
perimeter fencing was the method with the second-highest chance of usability according to 
owners and clients, and third highest according to operators and researchers. Appropriate 
training was second highest for researchers, and third for consultants, planners and designers, 
while avoiding ‘Insecure Zones’ was third highest according to construction members.  
Table 4.10 shows the results of the survey with regard to evaluating the effectiveness degree 
of the RMMs.  
Table 4.10. The effectiveness degree of each RMM by participants' occupation. 
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 RMMs Effectiveness 
Total I II III IV V 
Anti-corrosion such as isolation & cathodic 
protection 
4.232 3.857 4.113 4.415 4.513 4.091 
Move to an underground pipeline 4.066 3.929 4.000 4.220 4.333 3.758 
High technology & professional remote monitoring 3.995 3.643 4.070 3.878 4.000 4.121 
Proper inspection, tests & maintenance 3.828 3.429 3.887 3.829 3.872 3.818 
Proper training 3.793 3.857 3.662 3.780 3.897 3.939 
Avoid "Hot-Zones 3.778 3.214 4.014 3.659 3.744 3.697 
Anti-terrorism design 3.778 3.143 3.986 3.341 4.179 3.667 
Avoid the registered risks & threats 3.773 3.500 3.817 3.683 4.000 3.636 
Protective barriers & perimeter fencing 3.682 3.214 3.577 3.756 3.872 3.788 
Warning signs & marker tape above the pipeline 3.571 2.929 3.577 3.439 3.923 3.576 
Government-public cooperation 3.545 3.214 3.563 3.561 3.564 3.606 
Foot & vehicle patrols 3.530 3.429 3.563 3.634 3.615 3.273 
Note: Total means the overall results of the survey, (I) means the consultants, planners and designers; 
(II) means the construction workers; (III) means the operators; (IV) means the owners and clients; and 
(V) means the researchers. 
As shown in the table above, based on the perceptions of the stakeholders in OGP projects 
that were collected from the survey, the results of evaluating the effectiveness degree of the 
RMMs show that anti-corrosion measures (such as isolation and cathodic protection), 
moving to an underground pipeline, and the use of high technology and professional remote 
monitoring are the most effective RMMs. The RMM anti-corrosion measures (such as 
isolation and cathodic protection) is the most effective RMM based on the perceptions from 
construction team members, operators, and owners and clients, while this method is the 
second most effective according to consultants, planners and designers, and researchers. 
Laying the pipelines underground is the most effective RMM for consultants, planners and 
designers, while this method is the second most effective according to operators, and owners 
and clients. Using high technology and professional remote monitoring is the most effective 
RMM according to researchers, the second for construction workers, and the third for 
consultants, planners and designers, and operators.  Appropriate training to mitigate the IRFs 
is the third most effective RMM according to consultants, planners and designers, and 
researchers. Meanwhile, the third most effective RMMs for construction workers, and 
owners and clients were avoiding insecure areas and anti-terrorism design, respectively. 
Although the overall results indicated that anti-corrosion measures and laying the pipelines 
underground were the RMMs that had the best chance of being used and were the most 
effective methods in the projects, the stakeholders' jobs in OGP projects might affect their 
evaluation of the RMMs. This can be seen in some examples: consultants, planners and 
designers said that training the staff is the RMM with the highest rate of usability to mitigate 
the IRFs. However, the construction teams and operators said avoiding insecure areas and 
having protective barriers and perimeter fencing are the methods with the highest rate of 
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usability and effectiveness, as they are facing the risk of terrorism & sabotage directly. 
Additionally, using high technology and professional remote monitoring was evaluated as 
an effective RMM because such methods could cover wide areas in less time (compared to 
foot and/or vehicle patrols) to identify any threats to the pipelines. 
The results presented in the two tables above will be used later in this research to make useful 
recommendations for identifying effective risk mitigation methods in OGP projects in Iraq, 
see Chapter 7:. The next section discusses the participants’ comments with regard to adding 
more RMMs to the survey.  
4.4.9 The Comments of the Participants about Additional RMMs  
In question 10, which is an open-ended question, the participants wrote several comments 
with regard to adding RMMs to the survey use. A summary of these comments is provided 
in Table 4.11. 
Table 4.11: The summary of the participations’ comments about adding RMMs to the 
survey.   
type frequency (total comments = 29) percentage (100%) 
Advanced IT System 7 24.138 
Anti-Corrosion 5 17.241 
Barriers 4 13.793 
Pipe Brand 2 6.897 
Product Type 2 6.897 
Geographical Location 2 6.897 
Government and Public cooperation 2 6.897 
Maintenance 1 3.448 
Experts 1 3.448 
Grads 1 3.448 
Risk registration 1 3.448 
Rules and regulation 1 3.448 
Table B.3 and Table B.4 in APPENDIX B: provide all the participants’ comments about 
adding RMMs to the survey. As these RMMs were not mentioned in the survey, the 
highlighted RMMs in the table above expand the knowledge of managing the IRFs in OGP 
project in Iraq. These RMMs could be used to manage the IRFs in OGPs in Iraq and minimise 
the problems of risk in these projects, as suggested by the survey participants. The results of 
this section will be used in the future work of this research, as discussed in the future work 
section in the last chapter of this thesis.   
The next section shows the priority of applying the RMMs to manage the IRFs in OGPs 
during the different stages of the projects. 
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4.4.10 Application of RMM at Different Project Stages 
The project stages were ranked regarding the priority in applying the RMMs in OGP projects 
in Iraq by calculating the average response rate in question 10 of the survey, as shown in 
Table 4.12.  
Table 4.12: The priority of the project stage regarding applying the RMMs to mitigate the 




Total I II III IV V 




1.52 1 1.857 1 1.423 1 1.439 1 1.385 1 1.848 1 
Constructi
on Stage 
2.045 2 2.071 2 2.085 2 1.951 2 2.051 2 2.061 2 
Operation 
Stage 
2.434 3 2.071 3 2.493 3 2.610 3 2.564 3 2.091 3 
Note: Total means the overall results of the survey, (I) means the consultants, planners and designers; (II) 
means the construction workers; (III) means the operators; (IV) means the owners and clients; and (V) 
means the researchers. 
R* means Ranking 
As shown in the table above, all the groups of participants were agreed that the management 
of the IRFs in the projects must be started during the project planning stage. The construction 
and operation stages were the second and third stages with regard to this ranking.  
The next section makes a comparison between the above and underground pipelines based 
on the subjected risk factors in each type of these pipelines.  
4.4.11 Comparing the Aboveground and Underground OGPs  
The table below shows the results of comparing the above ground and underground pipelines 
based on the stakeholders’ perceptions. 
Table 4.13: A comparison between the above ground and underground pipelines based on 
the stakeholders’ perceptions. 
Above ground and 
underground pipes 
Total I II III IV V 
A 71% 21.4% 35.2% 22.0% 17.9% 42.2% 
B 29% 78.6% 64.8% 78.0% 82.1% 57.6% 
A- The above ground pipelines are safer than the underground pipelines, despite them being exposed, and 
providing sabotage and theft opportunities. 
B- The underground pipelines are safer than the above ground pipelines, despite the corrosion, geological, 
construction and maintenance risks. 
Note: Total means the overall results of the survey, (I) means the consultants, planners and designers; (II) 
means the construction workers; (III) means the operators; (IV) means the owners and clients; and (V) 
means the researchers. 
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As shown in the table above, the majority of participants (71%) agreed that extending the 
pipelines underground is a safer option than extending them above ground, even though they 
will be subject to corrosion, and the added cost and time factors which should be considered 
when digging the trenches and laying the pipelines. This is because underground pipelines 
are not as easy to access as above ground ones. Thus, they are less subject to terrorism & 
sabotage, thieves, and vehicular and animal accident IRFs, which are the most influential 
risk factors in Iraq. Additionally, there is no need for an early warning system of signs along 
with the pipelines when the pipes are underground.  
4.5 Summary  
In this chapter:  
• A questionnaire survey has been designed to analyse the IRFs and RMMs in OGP 
projects in Iraq, which were identified from the literature review.  
• The survey design has gone through two stages, which are the pilot-like survey that 
provided the feedback to design the final draft of the survey, see section 4.2.   
• An online questionnaire survey with a snowball sampling technique is utilised in this 
research to ensure widespread distribution of the survey, section 4.3. 
The survey findings: 
• The response rate of the survey was high, section 4.4.1. And, the sampling of the 
targeted population was good, section 4.4.2.  
• Based on the results of the reliability testing of the survey, the survey was found to 
be reliable, section 4.4.3. 
• Based on the perceptions of the stakeholders in different occupations in OGP projects 
in Iraq, the survey was used to analyse the probability (RP) and severity (RS) of the 
IRFs that influence the safety of these projects in Iraq, section 4.4.4. Additionally, it 
was used to rank the IRFs with regard to their degree of impact on the projects, 
section 4.4.5.  
• The findings of the survey (e.g. the RP and RS of the IRFs) will be used as inputs for 
a computer-based risk analysis model that uses fuzzy theory to analyse and rank the 
IRFs with regard to their degree of impact on the projects, see Chapter 5:. 
• This chapter has shown the ranking of the five groups of the IRFs (S&S, PL, OR, 
HSE and R&R) with regard to their degree of influence on the projects, section 4.4.6. 
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• The survey has evaluated some of the RMMs that could be used to manage the IRFs 
in OGP projects in Iraq, based on the perceptions of the stakeholders about their 
degree of usability and effectiveness degrees in their projects, section 4.4.8.   
• The results of the survey regarding evaluating the RMM (e.g. their degrees of 
usability and effectiveness in OGP projects in Iraq) will be helpful to make useful 
suggestions and recommendations about identifying effective risk mitigation 
methods in OGP projects in Iraq. In other words, based on their degree of 
effectiveness, some of the RMMs will be suggested to manage the IRFs in Iraq, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 6: and Chapter 7:. 
• This chapter has shown the IRFs and RMMs added to the survey based on the 
comments of the participants, as per sections 4.4.7 and 4.4.9, respectively. This helps 
in providing lists of IRFs and RMMs that reflect the situation of risk management in 
pipeline projects in Iraq more realistically.   
• The added IRFs and RMMs will be used in the future work of this research, as 
discussed in the future work section in the last chapter of this thesis.   
• This chapter has shown the ranking of the project stages with regard to their priority 
in terms of managing the IRFs in the projects, section 4.4.10.  
• This chapter has shown that the majority of the stakeholders in OGP projects in Iraq 
prefer the above ground pipeline network, section 4.4.11. 
The statistical analysis of the opinions collected from the survey could provide a good 
understanding and meaningful results about the IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects in Iraq 
based on the perceptions of a larger and diverse group of stakeholders in these projects, 
which is one of the advantages of the survey. A big population participating in the survey 
enhances the chance of collecting more answers from them. This is one of the advantages of 
using an industry-wide questionnaire survey to analyse the IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects 
in Iraq. In other words, collecting stakeholders’ perceptions, i.e. government agencies, 
academic organisations and professionals (i.e. consultants, planners, designers, operators 
and researchers) about OGPs’ IRFs and RMMs could reduce the time and the cost of 
investigations into OGP issues. Additionally, it ensures more verified analysis results of 
OGP IRFs and RMMs as the information has been gathered from field-experienced 
individuals. However, this method relies on their willingness to cooperate with the 
researchers, which is one of its disadvantages. 
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CHAPTER 5: RISK MODELLING AND RANKING 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the modelling and the ranking methodology of the 
Influencing Risk Factors (IRFs) associated with the Oil and Gas Pipeline (OGP) projects. In 
this study, the theory of fuzzy logic is used for modelling the IRFs and ranking them in order 
of their degree of impact on the projects. In the previous chapter, the ranking of the IRFs 
was based on their values of probability and severity levels that were calculated from the 
survey, which directly depends on the people’s personal judgements. This means that 
ranking the IRFs based on the results of the survey is uncertain and biased due to the 
uncertainty and biases of the judgements. Hence, the theory of fuzzy logic was used to rank 
the IRFs since fuzzy logic has been widely used to reduce the uncertainty and the biases 
associated with the judgement of the participants in a survey.  
This chapter is organised under four sections as follows. Section 5.2 describes the 
background of fuzzy theory and its applications while ranking the IRFs. Section 5.3 presents 
the computer-based risk modelling based on the results of analysing the IRFs through the 
industry survey (Chapter 4:) in order to rank them. The values of Risk Probability (RP) and 
Risk Severity (RS) calculated from the survey are used as key inputs for risk modelling and 
ranking. Section 5.4 discusses the results of risk modelling and section 5.5 explains the 
difference in the results of the survey and the fuzzy theory. Section 5.6 summarises this 
chapter.  
5.2 Background of Fuzzy Theory   
5.2.1 Overview and Definitions  
The fuzzy set was introduced by Zadeh in 1965 and it is defined as a generalised 
characteristic function; that is, one which varies uniformly between zero and one rather than 
merely assuming the two values of zero and one (Zadeh, 1965). The fuzzy set is defined as 
a set of elements (X) that belong to a group called universe (U) with a membership degree 
between 0 and 1 (i.e. X ∈ U, [0-1]) (Pawlak, 1985). The definition of fuzzy logic is stated as 
follows. A fuzzy set (X) of a universe of (U) is represented by a collection of ordered pairs 
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of a generic element X ∈ U and its grade of membership function, as described below (Li et 














Where N is the number of elements in X. Note that the symbol ⅀ here denotes the collection 







Fuzzy logic uses intermediate values that give the grades of membership of various points 
in the fuzzy set. Higher values imply a higher grade of membership, and vice versa. Typical 
examples of fuzzy sets are the set of children around five years old or the set of young men. 
However, there still appears to be no satisfactory axiomatic theory to describe fuzziness 
(Nahmias, 1978). On the other side, on many occasions, the values of [0 or 1] are used to 
describe a certain phenomenon. For example, describing the colour of a number of cars in a 
car park to see how many black or white cars there are, where 1 means a black car and 0 
means a white car. In this situation, we are not expecting to see any values rather than 0 or 
1. Such a concept, therefore, is defined as a restriction concept. However, using fuzzy theory 
to describe the cars’ colours in that car park, we might see the value of 0.7 for example, as 
the colour of that car is not white or black, but nearly black. In such a case about how the 
colour of the car is near to the black colour, some of the observers might say it is 0.6, 0.65 
or 0.7, which depends on their personal perspective. The personal perspective and the 
personal judgement lead to a range of differences in the results, which is called uncertainty. 
In that case, the numbers between 0 and 1 are called membership degrees, in which the 
element belongs to the group (i.e. the universe). In another definition of the fuzzy theory, 
Marinos (1969) thought it was quite possible that certain situations might have values other 
than falsehood and truth. In another situation, the approach uses many variables with values 
between 0 to 1 called fuzzy set” to describe the degree of a person – is he/she young or old 
– and is called fuzzy logic (Marinos, 1969). Fuzzy logic – the logic underlying approximate, 
rather than exact, modes of reasoning – is finding applications that range from process 
control to medical diagnosis (Zadeh, 1988). The fuzzy logic system has different functions 
and three different stages, which are (i) fuzzification, (ii) model engine and knowledge base, 
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and (iii) defuzzification, as will be explained in section 5.3. The next section explains the 
application of fuzzy theory in risk analysis. 
5.2.2 Applications of Fuzzy Theory in Risk Analysis 
The IRFs in the OGP projects are complicated, uncertain and subjective due to the unique 
characteristics of the projects and the different types of work activities in them (Taylan et al. 
2014). The absence of enough information, the inaccurate values about the probability and 
severity levels of the IRFs in the projects, and the uncertainty and basicness of the external 
judgements about their impact lead to vague, imprecise understanding and low reliability of 
the results of risk assessment (Cheng and Lu, 2015). De Almeida et al. (2017) made a 
comparison between the multi-criteria and multi-objective models applied in risk 
management. This study has confirmed that fuzzy theory helps decision-makers to deal with 
the uncertainties and partially known facts while making decisions. A comprehensive review 
was conducted by Islam et al. (2017) about the application of fuzzy theory in the risk 
assessment of construction projects. Fuzzy theory was found to be an active alternative way 
of handling the uncertainty and vagueness associated with using document analysis, 
questionnaire survey and Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) risk analysis methods. AHP 
works by directly comparing two risk factors with regard to their degree of impact on the 
projects, as explained below.  
The IRFs IRF1  IRF2 
The impact 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
The answer                   
However, using AHP under an uncertain environment is still an open issue. This is because 
the weights of the main and sub-criteria in the tables imply that there exists variation between 
the priorities of the main and sub-criteria mentioned in the model (Azadeh et al. 2013).  
Gentile et al, (2003) as cited by Khan et al. (2015), p. 131 made a comparison between the 
methods and models used in risk management, explaining that: “Similar to any other 
quantification, quantification associated with inherent safety assessment may also contain a 
certain extent of uncertainty. A fuzzy logic based method was developed to produce a more 
realistic estimation reducing the uncertainty associated with subjective analysis”. The next 
paragraph focuses on reviewing a number of past studies that used fuzzy theory to analyse 
the Third-Party Disruption (TPD) IRFs in the oil and gas industry because they are related 
to the scope of this research.  
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Akyuz and Celik (2015) used fuzzy theory to enhance the results of analysing the potential 
hazards and accidents associated with transporting Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) using cargo 
tanks. Yoon et al. (2013) used fuzzy theory to develop a risk assessment system to analyse 
the IRFs in gas refinery plants. However, the IRFs in OGPs are different from those in cargo 
tanks and refinery plants because these projects run for thousands of kilometres, which 
makes them more exposed to the risk factors. This means that the methodology of these two 
papers cannot be applied to effectively analyse the operational IRFs in similar industry 
fields.  
Urbina and Aoyama (2017) used fuzzy theory to reduce the uncertainty associated with 
determining the cost of risk management activities in pipeline projects and the probability 
and the severity levels of the hazards events in these projects. Nevertheless, this study did 
not allocate the IRFs to the project activities to develop a risk optimisation model, which 
could help the project stakeholders in making sound decisions related to the safety domain 
of the projects. Innal et al. (2016) tried to reduce the uncertainty in safety-instrumented 
systems using fuzzy theory and Monte Carlo analysis. Keprate and Ratnayake (2016) used 
fuzzy theory to select the best locations for fatigue-critical piping locations for inspection of 
offshore pipelines. However, the last two studies did not consider the location of the 
pipelines. 
Lu et al. (2015) study used fuzzy theory to calculate the probability of failure for underwater 
gas pipeline projects undertaken by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). 
Peng et al. (2016a) used fuzzy theory to assess the TPD in OGP projects in Petro-China 
Gang-Zao. Fuzzy theory has enhanced the results of analysing the probability of  accidents 
and the IRFs. Nonetheless, the last two studies did not analyse the severity levels of the IRFs, 
which is one of their limitations.  
Guo et al. (2018) analysed some of the leakage accidents occurring in OGPs in China. This 
study used fuzzy theory and Bayesian theory to overcome the problem of defining the 
boundaries of the IRFs while analysing them in the pipeline projects. Jamshidi et al. (2013) 
provided a systematic risk assessment framework to analyse the IRFs in gas pipeline projects 
in Iran. This study used fuzzy theory as a rational way of coming up with precise and robust 
results of risk analysis. In these two studies, the detection of the probability and severity 
levels of the IRFs was not accurate, which is one of their limitations. The authors suggested 
performing more quantitative analyses about the IRFs (e.g. questionnaire survey and experts’ 
judgements) in order to provide accurate inputs for their study before using fuzzy theory to 
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analyse the IRFs. In doing so, fuzzy theory will provide a better prediction about the 
probability and severity levels of the IRFs in the projects.  
Zhang et al. (2016) developed a framework in order to evaluate the performance of a 
petroleum transportation system. The framework identified and evaluated the IRFs via the 
literature review and a questionnaire survey. It used linguistic evaluation and fuzzy theory 
to reduce the complexity and uncertainty involved with risk analyses using experts’ 
judgements. However, this study evaluated the IRFs based on ambiguous features and 
subjective perception, which means this study needs further research with regard to 
providing dynamic data and effective mathematical algorithms and calculations to provide 
more trusted inputs for the study. 
Fuzzy theory, therefore, has been increasingly used to analyse the IRFs in projects in the 
conditions of poor data and information about the IRFs (Chan et al. 2009). Still, all of the 
above-mentioned studies are limited to analysing the IRFs during the operational stage of 
the projects. Meanwhile, the pipeline projects are vulnerable to a massive number of risks 
during the planning and construction stages as well. Moreover, the above-mentioned studies 
are limited to analysing the IRFs in their countries, which means they would not be effective 
to analyse the IRFs in OGP projects elsewhere. This is because OGP projects are subjected 
to different IRFs in different countries and different situations. Fuzzy theory cannot be used 
to draw and analyse the failure scenarios in pipeline projects, which is one of the 
disadvantages of using fuzzy theory for analysing the IRFs in the projects. 
The next section provides the assessment and the ranking of the IRFs in OGP projects using 
a computer-based risk assessment model integrated with fuzzy theory. 
5.3 Computer-based Risk Modelling  
As explained in section 5.2 above, fuzzy theory is useful to reduce the uncertainty caused by 
the lack of data about the IRFs and the biases associated with human judgements about their 
level of impact. The uncertainty associated with analysing the IRFs comes from the lack of 
data about the IRFs, which leads to stakeholder judgements being used to analyse the IRFs 
in the projects. Therefore, both the lack of data and the biases associated with the judgements 
about the IRFs make the results of risk analyses uncertain. Figure 5.1 shows a flowchart of 
a computer-based risk model that was developed in this study with the aim of ranking the 
IRFs based on their degree of the probability and severity impact in the OGP projects.  
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Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) (Model)
Risk Severity (RS) 
 
Figure 5.1: The data flowchart used in risk modelling.  
The model uses the fuzzy logic tool provided by the Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) toolbox 
within MATLAB software to calculate the Risk Index (RI) of IRFs. Following are the steps 
involved as inputs, process and outputs of the computer-based risk model. 
1- The findings of the survey, which are the Risk Probability (RP) and Risk Severity 
(RS) levels of the IRFs, were used as inputs of the FIS.  
2- As shown in Figure 5.1, using the FIS to analyse the IRFs in the projects has three 
stages, which are (I) fuzzification (section 5.3.1), (II) the engine of the FIS (e.g. the 
knowledge base, the controlling rules and the membership functions) (section 5.3.2) 
and (III) defuzzification (section 5.3.3) (Jamshidi et al. 2013; Li et al. 2010 and Sa’idi 
et al. 2014).  
3- The outputs of the model are the value Risk Index (RI) of the IRFs. 
5.3.1 Step I: Fuzzification  
Fuzzification is about providing crisp inputs for the FIS by generating sets of membership 
functions. The inputs of the system were the RP and RS of the IRFs, which were calculated 
via the survey. The Min-Max membership function, which is explained in Figure 5.2, was 
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Figure 5.2: The Min-Max membership function of the fuzzy theory. 
The model uses the fuzzy logic functions provided by the Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) 
toolbox within MATLAB software to calculate the Risk Index (RI) of IRFs. Two types of 
membership functions proposed by the Mamdani mathematical algorithm were applied in 
this research, which are the triangular and the trapezoidal membership functions. In the 
triangular membership function, full compliance is only attained at the maximum score of 
RI, see Figure 5.3 and equations 5.1 to 5.5. 
  
Figure 5.3: Fuzzy triangular membership functions for (a) RP, (b) RS, and (c) RI.  
 
Very Low (VL): [0 0 1.25] 
Low (VL)         : [0 1.25 2.5] 
Moderate (M)   : [1.25 2.5 3.75] 
High (H)           : [2.5 3.5 5] 





Very Low (VL)  =[0 0 1.25] ...(5.1) (1.25-x)/(1.25-0.5) 0.5<x<1.25 
0 Otherwise 
     
f(L)x= 
(1.25-x)/(1.25-0.0) 0.0<x<1.25 





     
f(M)x= 
(x-1.25)/(2.5-2) 1.25<x<2.5 
Moderate (M)  = [1.25 2.5 3.75] ...)5.3) (3.75-x)/(3.75-2.5) 2.5<x<3.75 
0 Otherwise 
     
f(H)x= 
(x-2.5)/(3.5-3) 2.5<x<3.5 
High (H)  = [2.5 3.5 5] ...)5.4) (2.5-x)/(5-3.5) 5<x<3.5 
0 Otherwise 
     
f(VH)x= 
(x-4)/(4.5-4) 4<x<4.5 
Very High (VH)  = [3.75 5 5] ...)5.5) 
(4.5-x)/(5-4.5) 4.5<x<5 
0 Otherwise   
The trapezoidal membership function has used both an upper and a lower limit. This means 
that the RI score is considered fully compliant once it hits the upper limit, see Figure 5.4 and 
equations 5.6 to 5.10. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Fuzzy trapezoidal membership functions for (a) RP, (b) RS, and (c) RI.  
 
Very Low (VL): [0 0 0.5 1] 
Low (VL)         : [0.5 1 1.5 2] 
Moderate (M)   : [1.5 2 2.5 3] 
High (H)           : [2.5 3 3.5 4] 






Very Low = [0 0 0.5 1]  ...(5.6) (1-x)/(1-0.5) 0.5<x<1 
0 Otherwise 
     
f(A)x= 
(x-1)/(1.5-1) 0.5<x<1 




     
f(A)x= 
(x-2)/(2.5-2) 1.5<x<2 
Moderate = [1.5 2 2.5 3]  ...(5.8) 5 2<x<2.5 
(3-x)/(3-2.5) 2.5<x<3 
0 Otherwise 
High = [2.5 3 3.5 4] …(5.9) 






     
f(A)x= 
(x-4)/(4.5-4) 3.5<x<4 
Very High = [4 4.5 5 5] …(5.10) 5 4<x<4.5 
(4.5-x)/(5-4.5) 4.5<x<5 
0 Otherwise 
The next section details the knowledge base and the controlling rules of the model.  
5.3.2 Step II: The Knowledgebase and If-Then Rules 
The knowledge base is about defining the rules controlling the behaviour of the FIS, i.e. the 
“If-Then rules” (Guzman Urbina and Aoyama, 2017). The following 25 rules were used to 
control the model. The rule weight was one. The rules are presented below. 
1. Rule 1: If RP is Very Low and RS is Very Low, Then RI is Very Low 
2. Rule 2: If RP is Very Low and RS is Low, Then RI is Very Low 
3. Rule 2: If RP is Very Low and RS is Medium, Then RI is Very Low 
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4. Rule 4: If RP is Very Low and RS is High, Then RI is Medium 
5. Rule 5: If RP is Very Low and RS is Very High, Then RI is Medium 
6. Rule 6: If RP is Low and RS is Very Low, Then RI is Very Low 
7. Rule 7: If RP is Low and RS is Low, Then RI is Low 
8. Rule 8: If RP is Low and RS is Medium, Then RI is Low 
9. Rule 9: If RP is Low and RS is High, Then RI is Medium 
10. Rule 10: If RP is Low and RS is Very High, Then RI is High 
11. Rule 11: If RP is Medium and RS is Very Low, Then RI is Low 
12. Rule 12: If RP is Medium and RS is Low, Then RI is Low 
13. Rule 13: If RP is Medium and RS is Medium, Then RI is Medium 
14. Rule 14: If RP is Medium and RS is High, Then RI is High 
15. Rule 15: If RP is Medium and RS is Very High, Then RI is High 
16. Rule 16: If RP is High and RS is Very Low, Then RI is Low 
17. Rule 17: If RP is High and RS is Low, Then RI is Very Medium 
18. Rule 18: If RP is High and RS is Medium, Then RI is High 
19. Rule 19: If RP is High and RS is High, Then RI is High 
20. Rule 20: If RP is High and RS is Very High, Then RI is Very High 
21. Rule 21: If RP is Very High and RS is Very Low, Then RI is Medium 
22. Rule 22: If RP is Very High and RS is Low, Then RI is Very Medium 
23. Rule 23: If RP is Very High and RS is Medium, Then RI is High 
24. Rule 24: If RP is Very High and RS is High, Then RI is Very High 
25. Rule 25: If RP is Very High and RS is Very High, Then RI is Very High 
The next section details the defuzzification step and the outputs of the risk model.  
5.3.3 Step III: Defuzzification 
The defuzzification step is about providing the outputs of the model, which were the RI for 
each IRF. The defuzzification could be done in different methods such as centroid, the centre 
of an area, mean max membership, weighted average, max membership principle, the centre 
of sums, IRF weighted valuation function and first (or last) of maxima methods. This thesis 
has used the centre of the area to calculate the RI of the IRFs because this method of 
defuzzification is a more reasonable and reliable method. Most of the past studies that used 
fuzzy theory to analyse the IRFs in projects have used the centre of the area to calculate the 
RI of the IRFs. For example, these include Beriha et al. (2012), Elsayed (2009), Innal et al. 
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(2016), Jamshidi et al. (2013), Kabir et al. (2015), Keprate and Ratnayake (2016), Li et al. 
(2010), Markowski and Mannan (2008), Mokhtari et al. (2012), Sa’idi et al. (2014) and 
Tabesh et al. 2018. The FIS provides a powerful rule viewer tool, which displays the RP and 
RS of the IRFs, controlling rules, and the RI of the IRFs. The rule viewer and the three-
dimension risk matrix are shown in Figure 5.5.  
Figure 5.5: (a) Rule viewer, and (b) 3D risk matrix in FIS.  
The results of analysing the IRFs using the FIS are shown in the next section. 
5.4 Results 
Table 5.1 presents the key output of the risk model which are the results of analysing the 
IRFs using the FIS. 
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Table 5.1: The results of assessing the IRFs using FIS. 
IRFs The outputs of the FIS, which are the 
values of RI for the IRFs 
 
Rank 
RI (1)* Risk 
Range 
RI (2)^ Risk 
Range 
 
Terrorism & sabotage  3.99 H 4.38 VH 1 
Corruption  3.87 H 4.38 VH 2 
Low public legal & moral awareness  3.8 H 4.36 VH 3 
Insecure areas  3.76 H 4.34 VH 4 
Theft  3.75 H 4.33 VH 5 
Corrosion & lack of protection against it  3.72 H 4.31 VH 6 
Lack of  appropriate training  3.71 H 4.29 VH 7 
Improper safety regulations  3.7 H 4.2 VH 8 
Exposed pipelines  3.7 H 4.15 VH 9 
Improper inspection & maintenance  3.69 H 4.13 VH 10 
Shortage of modern IT services  3.68 H 4.01 VH 11 
Conflicts over land ownership 3.68 H 4.04 VH 12 
Weak ability to identify & monitor the risks  3.67 H 3.87 H 13 
Design, construction & material defects 3.64 H 3.78 H 14 
Lack of risk registration  3.6 H 3.72 H 15 
Easy access to pipeline  3.57 H 3.67 H 16 
Limited warning signs  3.56 H 3.65 H 17 
Little research on this topic 3.55 H 3.63 H 18 
Lawlessness  3.54 H 3.61 H 19 
Stakeholders not paying  appropriate attention  3.51 H 3.54  20 
Public poverty & education level 3.49 H 3.52 H 21 
Inadequate risk management 3.48 H 3.52 H 22 
Leakage of sensitive information 3.38 H 3.28 H 23 
Threats to staff 3.35 H 3.25 H 24 
Operational errors 3.3 H 3.25 H 25 
Geological risks 3.17 H 3.25 H 26 
Natural disasters & weather conditions 3.1 H 3.25 H 27 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control 
systems 
3.03 H 3.18 H 28 
Vehicular accidents 2.8 M 2.68 M 29 
Animal accidents 1.95 L 2.5 M 30 
*RI(1): RI using triangular membership function. ^ RI(2): RI using trapezoidal membership function. 
In this research, the IRFs were ranked with regard to their degree of impact on OGP projects 
in Iraq based on their values of RI, which were the results of the FIS. The table above shows 
the top five IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq, which are terrorism & sabotage, corruption, low 
public legal & moral awareness, insecure areas and theft. And the IRFs with less impact in 
these projects are geological risks, natural disasters & weather conditions, hacker attacks on 
the operating or control systems, vehicular accidents and animal accidents.  
The results of Table 5.1 above (e.g. the RI of the IRFs) will be used in Chapter 6: to optimise 
the pipeline routes/alignments based on identified IRFs to build a new pipeline project. This 
analysis involves selecting safest routes/alignments for a pipeline project. Additionally, the 
RI values of each IRF will be used in Chapter 7: to select the optimum safest 
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routes/alignments for the new pipeline project, and in Chapter 8: and Chapter 9: to quantify 
the delay impact from IRFs on the project duration of a pipeline construction project.  
Using the fuzzy theory to analyse the IRFs in the project could be improved by paying more 
attention towards the fact that the fuzzy theory-based expert system applies an imprecise 
term that could lead to poor performance in many situations, where identifying risk level of 
OGP stations includes many overlapping variables changing over time. This does not really 
assess the risk level in such big projects, and can affect decision-making as well as the 
validity and reliability of decisions made by such systems. Consequently, we recommend 
taking a step forward and considering sophisticated, intelligent approaches to identify the 
risk levels of such big projects. In our upcoming study that will be available online soon, we 
are applying a set of machine-learning methods for the same purpose. 
5.5 Difference between the Results of the Risk Importance 
Index and the FIS 
Table 5.2 shows the difference in ranking the IRFs using the Risk Importance Index (RII) of 





Table 5.2: The ranking of the IRFs using equation 4.1 and the FIS. 




Terrorism & sabotage  S&S 1 1 
Corruption  R&R 2 2 
Low public legal & moral awareness  S&S 9 3 
Insecure areas  PL 3 4 
Theft S&S 5 5 
Corrosion & lack of protection against it  OR 6 6 
Lack of  appropriate training  R&R 12 7 
Improper safety regulations  HSE 7 8 
Exposed pipelines  HSE 13 9 
Improper inspection & maintenance  HSE 8 10 
Shortage of modern IT services  OR 14 12 
Conflicts over land ownership PL 20 11 
Weak ability to identify & monitor the risks  OR 10 13 
Design, construction & material defects OR 19 14 
Lack of risk registration  R&R 17 15 
Easy access to pipeline  PL 16 16 
Limited warning signs  HSE 15 17 
Little research on this topic R&R 18 18 
Lawlessness  R&R 4 19 
Stakeholders not paying  appropriate attention  R&R 11 20 
Public poverty & education level S&S 22 21 
Inadequate risk management HSE 24 22 
Leakage of sensitive information S&S 25 23 
Threats to staff S&S 21 24 
Operational errors OR 23 25 
Geological risks PL 26 26 
Natural disasters & weather conditions HSE 27 27 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control systems OR 29 28 
Vehicle accidents PL 28 29 
Animal accidents PL 30 30 
In addition to the uncertainty associated with analysing the IRFs based on the traditional risk 
assessment and ranking methods using the RII, as explained earlier in the study (see section 
1.3), ranking the IRFs regarding their RI values might not reflect their criticality. When 
comparing the ranking of the IRFs using the results of RII and the FIS, it was found that the 
five most critical IRFs and the five least critical ones barely changed, with a slight change 
between the 3rd and the 4th and the 28th and the 29th IRFs.  
The FIS assists in overcoming the limitations in ranking the IRFs using the traditional 
assessment methods via the RII (Kraidi et al. 2020). The difference in the ranking of the 
IRFs using the two different methods is because the FIS uses the class of linguistic 
summaries ‘VL, L, M, H and VH’ and the If-Then to analyse the IRFs. For example, the 
probability of the IRF ‘little research on this topic’ is = 3.62 and its severity = 3.7. The rank 
of this IRF was 18th with RI = 3.55. However, the probability of the IRF ‘lack of risk 
registration’ = 3.57 and its severity = 3.66, which are lower than the probability and severity 
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levels of ‘lack of risk registration’, but ‘lack of risk registration’ was ranked higher as the 
15th IRF with RI = 3.6.  
5.6 Summary  
This chapter has defined the fuzzy theory and explained its applications in analysing the 
IRFs in the projects, see section 5.2. The main points in this chapter are: 
• The findings of the survey were used as inputs for a computer-based risk analysis 
model, section 5.3.1.  
• This model has used fuzzy theory to assess and rank the IRFs in OGP projects in 
Iraq, section 5.3.2.  
• The FIS in MATLAB was used to apply the fuzzy theory for assessing, ranking and 
calculating the RI values of the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq.   
• The results of the survey and the FIS highlighted the most critical IRFs in OGP 
projects in Iraq, which are: terrorism & sabotage, corruption, low public legal & 
moral awareness, insecure areas and theft, see Table 5.1.  
• The IRFs that have the least impact on OGP projects in Iraq are: geological risks, 
natural disasters & weather conditions, hacker attacks on the operating or control 
systems, vehicular accidents and animal accidents, see Table 5.1.  
• The fuzzy theory has helped in providing more accurate results of assessing and 
ranking the IRFs in OGP projects by reducing the uncertainty and biases in analysing 
them, based on the results of the survey only. When comparing the ranking of the 
IRFs using the results of RII and the FIS, it was found that the five most critical IRFs 
and the five least critical ones barely changed, see section 5.4. 
• The results of the risk analysis will be used in the next chapter in order to select safe 
routes/alignments for the new OGP projects in Iraq (Chapter 7:) and quantify the 
impact of the IRFs on the duration of these projects (Chapter 8: and Chapter 9:). 
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CHAPTER 6: DESIGN OF THE RISK MANAGEMENT 
FRAMEWORK  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the design details and specifications of a Risk Management 
Framework (RMF), which is one of the key goals of this study. The RMF is applicable to 
analyse and manage the Influencing Risk Factors (IRFs) in Oil and Gas Pipeline (OGP) 
projects. In addition, the RMF has three main functionalities: (i) optimise the safest pipeline 
routes/alignments for laying new projects, (ii) make recommendations of a suitable risk 
mitigation method in the projects, and (iii) quantify the impact of delay caused by the IRFs 
in the OGP projects. 
The RMF is structured under three main components: inputs, process and outputs. The key 
information in this study that is used to design the RMF are the IRFs and the list of existing 
Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs). The potential list of existing RMMs was identified 
through an extensive review of the literature (in Chapter 2:). The IRFs and RMMs were 
analysed with regard to their impact on the OGP projects based on the industrial survey (in 
Chapter 4:) and the application of fuzzy theory (in Chapter 5:). The key modules integrated 
in the RMF are risk optimisation, identification of RMMs and quantification of the impact 
of delay caused by the associated IRFs in the OGP project. The key outputs of the RMF are 
(i) the safest pipeline routes/alignments based on risk level in the suggested routes; (ii) the 
effective RMMs, which could be used to mitigate the IRFs; and (iii) the amount of 
construction delay in the projects caused by the IRFs in the OGP projects. Section 6.2 
presents the overall structure of the RMF and its design procedure. The details of key 
components of the framework that are integrated within the framework, which are the inputs 
(section 6.3), the processes (section 6.4) and the outputs (section 6.5), are discussed below. 
Section 6.6 presents the summary of this chapter.  
6.2 Design a Risk Management Framework (RMF)  
This section explains the design specification of the RMF and the key components of the 
framework that include inputs, the process and the outputs. The research study designed a 
concept and developed a risk management framework in order to analyse and manage the 
risk factors associated with the OGP projects. According to the justification presented in 
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Chapter 3:, the pragmatist paradigm philosophy is adopted in this study to design the RMF. 
Both qualitative and quantitative approaches were used to collect and analyse the 
information required to design and evaluate the RMF, as explained below.  
• The findings of the qualitative part of this research that were used to develop the 
RMF were the IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects, which were identified based on the 
literature review. In addition, the investigations of the literature review were 
extended to understand the limitations and the strengths of the existing RMFs in the 
OGP projects. Moreover, the literature review was used to analyse the past studies 
about selecting safest routes for the new pipeline projects and to analyse the impact 
of the construction delay in these projects.  
• The findings of the quantitative part of this research used to develop the RMF 
included the results of analysing the probability and severity levels of the IRFs, the 
usability and the effectiveness degrees of the RMMs (Chapter 4:) and the values of 
the Risk Index (RI) of the IRFs (Chapter 5:). 
Based on the findings mentioned above, the following steps are followed to design the risk 
management framework.  
• Step 1: Identify, assess and document the potential IRFs in OGP projects.  
This step involves investigating the past studies about risk management in OGP projects 
worldwide. The findings of this step are the potential IRFs in the projects which could 
obstruct the safety of their projects. This step will help the stakeholders in looking at the 
problems in their projects and considering the causes of the problems they might face. The 
sources of the IRFs listed in this research should not be ignored because they were identified 
based on international investigations about addressing the problems in OGP projects.  
• Step 2: Establish the context of the risk management plans.  
The qualitative part of the research was extended to review the past studies about managing 
the IRFs in the projects (section 2.5). Additionally, the literature review was used to examine 
the prior studies about selecting safest routes for the new pipeline projects (section 2.5.2) 
and to analyse the construction delay in these projects (section 2.5.3). The findings of this 
step have helped to understand the existing management system and identify the strengths 
and limitations of the existing RMFs in OGP projects.  
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• Step 3: Risk assessment. 
The IRFs were assessed with regard to their degree of impact on the projects based on the 
results of  
1- An industrial survey that tested the Risk Probability (RP) and Risk Severity (RS) of 
the IRFs (section 2.4.4, 2.4.5); and  
2- The results of the fuzzy theory used to calculate the IRFs’ degree of impact on the 
projects (section 5.3.3). 
This step has helped in ranking the IRFs with regard to their degree of impact on the projects.  
• Step 4: Potential risk treatments – how will the risk will be managed? 
This step involved identifying the RMMs used to manage the IRFs in the projects based on 
the literature review (section 2.4.6) and analysing their effectiveness degree in the projects 
based on the results of the survey (section 4.4.8). The findings of this step could make the 
RMFs able to be used for recommending some of the effective RMMs in OGP projects.  
• Step 5: Create a risk management plan, implementation and evaluation.  
Selecting an appropriate risk management and controlling plan is a vital part of risk 
management. This step involves using the findings of the four steps above to measure and 
control each risk factor in the projects. In this research, the findings of this step will be 
flowchart diagrams about the inputs, process and outputs used to assess and manage the IRFs 
in OGP projects in Iraq. The risk management plan of this research involves designing an 
integrated RMF, which could be implemented to optimise and manage the IRFs in the new 
pipeline projects. Additionally, it includes analysing the construction delay in the projects, 
which is caused by the associated IRFs. Meanwhile, the evaluation process of the developed 
RMF involves testing its functionality by using it for analysing and managing the IRFs in a 
real case study project selected from Iraq. 
This section, therefore, is about providing the explanations about designing and evaluating 
the RMF which will be used to manage the IRFs in OGP projects. The key information about 




Figure 6.1: Specifications of the Risk Management Framework (RMF). 
As shown in Figure 6.1 above, the RMF has been developed using three main components 
(input, process and outputs), which are explained below: 
1- Inputs: The main sources of inputs used in the RMF are the list of IRFs and their 
degree of impact in terms of probability and severity in the OGP projects, which is 
analysed and expressed as the risk index (RI) of each risk factor. The values of RI of 
the IRFs were calculated using fuzzy logic (for details see Chapter 5:).  
2- Process: Three main functionalities/modules were used in this RMF, which are  
A. Optimising the safest pipeline route/alignment for the OGP projects,  
B. Recommending suitable risk mitigation methods in the OGP projects, and  
C. Quantifying the impact of delay caused by the IRFs in the OGP projects.  
3- Outputs: The main outputs of the framework are  
A. Identification of safest pipeline route/alignment based on risk level in the 
suggested routes;  
B. Identification of suitable RMMs for particular risk factors in OGP projects; and 
C. Quantification of delay impacting the OGP project’s delivery, which could be 
caused by the associated IRFs.  
The RMF will be used to analyse the IRFs in a real case study pipeline project. The case 
study used in this research is aimed to analyse the IRFs associated with a new gas/oil export 
pipeline project, which will be built in the south of Iraq. This project belongs to the Gazprom 
Neft Badra company. The length of the pipe is 164 km, and, when constructed, the pipe will 
transport the extracted gas from Badra gas field to the shipping point on the Gulf in Basra. 
A detailed data flowchart of the RMF is shown in Figure 6.2.  
Inputs
• List of Influencing 
Risk Factors (IRFs)
• Risk Index (RI) 
values of the IRFs.
• Risk Mitigation 
Methods (RMMs).





• Risk mitigation 
analsysis
• Delay impact analysis 
using ASTA and 
@Risk simulator
Outputs
• Safer pipeline routes 
in OGP projects.
• Effective Risk 
Mitigation Methods 
(RMMs) in OGPs.
• The impact of the 






Risk Management in OGP projects The Impact of the IRFs on the Duration of an OGP projectSelect the safest Route for an OGP project
(Inputs)
Research articles, conference papers, 
surveys, databases, and reports, etc     
Qualitative document analysis (literature review)
• Identify the IRFs and RMMs  in OGP 
projects 
• Understand the limitations in the 
existing RMFs 
The IRFs and RMMs (identified 
from the literature review )
Design an industrial questionnaire survey
Collect the stakeholders  perceptions about the 
IRFs and RMMs in the projects
Statistical analysis of the survey
• The values of RP and RS of the IRFs
• The  Usability  and  Effectiveness  
degrees of the RMMs.
The RP and RS of the IRFs
The application of the fuzzy theory 
Calculate the Risk Index (RI) of the IRFs
The RI values of the IRFs
Qualitative and subjective document analyses  
 Use the safest route for the 
new pipeline
Allocate the IRFs to the suggested routes for 
the new pipeline
• The RI values of the IRFs
• Documents collected from 
the projects
Calculate the total risk in the routes
Select the safest route for the new pipeline 
project (the route that has the less total risk)
• The RI values of the IRFs
• The project activities 
• Documents from the projects
Qualitative and subjective document analyses  
Allocate the IRFs to the pipeline activities
Calculate the impact of the IRFs on the duration of 
the new OGP project  (Use MCS and LHS) 
Estimate if the project could be 
delivered on time or not
Subjective and objective analysis of the RMMs using the 
 Usability  and  Effectiveness  of the RMMs 
The effective RMMs to manage the IRFs 
in OGP projects in Iraq
RMMs using the  Usability  and 
 Effectiveness  of the RMMs (from the 
survey)
Identify new IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects (flexible 
inputs)
Figure 6.2: A detailed view of the inputs, process and outputs used in the Risk Management Framework (RMF). 
130 
 
Below is a detailed explanation of the preparation of the inputs of the RMF, the three 
functional processes modules and the outputs of the framework. 
6.3 Inputs  
This section explains the inputs used in the RMF and the preparations for collecting them, 
as shown in Figure 6.3. 
 
Figure 6.3: The inputs of the RMF. 
(Inputs)
Research articles, conference papers, surveys, databases, and reports, etc     
Qualitative document analysis (literature review)
• Identify the IRFs and RMMs  in OGP projects. 
• Understand the limitations in the existing RMFs 
Design an industrial questionnaire survey
Collect the stakeholders  perceptions about the IRFs and RMMs in the projects
Statistical analysis of the survey
• The values of RP and RS of the IRFs
• The  Usability  and  Effectiveness  degrees of the RMMs.
The application of the fuzzy logic theory 
Calculate the Risk Index (RI) of the IRFs
The RI values of the IRFs




As shown in Figure 6.3 above, the main inputs of the RMF are the values of the RI of the 
IRFs, which were calculated as follows. 
1- The research started by identifying the IRFs associated with OGP projects based on 
an extensive literature review about them in OGP projects worldwide (details in 
Chapter 2:, section 2.4.4 and 2.4.5).  
2- The IRFs were analysed based on the findings from an industrial survey conducted 
in Iraq. The perceptions of the stakeholders about the RP and RS levels of the IRFs 
were collected and analysed in order to assess the IRFs (details in Chapter 4:, section 
4.4.4 
3- The values of RP and RS of the IRFs have been used as inputs for the Fuzzy Inference 
System (FIS) in MATLAB, which was used to calculate the RI values of the IRFs 
(details in Chapter 5:). 
4- Moreover, in order to make useful suggestions for risk management in the OGPs, 
this research has identified some of the RMMs via a literature review (section 2.4.6) 
which could be used to manage the IRFs in the projects. The RMMs were evaluated 
regarding their degree of effectiveness in managing the risk factors in the projects, 
which were calculated based on the results of the industrial survey (details in Chapter 
4:, section 4.4.8).  
5- Further and above, a qualitative and subjective analysis of the documents collected 
from the projects is used within the process of risk analysis in order to allocate the 
identified IRFs to the routes and activities of the pipeline projects, as will be 
explained in the process section.  
In this research, the main inputs of the developed RMF are the common IRFs and RMMs in 
the OGP projects, which were identified based on the literature review. However, for other 
studies about analysing the IRFs and RMMs in different projects and/or in different 
geographical regions, the researchers might use a different list of IRFs and/or RMMs that fit 
the situations of their studies. In other words, this research designed an RMF that uses 
flexible lists of inputs based on the situations of the projects, which means that the 
application of the framework is not limited to certain projects or geographical regions; it will 
be applicable to manage the IRFs in OGP projects in different security and geographical 
situations. Additionally, if the researchers or the stakeholders have identified newly arising 
IRFs and RMMs in their project which should be considered in the risk management of the 
project, the RMF will also be applicable in future studies about analysing these new IRFs. 
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Moreover, the impact of the IRFs and RMMs in the projects might change as time passes. 
Nevertheless, the RMF has the ability to reanalyse the impact of the IRFs (i.e. the RP and 
RS levels of the IRFs) and the RMMs (i.e. the effectiveness and usability degrees of the 
RMMS) in the future. The next section details the process components of the RMF. 
6.4 Process  
This section describes the process of the RMF, which includes three modules. Module 1 is 
risk optimisation, module 2 is identification of risk mitigation methods, and module 3 is the 
quantification of the impact of delay in the construction of pipeline projects caused by the 
associated IRFs. The processes of each are explained below:  
1- Module 1: Optimisation of safest pipeline route/alignment for the new projects, 
which helps to identify the safest pipeline route/alignment in the OGP projects from 
the aspects of the risk level associated within the projects. The steps and algorithm 
for selecting the safest pipeline route/alignment for the new pipeline project are 
explained in section 6.4.1. 
2- Module 2: Identification of risk mitigation methods in the projects by suggesting 
some of the effective RMMs that could be used to manage the IRFs in the projects. 
The detailed process of how to identify suitable risk mitigation methods in the OGP 
project is explained in section 6.4.2.  
3- Module 3: Quantification of the impact of delay in the new pipeline projects 
delivery, which is caused by the associated IRFs in these projects. The process of 
quantifying the delay during the construction stage of the project is explained in 
section 6.4.3. 
6.4.1 Optimisation of OGP Pipeline Route/Alignment  
This section explains how the RMF could be used to select a safe pipeline route for the new 
OGP project, i.e. the case study project. Selecting safe pipeline routes for the new projects 
during the planning and design stage helps in improving the safety level of these pipelines 
during the construction and operation stages. The process details of this module are 





Qualitative and subjective document analyses  
 Use the safest route for the 
new pipelines
Allocate the IRFs with the routes of the pipelines
• The RI values of the IRFs
• Documents from the projects
Calculate the total risk in the routes
Select the safest routes for the new pipeline 
projects (the route that has the less total risk)
 
Figure 6.4: Process module 1 and output 1, select the safest pipeline route for the new project.  
As explained in the figure above, the RMF will use the values of the RI of the IRFs to analyse 
the impact of the IRFs on the pipeline routes in order to optimise the safest pipeline route 
for the new project. Figure 6.5 shows the algorithm used in this research to optimise safest 






Select the route with less summation of risk (A)
N = The number of routes
R = 0
Assume A1 is the less summation of risk 
A(R+1) < A(R)  
The less summation of risk  = A(R)
R < N  
Route (R) is the safest route to build the 
new pipeline project





The less summation of risk  = A1
The summation of risk in the route (A1, A2, ...AN)
• The impact of the IRFs on the projects (RI) (The 
findings of the FIS )
• The available documents about the routes 
Calculate the summation of risk in the proposed routes (A)
A = Summation of the RI values allocated with the routs 
Allocate the IRFs with the suggested route for the new OGP project. 
(use the subjective and objective analysis of the documents)
Inputs
Outputs
R <  N
The summation risk  in route N
R = R + 1
N = The number of routes
R = 0






Figure 6.5: The algorithm for selecting safe pipeline routes for the new OGP projects. 
As shown in Figure 6.5 above, the inputs used by the RMF to select the optimum safe 
pipeline routes of the new pipeline project were a list of the IRFs that may affect the safety 
of the pipelines in these routes. The IRFs were identified from the literature review, the 
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questionnaire survey and the documents collected from the project. The IRFs were evaluated 
based on the results of the survey and their degrees of impact on the project were calculated 
using the FIS in MATLAB. The process of calculating the impact of the IRFs in the pipeline 
routes and identifying safest pipeline routes for the new projects includes (i) subjective and 
qualitative document analyses, (ii) risk allocation and (iii) risk calculation in the project’s 
pipeline routes, as explained below.  
1- Allocation of the IRFs to a pipeline route/alignment. In this study, the routes were 
evaluated based on analysing the available/existing documents provided by the 
companies who are working on this project. The provided documents (such as design 
documents; maps; reports; time schedules; laboratories’ reports; work procedures 
and specifications; construction and insulation of the pipeline; functional 
specifications; field development report and similar documents) provide information 
about the pipeline routes based on site surveys and inspections, which were carried 
out along the routes suggested for the new pipeline project. The collected documents 
show useful information about the project. For instance, the topography of the 
pipeline routes; roads, rivers, lake and water channel crossings; seismic and flood 
hazard perceptions; geological risk in the routes (e.g. groundwater, the chemical and 
physical properties of the soil); weather conditions (e.g. rain, temperature and sand 
storms); population density; maps and GPS coordinates; the general conditions in the 
pipeline routes; and other supportive documents. Subjective and objective analyses 
of the documents and the professional knowledge in OGP projects were carried out 
to allocate the IRFs to the pipeline’s routes. The IRFs were allocated to the pipeline’s 
routes by adding the RI values of these IRFs to these routes. The documents are 
presented in Table C.1 of APPENDIX C:.  
2- Calculate (A), which is the summation of risk impact caused by the IRFs associated 
with the pipeline routes, using equation 6.1. In other words, (A) is the summation of 
the values of the RI of the IRFs associated with the suggested route.  
A = ∑ 𝑅𝐼 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠  … 6.1 
3- Select the optimum safe pipeline route to build the new oil and gas pipeline, which 
is the route that has the lowest value of (A), which is the summation of the impact of 
the associated IRFs with the routes. 
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The next chapter (see section 7.2) presents the results of using the RMF to optimise the 
pipeline routes for building the new pipeline project.  
6.4.2 Identification of Effective Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs) 
This section illustrates the process of making recommendations about risk management in 
OGP projects. Risk management is a continuous process of identifying and analysing the 
IRFs, risk response and risk control actions. Therefore, identifying and analysing effective 
RMMs to manage the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq is a part of the process of the RMF 
developed in the research. The steps to make recommendations for risk management to 
manage the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq are explained in Figure 6.6. 
(Outputs) (2)
(Process) module 2
Subjective and objective analysis of the RMMs using the  Usability  and 
 Effectiveness  of the RMMs (from the survey)
The effective RMMs to manage the IRFS in OGP 
projects in Iraq
RMMs using the  Usability  and  Effectiveness  
of the RMMs (from the survey)
 
Figure 6.6: Process module 2 and output 2, effective RMMs in the OGP projects. 
As explained in the figure above, the inputs used by the RMF to make useful suggestions 
regarding risk management in OGP projects in Iraq were a list of RMMs (which was 
identified based on the literature review) and their degrees of effectiveness in managing the 
IRFs (which were calculated based on the results of the survey). Depending on the character 
of the risk factor, a number of RMMs were suggested to manage each one of the IRFs. For 
example, avoiding insecure areas, using an anti-terrorism design, having protective barriers 
and patrols could mitigate the risk of terrorism & sabotage by direct action. Meanwhile, 
laying the pipelines underground can help with minimising the opportunities for terrorists 
and saboteurs to attack them. However, terrorists and vandals still have an opportunity to 
damage the pipelines. Educating government/public corporations about managing the safety 
of OGPs and reporting any case of vandalism could reduce pipeline attacks, but the 
137 
 
government cannot entirely stop terrorists and vandals from attacking the pipelines. From 
these examples, the RMMs were classified into direct and indirect RMMs in the way that 
the RMM(s) will mitigate the IRFs. In a case where the IRF has more than one RMM to 
manage it, the RMMs were ranked based on their degrees of effectiveness that were collected 
via the survey. Section 7.3 of Chapter 7: describes how to identify or recommend an effective 
RMM(s) to mitigate the IRFs in the OGP projects. 
6.4.3 Quantification of Impact Caused by IRFs in the OGP Project Delivery  
This section explains the procedure of analysing the level of impact of the IRFs on the 
duration of the project’s work activities. The steps of analysing and quantifying the delay in 




• The RI values of the IRFs
• The activities of the projects
• Documents from the projects
Qualitative and subjective document analyses  
Allocate the IRFs with the activities of the pipelines
Calculate the impact of the IRFs on the duration of new 
OGPs projects  (Use MCS and LHS) 
Estimate if the projects could be 
delivered on time or not
 
Figure 6.7: Process module 3 and output 3, delay analysis in the new OGP projects. 
As shown in the figure above, the inputs used to analyse the delay in the projects are (i) the 
IRFs, (ii) their values of RI (iii), the activities of the projects and (iv) their duration. Figure 
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6.8 shows the flowchart and the algorithm of analysing the level of impact of the IRFs on 
the duration of the work activities of the projects. 
End
Start
• The list of the IRFs (from literature review 
and questionnaire survey)
• The impact of the IRFs on the projects (RI) 
(The findings of the FIS )
• Work activities and Time schedule of the 
new OGP projects
Analyse the impact of the IRFs on the construction duration of  the 
new pipeline projects 
Allocating the IRFs with the work activities of 
the project
Calculate the summation of risk in each activity 
(using equation 6.2) 
The impact levels of the IRFs on the 
activities of the project
Calculate the summation of risk in each activity from 
100%  (using equation 6.3) 
Outputs




Figure 6.8: The algorithm for analysing the level of impact of the IRFs on the duration of 
the projects’ work activities. 
As shown in Figure 6.8 above, analysing the level of impact of the IRFs on the duration of 
the projects’ work activities includes the following steps. 
A- Inputs: the inputs used by the RMF to analyse the level of impact of the IRFs on the 
duration of the projects’ work activities were (i) a list of the IRFs that affect the safety 
of OGPs in Iraq (which was identified from the literature review); (ii) their degree of 
impact on the projects (which was calculated using the survey and the FIS in 
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MATLAB), and (iii) the activities and the time schedule of the projects, see Figure 
6.8.  
The case study project of this research is a new gas export pipeline project, which 
belongs to the Gazprom Neft Badra company. This project has been under planning 
since May 21, 2019, and the targeted delivery date is January 13, 2023. This means 
the duration of the project is estimated as three years and 238 days (1334 days).  
B- Process, which includes the following steps. 
1- Allocating the IRFs to the work activities of the projects. The IRFs were allocated 
to the work activities of the project depending on the type of risk factor and the 
nature of the activity. Professional knowledge was used to achieve this task. The 
subjective and objective analysis of technical reports, practical guides and studies 
such as CEPA Foundation Inc. and INGAA Foundation Inc (2016), E.E.P.A. 
(2016), F.T.A. (2019);, Folga (2007), Nandagopal (2007), Stanton and Stanton 
(2019) and Williams Companies (2019) were used to justify the process of risk 
allocation because they explained what is required in each activity, the nature of 
each activity and the potential IRFs that could affect that activity based on vast 
experience and a review of the construction process in OGP projects worldwide. 
For example, the IRFs such as terrorism; sabotage; Threats to staff; leakage of 
sensitive information; lack of  appropriatetraining; lack of records about the IRFs; 
little research about the IRFs; insecure areas; conflict over land ownership; 
improper safety regulations; natural disasters; weather conditions; weak ability to 
identify and monitor the threats; shortage of IT service; and construction defects 
were allocated to the trenching work activities (e.g. digging the trench, laying the 
pipelines, backfill, etc.) because such kinds of IRFs could affect the safety of the 
project during the trenching activities and cause delay in the project. The results 
of allocating the IRFs to the project’s work activities are shown in APPENDIX 
D:. 
This research has analysed the IRFs that affect the safety of the pipelines during 
the planning and design, construction and operation stages of the projects. In other 
words, this research has analysed the IRFs in OGP projects during the entire life 
of these projects. For some IRFs, such as corruption, which were assumed to affect 
the new pipeline projects, the activity or the location of the project does not matter, 
because such a risk factor does not only affect a specific project or a specific 
activity; it affects the OGP projects in the whole country and during their entire 
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work stages. Additionally, some relationships between the IRFs have been 
considered in this research. For instance, similar types of IRFs, such as sabotage 
and thefts, which are related to the security situation, might threaten a number of 
different pipelines together if the security level of a specific area is low. The case 
is similar to the pipelines in areas that are easy to access, which means the chance 
of vehicle and similar accidents is high in these areas. Meanwhile, it was assumed 
that some of the IRFs would not affect the new pipeline projects in Iraq. For 
example, hacker attacks on the system, as the stakeholders in OGP projects in Iraq 
are not using an advanced management system, yet.  
2- Calculate the summation of the impact of the IRFs associated with each project 
activity using equation 6.2, which calculates the summation of the RI values of 
the IRFs allocated to these activities.  
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
 ∑ 𝑅𝐼 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦                   …(6.2) 
For example, the summation of risk in the trenching activities; temporary erosion 
control and side support activities; pipe set-up and welding activities; and 
fabrication and installing pipe activities was 54.05, 57.48, 43.84 and 36.28, 
respectively.  
3- Calculate the summation of risk for the project activities from 100% using 
equation 6.3.  
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 10%) =  
∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 
∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡
 …(6.3) 
For example, the summation of risk from 100% for the above-mentioned activities 
was 2.567, 2.78, 2.082, and 1.723, respectively. 
4- Classify the project activities based on their level of risk as follows. The activities 
with [0-1] risk summation were considered as Very Low (VL) risk activities; the 
activities with [1-2] risk summation have a Low (L) risk; those with [2-3] risk 
summation have a Moderate (M) risk; those with [3-4] risk summation have a 
High (H) risk; and those with [4-5] risk summation have a Very High (VH) risk. 
For example, the level of risk for the above-mentioned activities was medium risk, 
medium risk medium risk and low risk, respectively. 
C- Outputs: Chapter 8: and Chapter 9: show the results of the above-mentioned steps 
in analysing the construction delay in the new pipeline projects. In other words, these 
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chapters present the amount of delay in the new pipeline projects during the 
construction stage of these projects.  
6.5 Risk Management Framework Outputs  
This section explains the key outputs of the RMF, which was developed to analyse the IRFs 
in the OGP projects, which are:  
1- The summation of the impact of the IRFs associated with the pipeline routes that are 
suggested to build the case pipeline project. Section 7.2 in Chapter 7: explains the 
final outputs of the summation of risk for the project’s pipeline routes. Additionally, 
this section explains the optimum safe route that could be used to build the project.  
2- The effective RMMs that could be used to manage the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq. 
Section 7.3 shows the final outputs of this step, which are the suggested RMMs that 
could be used to manage the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq.  
3- The level of impact of the IRFs on the duration of the project. The amount of 
construction delay in the project is presented in Chapter 8: and Chapter 9:. 
6.6 Summary  
This chapter presented the design and specification of the developed risk management 
framework, which will be used for assessing and managing the IRFs in OGP projects in 
addition to quantifying the delay impact in the OGP projects in Iraq. The RMF is useful to 
analyse the IRFs associated with OGP projects at the planning, design and execution stages. 
This chapter has also discussed details of inputs and algorithms used in the processes and 
key outputs of the framework: 
1- The inputs that were used to design the RMF in this research, which were the IRFs, 
the RI values and the RMMs in OGP projects, see section 6.3. 
2- The three process modules of the RMF, which are risk optimisation and select safest 
routes for the new pipeline projects; making recommendations about risk 
management in the projects; and analysing the delay caused by the associated IRFs, 
see sections 6.4.1, 6.4.2 and 6.4.3, respectively. 
3- The outputs of this RMF will be the optimum safest routes for the new pipeline 
projects; the effective RMMs that could be used to manage the IRFs in the project 




CHAPTER 7: RISK OPTIMISATION IN OGP PROJECTS  
This chapter aims to evaluate two functionalities of the Risk Management Framework 
(RMF) developed in this study and presented in the previous chapter. The chapter explains 
how to optimise risk factors to identify the safest route/alignment considering the risk level 
available in each route/alignment in the OGP project, which is the first functionality of the 
framework. The second functionality of the framework focuses on how to identify the 
effective/suitable Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs) to mitigate the risk factors in the OGP 
projects. This chapter also presents the background and introduction to a case study used to 
evaluate the functionality of the framework, as explained in section 7.1.  
This chapter also discusses two key outputs of the RMF developed in this research. The first 
output is risk optimisation and identification of the safest pipeline route/alignment based on 
risk levels. The second output is the identification of the suitable RMMs which could be 
used to mitigate/control the IRFs in OGP projects. The case study selected in this research 
is a new oil and gas export pipeline, which will be built in the south of Iraq. This project 
belongs to the Gazprom Neft Badra Company. The key inputs are the IRF associated within 
the case study project in Iraq and their degree of impact on the project. Section 7.2 explains 
the functionality of the RMF with regard to how to use it to optimise risk and identify safest 
routes/alignments for the OGP projects. Section 7.3 explains the second functionality of the 
RMF for identifying and recommending suitable risk mitigation methods in the OGP 
projects. Section 7.4 summarises the chapter.   
7.1 Introduction to the Case Study Project  
The case study of this research is to analyse the IRFs associated with a new oil and gas export 
pipeline, which is going to be built in the south of Iraq. This project belongs to the Gazprom 
Neft Badra Company. The length of the pipe is 164 km, and, when constructed, the pipe will 
transport the extracted oil and gas from Badra field to the shipping point on the Gulf in Basra. 
The export pipeline runs between the Central Processing Facility (CPF) of Badra field to the 
third-party pipeline system at Gharraf–An Nassiriyah. The expected operating gas flowrate 
of this pipeline is 110 Million standard cubic feet per day (MMSCF/day) and the design 
flowrate is 156 MMSCF/day. This project has been under planning since May 21, 2019 and 
the targeted delivery date is January 13, 2023. This means the duration of the project is 
estimated as three years and 238 days (1334 days). The information mentioned in this 
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paragraph was taken from Gulf Oil & Gas (2020a, 2020b) and Mehdi (2018). This section 
analyses the information collected from the project, which was provided by Gazprom 
company. Gazprom is a global energy company focused on geological exploration, 
production, transportation, storage, processing and sales of gas, gas condensate and oil, sales 
of gas as a vehicle fuel, as well as generation and marketing of heat and electric power 
(Gazprom, 2020). Gazprom is an international company working on the project, which is 
responsible for making investigations about the routes for the new gas pipeline (Iraq - 
Gazprom, 2020). In order to provide a general view of the OGP projects in the country, the 
two figures below show the Iraqi oil and gas infrastructure units on the map.  
 




Figure 7.2: Iraq oil fields and pipelines (Energy Security, 2008).  
Moreover, the figure below shows the oil and gas infrastructure units in the south of Iraq 




Figure 7.3: The pipelines in the south of Iraq (Al-Mudhafar, 2017). 





Figure 7.4: Badra and Zubair areas on the map (2B1st Consulting, 2012). 
 
Figure 7.5: The pipelines between Badra and Zubair areas on the map (Global Resources 
News, 2016).  
Five different routes are suggested for the new gas export pipeline. This section will describe 
route 1 of the gas pipeline project. The figures below were taken from the Iraq-Gazprom 
company.  
Route 1 of the pipeline project is divided into three sections. The figures and text below 
provide more detail about section 1 of route 1 of the pipeline project. The approximate length 
of this section is 48 km, see Figure 7.6. 
Pipeline route 1 
Pipeline route 2 
Pipeline route 3 
 
Pipeline route 4 
 





Figure 7.6: The join between Faihaa 1 with the Bazirgan pipeline near the current offloading 
station. 
After analysing the documents collected from the project, the following IRFs were identified 
in route 1 of the pipeline project, as shown in the table below.   
Table 7.1: The Influencing Risk Factors (IRFs) identified in route 1 of the pipeline project. 
IRFs IRF types 
Terrorism, sabotage and the security risk  Social and Security (S&S) 
Theft of the products S&S 
 Public awareness   S&S 
Leakage of sensitive information  S&S 
Corruption   Rules & Regulations (R&R) 
The absence of the law on TPD  R&R 
Lack of risk management practice   R&R 
Lack of  appropriate training  R&R 
Lack of risk registration   R&R 
Little research on this topic  R&R 
The pipeline is easy to access  Pipeline Location (PL) 
Land ownership conflicts   PL 
Improper safety regulations  Health Safety and Environment (HSE) 
Improper inspection and maintenance   HSE 
The risk related to the above ground pipeline   HSE 
Inadequate risk management   HSE 
Natural disasters  HSE 
The weak ability to manage the risk   Operational Risk (OR) 
Shortage of modern equipment   OR 
Design, construction and material defects Design and construction risk 
The figures below show information about the first section of the pipeline (48 km out of 164 
km). These figures show the IRFs associated with the project pipeline route 1. For example, 






Figure 7.7: The route elevation profile of the crossing area. 
The figure below shows the Horizontal Directional Drilling line of the pipeline.  
 
Figure 7.8: Satellite map of HDD crossing for Al Mzaak and Al Rahma canals. 
This initial route can cross the Bin Omran river near Bin Omran oil and gas field, to minimise 
its effect on nearby farmers. The river’s width at that area is approximately 200 m, with the 
north bank fully occupied by farms and houses, see Figure 7.9 to Figure 7.14. These figures 




Figure 7.9: This initial route can cross the Bin Omran river near Bin Omran oil and gas field. 
The river’s width at that area is approximately 200 m. 
 
Figure 7.10: River crossing; the river’s width in that area is approximately 200 m. 
 




Figure 7.12: Green area crossing of section 1 of route 1 of the pipeline 
 
Figure 7.13: Green area and road crossing of section 1 of route 1 of the pipeline 
 
Figure 7.14: Bridge crossing of section 1 of route 1 of the pipeline (there is a floating bridge 
near the offloading station with a weight capacity of 5 tons). 
The figures below show some photos of the surrounding area (between Yamama and 




Figure 7.15: Some photos of the area between the river and Yamama Junction and street.  
 
Figure 7.16: The area surrounding the pipelines. 
 




Figure 7.18: The area surrounding the pipelines. 
 
Figure 7.19: The area surrounding the pipelines. 
The figures below show some of the risks on section 1 of route 1 of the project, for example, 
Figure 7.20 shows oil contamination on that route, Figure 7.21 shows the flooding risk, 
Figure 7.22  shows illegal housing on the route and Figure 7.23 shows the risk of crude oil 
near to the surface on the pipeline route.  
 




Figure 7.21: A flooded area due to the seasonal rain. 
 
Figure 7.22: Illegal housing on the pipeline route. 
 
Figure 7.23: Crude oil near the surface on the pipeline route.  
The second section of route 1 of the pipeline project covers 103 km out of 164 km, which 
will be used to transport the natural gas extracted from Bazirgan to Zubair. When 
constructed, the third section of the pipeline is going to transport the extracted oil and gas 
from Zubair to the export point on the Gulf. To keep this chapter short, APPENDIX C: 
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explains the details of routes two, three, four and five of the pipeline on the map, see 
Figure C.1.  
The next section explains how the RMF will be used to select safest routes by optimising the 
risk level for the new OGP projects.  
7.2 Optimisation of Risk Factors in Pipeline Routes/Alignments 
This section tests the functionality of the RMF with regard to selecting a safe pipeline 
route/alignment for the new OGP project, i.e. the case study project. The section presents 
the results of section 6.4.1 in Chapter 6:, which explained the process of selecting safest 
pipeline routes/alignments for new pipeline projects using the developed RMF. The 
summary of the process steps is as follows:  
1- Identify the IRFs in the projects via literature review, analyse the RP and RS levels 
of the IRFs via the survey, and calculate the RI of these risk factors using fuzzy 
theory. 
The RI values are the standard values of the degree of impact of the IRFs in OGP 
projects in the whole of Iraq. 
2- Analyse the documents collected from the project to allocate the IRFs with the routes 
suggested to build the pipeline by adding the values of RI of the IRFs to the routes.  
3- Calculate the summation of risk in each route.  
4- Select the optimum safe routes for the OGP project by selecting the route that has 
the lowest summation of risk (A).   
Table 7.2 shows the results (the outputs) of using the steps above to analyse the IRFs in five 
routes that were suggested for building the new gas pipeline in the south of Iraq. 
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Table 7.2: The allocation of the IRFs to the activities of the project. 











Terrorism, sabotage and the security risk (S&S) 3.99* 3.99* 3.99* 3.99* 3.99* 3.99* 
Theft of the products (S&S) 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75     
Public awareness (S&S) 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 
Threats to staff (S&S) 3.35   3.35   3.35   
Socio-political effects (S&S) 3.49   3.49 3.49 3.49   
Leakage of sensitive information (S&S) 3.38 3.38   3.38   3.38 
Corruption (R&R) 3.87 3.87 3.87 3.87 3.87 3.87 
The absence of the law on TPD (R&R) 3.54 3.54 3.54 3.54 3.54   
Lack of risk management practice (R&R) 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 
Lack of  appropriate training (R&R) 3.71 3.71 3.71 3.71 3.71 3.71 
Lack of risk registration (R&R) 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 
Little research on this topic (R&R) 3.55 3.55 3.55 3.55 3.55 3.55 
The geographical location (PL) 3.76   3.76 3.76     
The pipeline is easy to access (PL) 3.57 3.57 3.57 3.57   3.57 
Land ownership conflicts (PL) 3.68 3.68 3.68 0 3.68 3.68 
Geological risks (PL) 3.17   3.17 3.17   3.17 
Vehicle accidents (PL) 2.8   2.8 2.8   2.8 
Animal accidents (PL) 1.95           
Improper safety regulations (HSE) 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Improper inspection and maintenance (HSE) 3.69 3.69 3.69     3.69 
The risk related to the above ground pipeline 
(HSE) 
3.7 3.7 3.7   3.7 3.7 
Limited warning signs (HSE) 3.56   3.56 3.56   3.56 
Inadequate risk management (HSE) 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 
Natural disasters (HSE) 3.1 3.1   3.1   3.1 
Corrosion (OC) 3.72   3.72 3.72 3.72   
The weak ability to manage the risk (OC) 3.67 3.67 3.67 3.67 3.67 3.67 
Shortage of modern equipment (OC) 3.68 3.68 3.68 3.68 3.68 3.68 
Design, construction and material defects (OC) 3.64 3.64 0 3.64   3.64 
Operational errors (OC) 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3   3.3 
Hacker attacks on the system (OC) 3.03           
The summation of RI in the each route (A)= 75.91^ 89.64^ 85.34^ 62.04^ 78.15^ 
*The value of the RI of each IRF (from the FIS). The RI values are the standard values of the degree of 
impact of the IRFs in OGP projects in the whole Iraq. ^ The summation of the column. 
With regard to calculating the summation of the impact of the IRFs associated with the 
pipeline routes, it was found in the table above that the pipeline route number 4 is the route 
that has the lowest summation of risk and pipeline route number 2 is the route that has the 
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highest summation of risk. This means that pipeline route number 4 is the safest route for 
the new pipeline project, and pipeline route number 2 is the riskiest route for this project.  
The routes/alignments suggested for the new pipeline project are tested further by analysing 
the level of risk in each route depending on the types of associated IRFs. Table 7.3 shows 
the analysis of the IRFs in the pipeline routes based on the types of IRFs that affect the 
project.  
Table 7.3: The summation of risk in the five routes by the type of risk in each route.  
The type of IRFs  Route 1 Route 2 Route 3 Route 4 Route 5 
Safety and Security (S&S) 14.92 18.38 18.41^ 14.63 11.17* 
Rules and Regulations (R&R) 21.78^ 21.78^ 21.78^ 21.78^ 18.24* 
Pipeline Location (PL) 7.25 16.98^ 13.3 3.68* 13.22 
Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) 17.67 18.13 13.84 10.88* 21.23^ 
Operation Risks (OR) 14.29 14.37 18.01^ 11.07* 14.29 
*means the lowest total risk and ^means the highest total risk.  
As shown in the table above, considering the impact of different types of IRFs on the project, 
it was found that pipeline route number 4 is the safest route with regard to the PL, HSE and 
OR IRFs, and pipeline route number 5 is the safest route with regard to the S&S and PL 
IRFs. These results also testify that route number 4 is the safest route for the new pipeline 
project as it appears to be the safest route three out of five times, see the table above.   
On the other side, pipeline route number 1 is the riskiest route considering the impact of the 
R&R IRFs; pipeline route number 2 is the riskiest route considering the impact of the R&R 
and PL IRFs; pipeline route number 3 is the riskiest route considering the impact of the S&S 
R&R and OR IRFs; pipeline route 4 is the riskiest route considering the impact of the R&R 
IRFs; and pipeline route number 5 is the riskiest route considering the impact of the HSE 
IRFs. It was found that the IRFs related to the R&R in the pipeline projects were found to 
be the riskiest type of risk factors in most of the routes, see Table 7.3.  
This research has investigated and ranked the IRFs associated with the pipeline projects in 
the whole of Iraq. These investigations provide wide knowledge about the IRFs and their 
impact on OGP projects across the country. Additionally, this research has evaluated a 
pipeline project in Iraq that covers 164 km, which is a long pipeline that crosses different 
regions with different topographies and safety environments. This has helped to quantify the 
impact of the IRFs on the pipeline routes in Iraq, particularly in the south of Iraq.  
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However, the IRFs might have a slightly different impact on the OGPs in different regions 
in the country. Also, the analysis and allocation of the IRFs to the pipeline routes were 
performed based on analysing the documents collected from these projects. This means that 
collecting more documents and carrying out targeted questionnaires, focus group survey 
and/or interviews with the stakeholders in these projects will enhance the process of 
analysing the IRFs that affect the pipelines along these routes. 
The next section explains the second functionality of the RMF that helps to identify an 
effective way or a suitable risk mitigation method to mitigate/control the risk factors in the 
OGP projects.  
7.3 Identification of Effective Risk Mitigation Methods 
(RMMs) 
This section illustrates the process of evaluating the functionality of the RMF with regard to 
using it to manage the IRFs in the projects. Risk management is a continuous process of 
identifying and analysing the IRFs, risk response and risk control actions. Therefore, 
identifying and analysing effective RMMs to manage the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq is a 
part of the process of the RMF developed in this research. This section present the results of 
section 6.4.2 in Chapter 6:. The summary of the process steps for making recommendations 
about risk management in OGP projects is as follows.  
1- Identify the RMMs in the projects via literature review and analyse their usability 
and effectiveness degrees in the projects via the survey.  
2- Classify the RMMs by their actions in managing the IRFs as direct and indirect 
RMMs. 
3- Allocate the RMMs to the IRFs in the project depending on the nature and the 
character of the IRFs and RMMs. 




Table 7.4: The RMMs suggested to mitigate the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq (Kraidi et al. 
2018a).  
IRFs  The suggested RMMs 
The RMMs that have a direct action to manage the 
IRFs 









1. Avoid the insecure areas. 
2. Anti-terrorism design. 
3. Use protective barriers and perimeter fencing 
4. Use a high technology and advanced risk-
monitoring system. 
5. Government-public cooperation. 
6. Foot and vehicle patrols. 
7. Use the rivers and lakes to extend the pipelines 
in the insecure areas despite the construction cost 
and the risk of corrosion. 
1. Use underground pipeline.  
2. Expand the protection zones along with the pipelines 
and remove the random buildings and unauthorised 
activities in the pipeline production zones. 




Government-public cooperation. 1. Use protective barriers and perimeter fencing. 
2. Expand the protection zones along with the pipelines 
and remove the random buildings and unauthorised 
activities in the pipeline production zones. 
Threats to staff 1. Avoid insecure areas. 
2. Foot and vehicle patrols. 
Government-public cooperation.  
The pipeline is 
easy to access 
1. Use underground pipeline.  
2. Use a high-technology and advanced risk-
monitoring system. 
3. Use protective barriers and perimeter fencing. 
4. Foot and vehicle patrols. 
5. Expand the protection zones along with the 
pipelines. 
6. Use the rivers and lakes to extend the pipelines 
in the insecure areas. 





1. Anti-corrosion such as isolation and cathodic 
protection. 
2. Extend the pipes inside concrete pipes. 
Proper inspection, tests and maintenance. 
Vehicle accidents 1. Use underground pipeline. 
2. Use protective barriers and perimeter fencing.  
3. Warning signs. 
4. Choose the pipeline routes accurately to avoid 
the traffic areas. 
Expand the protection zones. 
Animal accidents 
on the pipeline 
1. Use underground pipeline. 
2. Use protective barriers and perimeter fencing. 
Expand the protection zones. 
Corrosion and lack 
of protection 
against it 
1. Anti-corrosion such as isolation & cathodic 
protection. 
2. Extend the pipes inside concrete pipes. 
3. Use optimisers and remove the salts and metals 
before pumping the petroleum products. 
4. Pump only one type of product in the pipeline 
and use a different pipeline for each oil field. 
1. Proper inspection, tests and maintenance. 
2. Use high-quality pipes and spare parts. 
3. Do not use pipes older than the design age. 
The weak ability to 
identify and 
monitor the threats 
1. Use a high-technology and advanced risk-
monitoring system. 
2. Proper inspection, tests and maintenance. 
3. Proper training. 
4. Record pipeline accidents and risks in order to 
avoid them in the future. 
All of the RMMs could be used to improve the ability to 
identify and monitor the IRFs in OGP projects.  
Shortage of the IT 
services and 
modern equipment 






1. Proper training. 
2. Make studies about the safety of the pipelines 
and follow the new research about risk 
management. 
3. Use high-quality pipes and spare parts. 
4. Choose well-known design companies to 
minimise design errors. 
5. Choose well-known construction companies to 
minimise construction defects.  
Do not use pipes older than the design age. 
Operational errors 1. Choose well-known construction companies to 
minimise construction defects. 
2. Commit to the operating standards. (e.g. do not 
pass the design capacity). 
All of the RMMs could be used to manage the IRFs in 
OGP projects during the operation stage. 
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3. Use optimisers and remove the salts and metals 
before pumping the petroleum products. 
4. Pump only one type of product in the pipeline 
and use a different pipeline for each oil field. 
Lack of  
appropriatetraining 
Proper training. Record pipeline accidents and risks in order to avoid them 
in the future. 
Conflicts over land 
ownership 
1. Choose the pipeline routes accurately to avoid 
conflicts over land ownership. 
2. Taking future urban planning into account. 
 
Salt and metal 
contents in the 
transported 
products such as 
silver 
Use optimisers and remove the salts and metals before 
pumping the petroleum products. 
 
The pipes are older 
than the design age 
Do not use pipes older than the design age.  




Taking future urban planning into account.  








are dealing with 
this problem 
Make studies about the safety of the pipelines and 
follow the new research about risk management. 
 
Lack of risk 
registration 
Record pipeline accidents and risks in order to avoid 










1. The stakeholders in different levels should pay 
the  appropriate attention to the risk management 
in their projects.  
2. Follow and commit to the operating standards 





1. Proper inspection, tests and maintenance.  
Improper safety 
regulations 
1. All the methods.  
The aboveground 
pipelines increase 
sabotage and theft 
opportunities, as 
they are easy to 
access 
1. Move to an underground pipeline. 
2. Foot and vehicle patrols. 
3. Use the rivers and lakes to extend the pipelines 
in the insecure areas despite the construction cost 
and the risk of corrosion.  
1. Use a high technology and advanced risk-monitoring 
system. 
2. Use protective barriers and perimeter fencing. 
3. Warning signs and marker tape above the pipeline 
4. Expand the protection zones along with the pipelines 
and remove the random buildings and unauthorised 
activities in the production zones of the pipeline. 
Limited warning 
signs 
Warning signs and marker tape above the pipeline.  
Inadequate risk 
management 
All the methods.  
Pumping more 
than one type of 
petroleum product 
and crude oil from 
different fields in 
the same pipe 
Pump only one type of product in the pipeline and use 
a different pipeline for each oil field. 
 
Managing and mitigating the risk factors in these OGP projects is not limited to one stage of 
the project. Therefore, different risk mitigation methods were suggested to mitigate the risk 
factors during the project’s entirety. Based on the survey results, anti-corrosion measures 
such as isolation and cathodic protection were rated as effective RMMs. Corrosion could be 
protected against by providing the pipelines with an external coating, using isolation layers, 
a cathodic protection system, or a combination of these methods. However, these methods 
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are not perfect. Therefore, the condition of the coating, the isolation layers, and the system 
of cathodic protection must be periodically checked for any issues (Hopkins et al. 1999). 
The main disadvantage of this method is the added cost to the projects, and it might slow 
down pipeline construction and installation processes as certain protections need to be 
applied. 
Regular risk monitoring and surveys by using advanced technological and professional 
remote monitoring (e.g. aerial and satellite surveillance, remotely controlled vehicles, Global 
Positioning System (GPS), and smart camera systems) can help to investigate any 
unauthorised activities in OGP project zones such as terrorism, sabotage, thievery, illegal 
excavation, and construction activities near to the pipeline. Using these methods has a 
number of advantages, for example, surveying a large network of pipelines in a short period 
of time. The presence of these methods could serve as a deterrent against intentional TPD 
and provide quick risk prediction and alerts. These methods also enable photographs of 
pipelines to be shared between the project partners. However, they also have disadvantages 
including high capital investment for equipment and machinery, operational costs, and 
additional training for personnel on new software.  
Based on the survey results, foot and vehicle patrols are not effective RMMs as they are 
time-consuming, do not cover large areas of the OGP network, and need to be carried out at 
frequent intervals to be effective. That said, this method has some advantages such as 
requiring a moderate capital investment for equipment and machinery, and it is effective 
against intentional or unintentional TPD during inspection periods.  
Proper operational practices, inspections and maintenance reduce operative IRFs and 
mechanical failure for the pipeline. Most operators in OGP projects control operational IRFs 
by limiting the operational stress (operating pressure) and following the regulations and 
codes. However, Hopkins et al. (1999) noticed some problems with such a procedure: (i) the 
regulations and codes are different in different areas and companies; therefore, they are not 
applicable to OGPs everywhere; (ii) this procedure might potentially miss new IRFs if IRF 
identification and registration are not up to date; and (iii) this procedure creates an inflexible 
practice of risk management that restricts the stakeholders in applying new methods of 
identifying and mitigating the IRFs.  
The landowners and construction workers should monitor pipelines in their areas to avoid 
carrying out farming or construction work that could damage the pipes. Providing 
communication facilities for the local population such as emergency contact (emails and 
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phone numbers) and phone lines, mailboxes, and so forth) could help people to report any 
threat to a pipeline. Iraq’s OGP network is above ground, which means that the pipelines are 
susceptible to IRFs mainly related to TPD. 
The majority of participants agreed that moving pipelines underground is safer than having 
exposed ones, despite the corrosion and geological IRFs, and the construction and 
maintenance difficulties. 
This research’s findings and recommendations are suitable and applicable for OGPs in Iraq 
and many other countries under similar situations. OGP stakeholders could use this 
research’s findings to improve risk management during the pipeline projects' stages. 
Moreover, the RMF could be applied to mitigate the IRFs for other critical infrastructures 
such as water supply network; transportation system (e.g. railway, highways, fuel supply, 
etc.); energy supply infrastructure (e.g. transmission and distribution lines, nuclear power 
generators, etc.); telecommunication and communication facilities; etc. The IRFs may be 
different in these projects, but insecure situations cause similar types of risks. Therefore, the 
methodology for identifying and evaluating the IRFs and RMMs could also be similar.  
Suggesting, recommending and/or identifying effective RMMs to manage the risk factors in 
the projects should be done based on an extensive review though the project stages. In other 
words, the perceptions of the manufacturers, the designers, the inspections and the operators 
should be collected and analysed in order to enhance the safety levels of the pipelines 
continually. This is because: (i) the impact of the risk factors changes as time passes, (ii) 
there are always new risk factors arising in the projects and (iii) the methods of risk 
management are continually improved. This means that the stakeholders and researchers 
should be prepared and updated about: (i) analysing and reanalysing the existing risk factors, 
(ii) revaluating the existing RMMs with regard to their effectiveness degree in the projects, 
(iii) analysing the newly arising risk factors, and (iv) using modern and new RMMs. 
Therefore, continuous extensive interviews and focus group studies with experts with high 
experience levels in the projects should be conducted to recommend a robust system of risk 
management in the OGP projects.  
7.3.1 Evaluating the Recommendations for Identifying Effective RMMs (Stage I) 
This section explains the process of evaluating the functionality of the RMF with regard to 
identifying and recommending some of the effective RMMs which could be used to manage 
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the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq. The process for evaluating the identified and recommended 
RMMs involves creating a targeted questionnaire asking several experts in the field about 
their perceptions of the recommended RMMs. The survey was conducted using a Google 
Forms survey. The survey link was sent to the potential participants via email or private 
message on Facebook. The survey was sent to 35 participants, and 20 participants answered 
the survey questions, which means the survey response rate was 57.14%.  
The experience levels of the participants in OGP projects were as follows: 5% (1 out of 20) 
of the participants had between 5 and 10 years of experience; 55% (11 out of 20) had between 
10 and 15 years; and 40% (8 out of 20) had more than 15 years of experience, as shown in 
the figure below.   
 
Figure 7.24: The experience levels of the participants, evaluation survey stage I. 
The participants’ occupations were as follows: 40% (8 out of 20) of the participants were 
clients or owners; 35% (7 out of 20) were operators; 20% (4 out of 20) were members of a 
construction teams; and 5% (1 out of 20) were consultants, planners or designers, as 
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Figure 7.25: The occupations of the participants, evaluation survey stage I. 
As shown in the two figures above, most of the participants had more than 11 years of 
experience in OGP projects. Additionally, the appropriate sampling of people representing 
all the roles in OGP projects enhances the results of the survey. This means that the results 
of the targeted questionnaire reflect valid and trusted perceptions about the recommended 
RMMs which have been collected by surveying people from all the roles in OGP projects in 
Iraq.  
The results of the survey show that the majority of the participants agreed about the results, 
which evaluated the RMF with regard to using it to identify effective RMMs to manage the 
IRFs in the OGP projects in Iraq. The figure below shows an example of the survey results.  
 
Figure 7.26: The results of evaluating the identified RMMs to mitigate terrorism, sabotage 





The occupations of the participants
A consultant, planner or designer A member of a construction team
An operator An owner or client
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As the size of the figure above was not big enough to explain the full details, the 
recommended RMM to manage the Terrorism, sabotage and the security, Theft of the 
products and Insecure areas IRFs, were (I) Avoid the insecure areas. (II) Anti-terrorism 
design. (III) Use protective barriers and perimeter fencing. (IV) Use a high technology and 
advanced risk-monitoring system. (V) Government-public cooperation. (VI) Foot and 
vehicle patrols. (VII) Use the rivers and lakes to extend the pipelines in the insecure areas 
despite the construction cost and the risk of corrosion. 
The responses to most of the questions were 100% yes. This is because the types and 
characteristics of the identified and recommended risk mitigation methods are suitable to 
manage the risk factors. To justify these answers, this research has been based on an 
extensive literature review about the IRFs and risk mitigation methods in OGP projects. The 
findings of the literature review have helped to identity most of the common risk mitigation 
methods in the projects. Additionally, the data collected from the initial survey (in Chapter 
4:) have helped in identifying at least one risk mitigation method for the IRFs mentioned in 
the survey. Moreover, the results from using the RMF to identify and recommend effective 
risk mitigation methods to manage the IRFs in Iraq have been presented at a prestigious 
conference (Kraidi et al. 2018a). The reviewers’ comments helped to reduce the chance of 
identifying and recommending unsuitable risk mitigation methods for the IRFs in the 
projects. 
Furthermore, as the technology and the risk mitigation methods are continuously developing 
with time, the participants in the targeted survey have added more risk mitigation methods 
to the worklist. This means that risk management in oil and gas pipeline projects is dynamic 
and always being updated. In other words, there are always new risk mitigation methods 
arising in the projects which could be used by the stakeholders to manage the IRFs in their 
projects. For example, an advanced monitoring system such as SAP software, or new 
chemical materials that prevent the internal and external corrosion of the pipelines, were 
added by the participants in the targeted survey as risk mitigation methods that could be used 
to manage the risk factors in OGP projects. These methods were not found in the literature 
review when this research started. Therefore, these methods were not involved in the first 
survey, which was about analysing the IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects in Iraq. One of the 
recommendations of the future work of this research, therefore, is to be up to date with the 
new risk mitigation methods, as will be explained in Chapter 10:. To keep this chapter short, 
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the results of the targeted survey and the participants’ comments (i.e. the added risk 
mitigation methods) are explained in APPENDIX E:.  
7.3.2 Evaluating the Recommendations for Identifying Effective RMMs (Stage II) 
As explained and justified in the section above, the responses to most of the questions were 
100% yes. This is because the types and characteristics of the identified RMMs are suitable 
to manage the risk factors. Therefore, the research distributed another targeted survey to 
evaluate the findings of the RMF with regard to identifying and recommending RMMs to 
manage the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq.   
In this targeted survey, which has been considered as stage II of evaluating the findings of 
the RMF, the researcher has used a five-point Likert scale to collect the perceptions of the 
participants regarding the identified and recommended RMMs where 5 means strongly agree 
and 1 means strongly disagree. This is because such a scale is useful to understand to what 
extent the participants accept/agree or not on the recommended RMMs rather than 
accept/agree or not on these methods, rather than if they just accept/ agree about them by 
answering to yes or no questions.  
Nine participants responded to the targeted survey (stage II). These participants also 
responded to stage I of the evaluation survey. The experience levels of the participants in 
OGP projects were as follows: 11.1% (one out of nine) of the participants had between five 
and 10 years of experience; 33.3% (three out of nine) had between 10 and 15 years; and 
455.6% (five out of nine) had more than 15 years of experience, as shown in the figure 
below.   
 
Figure 7.27: The experience levels of the participants, evaluation survey stage II. 
1
35
The experience levels of the participants
5 - 10 years 10 - 15 years more than 15 years
166 
 
The results of stage II of the survey show that the majority of the participants agreed about 
the results, which evaluated the RMF with regard to using it to identify effective RMMs to 
manage the IRFs in the OGP projects in Iraq, as shown in the figure below.  
 
Figure 7.28: The results of evaluating the identified RMMs to mitigate terrorism, sabotage 
and the security, theft of the products and insecure areas, evaluation survey stage II.  
As the figure above is not big enough to explain the full details, the RMMs recommended to 
manage the Terrorism, sabotage and the security, Theft of the products and Insecure areas 
IRFs, were (I) Avoid the insecure areas. (II) Anti-terrorism design. (III) Use protective 
barriers and perimeter fencing. (IV) Use a high technology and advanced risk-monitoring 
system. (V) Government-public cooperation. (VI) Foot and vehicle patrols. (VII) Use the 
rivers and lakes to extend the pipelines in the insecure areas despite the construction cost 
and the risk of corrosion. 
To keep this chapter short, the results of the targeted survey and the participants’ comments 
(i.e. the added risk mitigation methods) are explained in APPENDIX D:.  
7.4 Summary  
The new oil and gas pipeline projects must be planned, designed, installed, operated and 
maintained after detailed analysis of risk factors including safety requirements and 
regulations in order to transport the petroleum products safely. Building an OGP project 
without analysing safest routes based on risk levels could result in serious consequences in 
the future of such projects where the selected pipeline route is influenced by a number of 
risk factors. On the other side, the safest pipeline route provides a safe means of transport 
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for oil and gas products as well as reducing the associated risk factors in the projects. 
Moreover, it is important to understand the RMMs that could be used to manage the IRFs in 
the projects and estimate their degree of effectiveness in the projects to take suitable risk 
management actions if a risky event occurs. The developed RMF is useful to satisfy the 
following functionalities.  
1. The developed framework will help in identifying the safest pipeline route amongst 
others while developing a new gas and oil pipeline, see section 7.2. 
2. The developed framework also helps to suggest some effective RMMs which could 
be used to mitigate the risk factors in the OGP projects, see section 7.3. 
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CHAPTER 8: RISK IMPACT QUANTIFICATION USING 
ASTA RISK SIMULATOR 
8.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the process of evaluating the functionality of the Risk Management 
Framework (RMF) developed in this study. The third functionality of the RMF focuses on 
the quantification of delay impacts caused by the risk factors associated with Oil and Gas 
Pipeline (OGP) projects. This chapter also illustrates how to perform the quantification of 
the delay impact in an OGP project caused by the associated IRFs using a real case study 
project. The key inputs in the RMF are the summation of the impact in terms of the Risk 
Index (RI) of each IRF on the project’s work activities and their level of probability and 
consequence, as shown in section 8.2. 
The first process in quantifying the delay impact on the construction project is the allocation 
of the potential Influencing Risk Factors (IRFs) that influence the work activities in the OGP 
project. Then the delay impact of the risk factors will be quantified using the risk simulation 
algorithm integrated within the ASTA risk simulator programme. The key outputs of the 
RMF are the amount of delay impact caused by the IRFs in the construction project in the 
OGP and the sensitivity levels of risk factors. Figure 8.1 explains the layout when analysing 
the delay impact of the IRFs in the OGP project delivery. 
 
Figure 8.1: The layout when analysing the delay impact of the IRFs in the OGP project 
delivery. 
This chapter is organised in six sections including the introduction. Section 8.2 presents the 
systematic steps of calculating the summation of risk level in terms of RI caused by IRFs on 
the work activities of the OGP project. Section 8.3 describes the details of the quantification 
of the impact on the OGP project delivery caused by IRFs in each work activity. The 
Inputs
• The work activities of the 
OGP project
• The summation of the risk 
index of each work activity 
(chapter 6)
Process
• Risk simulation 
using ASTA risk 
simulator
Outputs
• Impact of delay in 




quantification processes are presented under inputs, process and outputs, which are 
integrated within the developed RMF. Section 8.4 analyses the delay impact of the IRFs on 
the duration of the OGP project. Section 8.5 analyses the project activities in order to 
understand their degree of impact and their likelihood of affecting the duration of the project. 
Section 8.6 analyses the activities on the critical path of the project time schedule to 
understand their degree of impact on the project duration. Finally, section 8.7 summarises 
the key outputs and results of the case study used for the evaluation process of the RMF’s 
functionality with regard to using it to quantify project delay.  
8.2 Analysis of Risk Impact Caused by IRF in Each Project 
Activity  
This section explains the algorithm and systematic procedure of analysing the impact of the 
IRFs on the work activities associated with an OGP project. As shown in  Figure 6.8 in 
Chapter 6:, this section presents the results after analysing the risk impact caused by the IRFs 
on the duration of each work activity. The summation processes of the risk impact are 











The IRFs (from the literature review )
Design a questionnaire survey to analyse the IRFs in the OGP projects
The values of RP and RS of the IRFs
Calculate the Risk Index (RI) of the IRFs using the fuzzy logic theory 
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Estimate if the project could be 
delivered on time or not
Chapter 8 (section 8.2)
• The RI values of the IRFs
• The project activities 
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Qualitative and subjective document analyses  
Allocate the IRFs with the activities of the pipelines
Allocating the IRFs to the pipeline activities
Calculate the total risk in each activity (using equation 6.2) 
Classify the project activities based on their level of risk 
Calculate the total risk in each activity from 100%  (using equation 6.3) 
Chapter 8 (section 8.3)
Calculate the Time impact of the IRFs 
Applay the risk distribution methods
Calculate the impact of the IRFs on the duration of new OGP projects  (use 
Monte Carlo Simulation and Latin Hypercube Simulation) using ATSA





Figure 8.2: A detailed flowchart of calculating the delay impact in the case study project. 
171 
 
A- Inputs: the inputs used by the RMF to analyse the level of impact of the IRFs on the 
duration of the project work activities were (i) a list of the IRFs that affect the safety 
of OGPs in Iraq (which were identified from the literature review); (ii) their degree 
of impact on the project (which was calculated using the survey and the FIS in 
MATLAB), and (iii) the activities and the time schedule of the project. This case 
study project belongs to the Gazprom Neft Badra company. Figure 7.5 presents the 
case study project, which is route 1 of the oil and gas export pipeline.  
At the time of this research, the project was under the planning phase, with a starting 
date of May 21, 2019, and the targeted delivery date is January 13, 2023. This means 
that the duration of the project is estimated at around three years and 238 days (1334 
days).  
In this step, the data collected from the project were the project work activities, the 
duration of these activities (including the activities’ start and finish dates), the logical 
link between the activities, and the project construction programme. These data are 
presented at the end of APPENDIX D:. 
B- Process: algorithms for analysing the impact of IRFs. 
1- Allocating the IRFs to the project work activities. The IRFs were allocated to the 
project work activities depending on the type of IRF and the nature of the activity. 
Professional knowledge was used to achieve this task. The subjective and objective 
analysis of technical reports, practical guides and studies such as CEPA Foundation 
Inc. and INGAA Foundation Inc (2016), E.E.P.A. (2016), F.T.A. (2019), Folga 
(2007), Nandagopal (2007), Stanton and Stanton (2019) and Williams Companies 
(2019) were used to justify the process of risk allocation because they explained what 
is required in each activity, the nature of each activity and the potential IRFs that 
could affect that activity based on vast experience and a review of the construction 
process in OGP projects worldwide. 
For example, IRFs such as terrorism; sabotage; threats to staff; leakage of sensitive 
information; lack of  appropriate training; lack of records about the IRFs; little 
research about the IRFs; insecure areas; conflict over land ownership; improper 
safety regulations; natural disasters; weather conditions; weak ability to identify and 
monitor the threats; shortage of IT services; and construction defects were allocated 
to the trenching work activities (e.g. digging the trench, laying the pipelines, backfill, 
etc.) because such kinds of IRFs could affect the safety of the project during the 
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trenching activities and cause delay in the project. The results of allocating the IRFs 
to the project work activities are shown in APPENDIX D:. 
This research has analysed the IRFs that affect the safety of the pipelines during the 
planning and design, construction and operation stages of projects. In other words, 
this research has analysed the IRFs in OGP projects during the entire lifetime of these 
projects. Some of the IRFs such as corruption were assumed to affect the new 
pipeline projects no matter the project activity or location, because such a risk factor 
is not only affecting a specific project or a specific activity, it affects the OGP 
projects in the whole country and during all their work stages. Additionally, there are 
some relationships between the IRFs which have been considered in this research. 
For instance, similar IRFs such as sabotage and thefts, which are related to the 
security situation, might threaten the pipelines together if the security level of a 
specific area is low.  In the areas with easy access to the piplines, the piplines are 
subject tp the vehicle and similar accidents. Meanwhile, it was assumed that some of 
the IRFs would not affect the new pipeline projects in Iraq. For example, hacker 
attacks on the system, as the stakeholders in OGP projects in Iraq are not using an 
advanced management system, yet.  
2- Calculate the summation of the impact of the IRFs associated with each activity of 
the project using  equation 8.4, which calculates the summation of the RI values of 
the IRFs allocated to these activities.  
The summation of risk in an activity= ∑RI values of the IFRs relevant to that activity     …(8.1) 
For example, the summation of risk in the trenching activities; temporary erosion 
control and side support activities; pipe set-up and welding activities; and 
fabrication and installing pipe activities was 54.05, 57.48, 43.84 and 36.28, 
respectively. For example, 54.05 was the summation of the RI values of the IRFs 
associated with trenching activities, see Table D.1 and Table D.2 in APPENDIX 
D:.  
3- Calculate the summation of risk for project work activities from 100% using equation 
8.2. 
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 100%) =  
∑ 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦
∑ 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡
  …(8.2) 
For example, the summation of risk from 100% for the above-mentioned activities 
was 2.567, 2.78, 2.082 and 1.723, respectively. For example, 2.567 was the 
summation of the RI values of the IRFs associated with trenching activities from 
100%, see see Table D.1 and Table D.2 in APPENDIX D:.  
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4- Classify the project activities based on their level of risk as follows. The activities 
with [0-1] risk summation were considered as Very Low (VL) risk activities; the 
activities with [1-2] risk summation have a Low (L) risk; those with [2-3] risk 
summation have a Moderate (M) risk; those with [3-4] risk summation have a 
High (H) risk; and those with [4-5] risk summation have a Very High (VH) risk. 
For example, the level of risk for the above-mentioned activities was medium risk, 
medium risk, medium risk and low risk, respectively. 
C- Outputs: Table 8.1 shows the results of the risk summation of the project’s main 
work activities and the level of risk of these activities   
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Table 8.1: The summation of the impact of the IRFs on the project’s main work activities 
and the level of risk of these activities.  
Activities Equation 8.1 Equation 8.2 Risk Level 
Concept and definitions 18.11^ 0.86¬ VL 
Life-cycle plan 71.8 3.41 H 
Choosing the route 76.65 3.64 H 
Route approval 73.14 3.47 H 
Design and development 43.44 2.06 M 
Installation procedure 29.28 1.39 L 
Risk assessment  49.67 2.36 M 
Time schedule 22.08 1.05 L 
Cost estimation  22.08 1.05 L 
Communications  25.43 1.21 L 
Materials order 18.41 0.87 VL 
Survey, staking and setting out 75.77 3.60 H 
Clearing and grading the right-of-way 73.46 3.49 H 
Topsoil stripping  57.88 2.75 M 
Buildings, roads and river crossings 76.63 3.64 H 
Pipe transportation to site 59.02 2.80 M 
Temporary fencing and signage 51.09 2.43 M 
Trenching  54.05 2.57 M 
Temporary erosion control and side support 57.48 2.73 M 
Pipe set-up  43.84 2.08 M 
NDT tests  32.77 1.56 L 
Welding, fabrication and installing  36.28 1.72 L 
Sandblast 32.82 1.56 L 
Painting 32.81 1.56 L 
Coating  54.69 2.60 M 
Lowering pipe and backfilling 46.71 2.22 M 
Cathodic protection of the pipe 68.64 3.26 H 
Final fitting 32.61 1.55 L 
As-built survey 32.48 1.54 L 
Hydro, pressure test 29.1 1.38 L 
Backfilling 36.16 1.72 L 
Fencing and signage 61.49 2.92 M 
Final clean-up  40.11 1.90 L 
Right of way reclamation 54.03 2.57 M 
Safety barriers 55.53 2.64 M 
Operation within design limits 97.54 4.63 VH 
Commissioning operation value 97.54 4.63 VH 
Measure the performance and efficiency 29.26 1.39 L 
Enhanced performance and efficiency 97.54 4.63 VH 
Monitoring and inspection  42.57 2.02 M 
Maintenance  59.54 2.83 H 
Risk control 36.31 1.72 L 
*See Table D.1 and f in APPENDIX D:.  ^For example, 54.05 was the summation of the RI values of the IRFs associated 
with trenching activities. ¬ For example, 2.567 was the summation of the RI values of the IRFs associated with trenching 
activities from 100%, 
The findings shown in Table 8.1 above will be used to quantify the delay impact in the 
selected case study OGP project using Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) and Latin Hypercube 
Simulation (LHS) algorithms, which are integrated within the ASTA risk simulator. This is 
explained in the next section. 
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8.3 Quantifying the Delay Impact of IRFs in the OGP Project 
Delivery 
As shown in Figure 8.2, section 8.2 was about allocating the IRFs to the work activities of 
the case study project and analysing the impact levels of the IRFs on the duration of these 
activities. This section shows the steps of using the ASTA risk simulator to analyse the delay 
impact in the OGP project. In this research, the risk simulation method that is integrated 
within the ASTA risk simulator is used to calculate the delay impact of the IRFs on the 
duration of the OGP case study project. Calculating the time impact and the delay in the 
project includes three main components, which are inputs, process and outputs. 
Figure 8.2 shows the key inputs, process and outputs used by the ASTA risk simulator to 
quantify the impact of the IRFs on the duration of the case study project. These steps are 
explained as follows.  
1- The inputs used in this process were a list of the IRFs (from the literature review) 
and their degree of impact on the project (from the Fuzzy Inference System (FIS)). 
The construction programme of the project is explained in section G.5 of APPENDIX 
G:. 
2- The processing steps of using these inputs were as follows. (I) Allocate the IRFs to 
the project activities. (II) Calculate the summation of risk in each activity. (III) 
Calculate the summation of risk of the project activities from 100%. And (IV) 
Classify the level of risk in the project activities. These steps are carried out in section 
8.2, see Table 8.1.  
In this section, the ASTA risk simulator was used to allocate the time schedule of the 
project and the risk levels of these activities to the risk simulation and distribution 
methods in order to quantify the delay in the case study project. The ASTA risk 
simulator has two types of risk simulation methods, which are MCS and LHS, and 
four types of risk distribution methods, which are Uniform, Normal, Skewed Normal 
and Skewed Triangular. Figure 8.3 shows the risk simulation and distribution 




Figure 8.3: Data sampling and distribution methods in the ASTA risk simulator. 
As shown in the figure above, this research has used two risk simulation methods to 
analyse the delay impact of the IRFs in the case study project. The reason for using 
two simulation methods in this research is to produce trusted research findings by 
comparing the results of these methods. The differences between the two data 
sampling methods of the ASTA risk simulator are as follows. 
1- Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS): Figure 8.4 displays an example of how MCS 
works. The example is as follows. If there was a semi-circle drawn inside a square, 
and someone dropped rice over the square, some of the rice would fall inside the 
semi-circle and some would fall outside it. If this action was carried out 100 times, 
and 60 grains fell inside the circle, it means the chance that every single grain of rice 
has of falling inside the semi-circle is 60%.  
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Rice grains outside the semi-circle
Rice grains inside the semi-circle
 
Figure 8.4: An example of the Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) method. 
The process of dropping the rice grains is called iteration, which means that, the more 
times the rice is dropped over the square, the predictions about the probability of the 
rice falling in the semi-circle become more accurate. Therefore, increasing the 
number of iterations provides a sample which is big enough to produce the desired 
level of prediction in research studies. With regard to the application of MCS to 
analyse the impact of the IRFs on the duration of the project activities, Grinstead and 
Snell (2012), Keramat and Kielbasa (1997) and Rutherford et al. (2006) assumed 
that, if an activity has a minimum duration of 10 days and a maximum duration of 
15 days, the duration of that activity produced by MCS after considering the impact 
of the IRFs would be 15 days, with a probability of 90%.  
2- Latin Hypercube Simulation (LHS): LHS will produce better results with less 
iteration. This is because it reduces the element of randomness by using the full 
range of possible results (Keramat and Kielbasa, 1997; Rutherford et al. 2006). 
The differences between the four data distribution methods of the ASTA risk simulator are 
as follows.  
1- Uniform distribution: In uniform distribution, the elements have the same 
probability, but they are discrete and not continuous. In other words, the 
probability values fall between the minimum and maximum duration and have 
equal likelihood (Castrup, 2009; Mun, 2015), see Figure 8.5. Uniform 
178 
 
distribution is useful when the results will fall between two values, but there is 
no indication as to which duration is most likely.  
2- Normal distribution: Triangular distribution is a continuous probability 
distribution. In this kind of data distribution, there will be three parameters, which 
are the minimum, the peak and the maximum values. If the peak value comes in 
the middle of the distribution, it means the distribution is normal (Castrup, 2009; 
Karagoz and Altunay, 2015), see Figure 8.5. 
3- Skewed Normal: Skewed normal distribution refers to a parametric class of 
probability distributions. It is similar to normal distribution, but it is extended by 
an additional shape parameter, which regulates the skewness and allows for a 
continuous variation from normality to non-normality (Ashour and Abdel-
hameed, 2010; Kumar and Anusree, 2015), see Figure 8.5. 
4- Skewed Triangular: Skewed triangular distribution is similar to skewed normal, 
but the results are most likely to fall on specified durations. This means that the 
results will move further and further from the predicted results and become less 
likely (Bhunya et al. 2004), see Figure 8.5. 












Figure 8.5: Uniform, Normal, Skewed Normal and Skewed Triangular risk simulation. 
After selecting the risk simulation and distribution methods, the ASTA risk simulator will 
apply the iterations between the minimum and maximum duration for each activity using the 
selected risk simulation and risk distribution methods to analyse the impact of the IRFs in 
the project. Increasing the number of iterations of the simulation enhances the accuracy of 
the results, but it takes a longer time. Therefore, this research has used 10,000 iterations, 
rather than 500 iterations, which is the software default.  
3- The key output of the ASTA risk simulator will be the amount of time delay caused by 
the IRFs in the project. Table D.1 and Table D.2 in APPENDIX D: show the IRFs 
allocated to the project activities.  
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The next section provides the results from using the ASTA risk simulator to analyse the time 
impact of the IRFs on the case study project.  
8.4 The Output of the RMFs with Regard to Using the ASTA 
Risk Simulator to Analyse the Delay in the Project  
This section presents the results of using the ASTA risk simulator to analyse the delay in the 
case study project. The project’s initial planned (original) duration was three years and 238 
days (1334 days). Table 8.2 shows the results of using the ASTA risk simulator to recalculate 
the duration of the project considering the impact of the associated IRFs.  
Table 8.2: The duration of the project after analysing the impact of the IRFs on it using the 
ASTA risk simulator. 
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15 22 1328 1371 1307 1391 311 
Before considering the impact of the IRFs, the expected finishing date of the project was January 13, 2023. 
*The difference between the finishing dates after and before considering the impact of the IRFs, i.e. it is the 




After analysing the impact of the associated IRFs that affect the duration of the project work 
activities, it was found that the average delay in the project varied using different risk 
simulation and distribution methods, as shown in the table above. The figure below presents 
the results of using the ASTA risk simulator to quantify the delay impact in the project using 
different risk simulation and distribution methods. 
 
Figure 8.6: The results from using the ASTA risk simulator to quantify the delay impact in 
the project using different risk simulation and distribution methods. 
Details of the results of these risk simulation and distribution methods are provided below.  
This section details the results of using the risk simulation methods (e.g. MCS and LHS) and 
the risk distribution methods (e.g. Uniform, Normal, Skewed Normal and Skewed 
Triangular), which are integrated into the ASTA risk simulator. The results of using these 
distribution methods are as follows.  
For example, when considering using MCS and Uniform risk distribution, it was found 
that the project needed 1,352 days to be completed rather than 1,334 days, which was the 
initial duration of the project. This means that the project will have a longer duration due to 























The results of the delay impact in the project using different risk 
simulation and distribution methods
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completed on January 31, 2023, rather than January 14, 2023, which means the average delay 
in the project is 18 days with 50% probability, see Figure 8.7.  
Additionally, the ASTA risk simulator shows the maximum hits for each sample, which is 
the date that had the highest frequency as a project finishing date during the simulation 
process. The maximum hits rate from using the Uniform risk distribution method is 353, 
which reflects the mean value of the project duration. Moreover, the ASTA risk simulator 
shows the Standard Deviation (Std) of each sample. The Std measures the dispersion of the 
data from the mean, which shows the variability within the sample. In other words, the Std 
characterises the average distance of the data from the mean of the distribution value of the 
sample, which means that the sample with a low Std is the more significant sample. The Std 
of this distribution method is 18 days. This means that there is a 68% probability that the 
project will be finished in between 1,334 and 1,370 days, whereas there is a 95% probability 
that it will be finished in between 1,316 and 1,388 days, see Figure 8.7.  
 
Figure 8.7: Finish date likelihood and distribution using the Uniform data distribution 
method, using MCS. 
As another example of the results of the ASTA risk simulators when considering LHC and 
Uniform risk distribution, it was found that the average delay in the project was 17 days, 
which means that it is expected that the project will be completed on January 30, 2023, with 
50% probability, see Figure 8.8. The maximum hits rate of this distribution method is 299, 
which reflects the mean value of the project duration. The Std of this distribution method is 
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18 days. This means that there is a 68% probability that the project will be finished in 
between 1,330 and 1,372 days, whereas there is a 95% probability that it will be finished in 
between 1,309 and 1,393 days, see Figure 8.8.  
 
Figure 8.8: Finish date likelihood and distribution using the Uniform data distribution 
method, using LHS. 
The rest of the results from using the ASTA risk simulator to quantify the delay impact in 
the project using different risk simulation and distribution methods are presented in 
APPENDIX G:. 
As shown in Table 8.2, the difference between the risk simulation and data distribution 
methods in this case study is minimal, which means that making a comparison between the 
methods to choose the one that gives a better result is challenging. The project programmers 
could use these dates to estimate and/or reanimate the project schedule. For example, if they 
found that is it definite that the project will be running late then they could either change the 
project time schedule, take the IRFs into consideration to develop suitable risk management 
strategies, or even accept that the project is going to be delivered late, and then they can deal 
with the consequences.  
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The next section details the task and activities of the project that affect its duration.  
8.5 Results of Project Duration Sensitivity 
This section provides the results from using the ASTA risk simulator to analyse the 
sensitivity index of the project activities and analyse their degree of impact on the duration 
of the project. The ASTA risk simulator shows the sensitivity analysis of the project 
activities that are most likely to affect the project duration if their duration changes. In other 
words, the ASTA risk simulator ranks these tasks in terms of their likelihood of delaying the 
project finishing date. Table 8.3 shows the top two activities affecting the project duration 
with either a positive or a negative impact on the duration. 
Table 8.3: The activities most likely to affect the project duration if their duration changes.  





Uniform  Right of way (42%) 
Design and development (40%) 
Trenching (-23%) 
Manufacturing and installation (-21%) 
Normal  Right of way (42%) 
Design and development (40%) 
Trenching (-24%) 
Manufacturing and installation (-20%) 
Skewed 
Normal  
Design and development (65%) 
Right of way (58%) 




Design and development (64%) 
Right of way (56%) 






Uniform  Design and development (64%) 
Right of way (57%) 
Manufacturing and installation (-52%) 
Trenching (-34%) 
Normal  Design and development (63%) 
Right of way (57%) 




Design and development (64%) 
Right of way (57%) 




Design and development (63%) 
Right of way (57%) 
Manufacturing and installation (-52%) 
Trenching (-33%) 
As shown in the table above, using different simulation and distribution methods to analyse 
the sensitivity index of the project activities has confirmed the two top activities that have a 
positive impact on the project duration, which are as follows. (i) The right of way, which is 
top twice; and (ii) the design and development, which is top six times. Similarly, the two top 
activities that have a negative impact on the duration of the project are (i) the trenching 
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activities, which come top twice; and (ii) manufacturing and installation, which come top 
six times.  
For example, with regard to analysing the duration sensitivity index of the project activities 
using MCS and Uniform methods, it was found that the right of way, design and 
development, final fitting, safety barriers, choosing routes, route approval and survey are the 
activities most likely to affect the duration of the project, see Figure 8.9.   
 
Figure 8.9: The duration sensitivity using the MCS method and Uniform data distribution 
method. 
To keep this chapter short, APPENDIX D: provides the detailed ranking of the project’s 
activities using different simulation and distribution methods.  
8.6 The Results of Criticality Index Sensitivity  
This section provides the results from using the ASTA risk simulator to analyse the criticality 
index of the activities that appear on the critical path of the project and their degree of impact 
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on changing the project duration if their duration changes. The ASTA risk simulator 
identifies the tasks that have the highest iterations as the activities that might change the 
duration of the project. After running thousands of simulations (depending on the number of 
iterations), the ASTA risk simulator generates a report to rank the project activities from 
highest to lowest impact in terms of their degrees of criticality impact on the project duration. 
The activities with the higher criticality index are the activities that are more likely to affect 
the project finishing date. Some activities may appear as critical activities using a certain 
simulation or distribution method, but they might not appear as critical activities using 
different methods. 
Table 8.4 shows the results of using the ASTA risk simulator to analyse the criticality 
sensitivity index of the activities of the case study project. This table highlights the activities 
that have a different impact on the project using different risk simulation and distribution 
methods. 
Table 8.4: The ranking of the project activities with regard to their degree of impact on 
project duration using the ASTA risk simulator.  
MCS LHS 
Uniform and Normal distribution  







Activity  Impact  Activity  Impact   
Concept and 




route(s)  100% Choosing the route(s)  100% Choosing the route(s)  100% 
Route(s) approval 100% Route(s) approval 100% Route(s) approval 100% 
Life-cycle plan 100% Life-cycle plan 100% Life-cycle plan 100% 
Design and 











Risk assessment and 
management plans 100% 
Risk assessment and 
management plans 100% 
Risk assessment and 
management plans 100% 
Staking for 
construction and 
Communications  100% 
Staking for construction and 
Communications  100% 
Staking for 
construction and 
Communications  100% 
Pipe set-up  100% Survey, staking and setting out 100% 
Survey, staking and 
setting out 100% 
Welding, fabrication 
and installing pipe 100% 
Clearing and grading the Right 
of way (ROW) 100% 
Clearing and grading 
the Right of way 
(ROW) 100% 
NDT tests  100% 
Topsoil stripping and Front-end 
grading 100% 
Topsoil stripping and 
Front-end grading 100% 
Sand blast 100% Pipe transporting to sit 100% Pipe transporting to sit 100% 
Backfilling 100% Pipe set-up  100% Pipe set-up  100% 
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Final clean-up  100% 
Welding, fabrication and 
installing pipe 100% 
Welding, fabrication 
and installing pipe 100% 
Safety barriers 100% NDT tests  100% NDT tests  100% 
Fencing and signage 100% SAND BLAST 100% SAND BLAST 100% 
Pipe transporting to 
site 99% Painting 100% Painting 100% 
Painting 98% Coating  100% Coating  100% 
Coating  92% Backfilling 100% Backfilling 100% 
Hydro, pressure test 85% Final clean-up  100% Final clean-up  100% 
Survey, staking and 
setting out 80% Safety barriers 100% Safety barriers 100% 
Clearing and grading 
the Right of way 
(ROW) 80% Fencing and signage 100% Fencing and signage 100% 
Topsoil stripping 
and Front-end 
grading 79% Hydro, pressure test 83% Hydro, pressure test 83% 
Time schedule 73% 
Lowering pipe in and 
backfilling 72% 
Lowering pipe in and 
backfilling 72% 
Lowering pipe in 
and backfilling 63% Time schedule 62% Time schedule 63% 
Right of way 
reclamation 57% Right of way reclamation 52% Cost estimation  37% 
Cost estimation  42% Cost estimation  38% 
Right of way 
reclamation 37% 
Final fitting 38% Final fitting 36% Final fitting 36% 
Materials order 27% Cathodic protecting the pipe 17% 
Cathodic protecting 
the pipe 17% 
Cathodic protecting 
the pipe 16% As-built survey 17% As-built survey 17% 
As-built survey 16% Materials order 0% Materials order 0% 
Buildings, roads and 
river crossings 1% 
Buildings, roads and river 
crossings 0% 
Buildings, roads and 
river crossings 0% 
Temporary fencing 
and signage 1% Temporary fencing and signage 0% 
Temporary fencing and 
signage 0% 
Trenching  1% Trenching  0% Trenching  0% 
Temporary erosion 
control and side 
support 1% 
Temporary erosion control and 
side support 0% 
Temporary erosion 
control and side 
support 0% 
As shown in the table above, most of the activities have stayed in the same ranking positions 
using different simulation and distribution methods. However, the percentage of the 
criticality index sensitivity of the activities is slightly different for a few activities using 
different simulation and distribution methods, as highlighted in yellow in the table. In the 
table above, the activities with different percentages of impact on the duration of the project 
are highlighted in yellow if the difference is 8% or higher. 
With regard to using MCS to analyse the criticality sensitivity index of the project activities, 
the activities stayed in the same ranking position using Uniform and Normal distribution or 
Skewed Normal and Skewed Triangular distribution. However, the ranking positions of 
these activities are slightly different using Uniform and Normal distribution comparing to 
Skewed Normal and Skewed Triangular distribution. In the meanwhile, the ranking positions 
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of the project activities were not changed using the four different risk distribution methods 
along with LHS. Nevertheless, the ranking positions were slightly changed comparing the 
results of MCS to LHS.  
For example, the results of analysing the criticality sensitivity index of the project activities 
using MCS and Uniform distribution are shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 8.10: Results of criticality index sensitivity using MCS and Uniform distribution.  
APPENDIX D: provides the detailed results of the critical index sensitivity analysis. 
8.7 Summary  
Having good analysis results for the IRFs that affect the duration of new projects as well as 
a good estimation about the delay in the projects before they start (as performed in this 
chapter), helps project stakeholders, decision-makers and policy-makers to develop suitable 
policies and take the correct actions related to risk management. Therefore, this chapter has 
used the RMF designed and developed in Chapter 6: to analyse the delay in the case study 
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project using ASTA risk simulator software. The list of the IRFs in OGP projects identified 
via the literature review (see Chapter 2:), their degree of impact on the projects (i.e. the RI 
values of the IRFs) (see Chapter 5:), and the activities of the projects were the inputs for the 
ASTA risk simulator. The ASTA risk simulator has integrated these inputs with MCS and 
LHS to analyse the project delay caused by the associated IRFs. The ASTA risk simulator 
was used in this research to do the following.  
• Show the results of the time impact and the delay caused by the IRFs associated with 
the project activities, see Table 8.2. 
• Show the results of the sensitivity index of the project activities and their likelihoods 
of influencing the project duration, see section Table 8.3. 
• Show the results of the criticality sensitivity index for the critical activities of the 
project and their degree of impact on the project duration, see Table 8.4.  
The difference between the results of the MCS and LHS is minimal, which enhances the 
results of this research. However, the ASTA risk simulator has only four methods of risk 
distribution, and only one distribution method could be applied at a time during the process 
of risk simulation, which means the process of risk simulation was carried out four times. 
This is one of the limitations of using the ASTA risk simulator to analyse the IRFs in the 
projects. Thus, there is a need to use risk analysis software that helps to apply different 
distribution methods for each IRF and activity at the same time, which will enhance the risk 
simulation results and add more confidence with regard to estimating the probability of the 
project completion dates. The @Risk simulator, therefore, will be used to analyse the impact 
of the IRFs on the duration of the new OGP projects, see Chapter 9:. 
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CHAPTER 9: ANALYSIS OF RISK IMPACT USING 
@RISK 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the systematic procedure and the results of the delay analysis 
considering the impact of the Influencing Risk Factors (IRFs) IRFs on the project’s delivery. 
The @Risk simulator is used in this study to quantify the delay impact of the case study 
project. This pipeline will be built in the south of Iraq to link between the Badra oil field and 
the export point on the Gulf, the length of the pipeline is 164 KMs, see Figure 7.5. The key 
inputs used in the risk simulator are the Risk Index (RI) (see Chapter 5:) caused by relevant 
IRFs that influence the duration of each work activity in the Oil and Gas Pipeline (OGP) 
project and the work activities of the project and their durations (see section 8.2 of Chapter 
8:). The results found by the @Risk simulator in terms of project delay in days have been 
compared with the results from the ASTA risk simulator to evaluate the functionality of the 
developed RMF. The comparison of the results from the ASTA risk simulator and the @Risk 
simulator is presented in this chapter.  
This chapter is organised under six sections. Section 9.2 provides the impact of the IRFs on 
the project duration using the @Risk Simulator. Section 9.3 presents the sensitivity analysis 
of the IRFs on the project work activities and their impact on the project duration. Section 
9.4 details the real-life case study with potential delay in the project. Section 9.5 provides a 
discussion of the results and differences in the results of quantifying the time impact of the 
IRFs using the ASTA risk simulator and @Risk program. Finally, section 9.6 summarises 
the chapter.  
9.2 Delay Impact of the IRFs on the OGP Project Delivery  
With reference to the collected data explained in section 7.1 of Chapter 7: and section 8.2 of 
Chapter 8:, the planned (original) duration of the project was 1,334 days. The inputs for the 
@Risk simulator include the following four steps. (I) Allocate the IRFs to the project 
activities, (II) calculate the total risk in each activity, (III) calculate the total risk of the 
activity from 100%, and (IV) classify the level of risk in the project activities. The results of 
these steps are presented in Table 8.1 and section 8.2 in Chapter 8:.  
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This chapter is focused on applying the findings of the above four steps using the @Risk 
simulation program to analyse the delay impact of the IRFs on the project delivery. The 
delay was analysed in (1) the overall duration of the project, (2) the planning and design 
stage of the project, (3) the pre-construction stage of the project, (4) the construction stage 
of the project and (5) the post-construction stage of the project. Additionally, this chapter 
also presents the quantification of delay caused by these IRFs using the @Risk simulator. 
After allocating the IRFs to the project activities, the researchers should assign the risk 
distribution methods suitable for the nature of the IRFs and the project activities. For 
example, the Risk Gamma (0.9,1) distribution risk method has been chosen for terrorism, 
sabotage and security. This is because the impact of such a risk factor is really high in the 
project and, when it occurs, the chance of it stopping the project is really high. The Excel 
sheet in APPENDIX H: shows the detailed results of the @Risk simulator, including the 
IRFs allocated to the project work activities and the assigned risk distribution methods. 
Please note that the reader needs to install the @Risk simulator on his/her device to be able 
to read the results in the Excel sheet. However, without installing the @Risk simulator, the 
reader can read the written notes to understand the risk distribution methods assigned to the 
IRFs and the project work activities.    
This section presents an example with regard to the result of quantifying the delay in the 
project using the @Risk simulator. For example, with regard to the delay in the overall 
duration of the project, the risk simulation results show the minimum and maximum duration 
of the project are 1,329.30 days and 1,441.84 days, respectively. The project has a 5% chance 
of being completed in between 1,329.30 and 1,349.1 days or between 1,404.5 days and 
1,441.84 days. The project has a 90% probability of being finished in between 1,349.1 days 




Figure 9.1: The results of simulating the duration of the project using @Risk. 
The mean duration of the project is 1,374.94 days, which means that the project has a 50% 
probability of being completed in this duration, see Figure 9.2. 
 
Figure 9.2: The results of the accumulative duration of the project using @Risk. 
The minimum delay and maximum delay in the project are -0.703 days and 111.84 days. 
The project has a 5% probability of being delayed between -0.703 and 19.1 days or between 
74.5 and 111.84 days. The project has a 90% probability of being delayed between 19.1 days 




Figure 9.3: The delay in the project using @Risk. 
The mean delay in the duration of the project is 44.94 days, with a probability of 50%, see 
Figure 9.4. 
 
Figure 9.4: The accumulative delay in the project using @Risk. 
To keep this chapter short, Table 9.1 summarises the results of estimating the duration of the 
project using @Risk.  
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Table 9.1: The project duration after allocating the IRFs in the project’s listed work activities 





allocating the IRFs 
(days) Delay (days) 
The total duration of the project 
1330 days 1374.94 (see Figure 9.1 
and Figure 9.2) 
44.944* (see Figure 9.3 
and Figure 9.4) 
The duration of the planning stage 
812 days 796.84 (see Figure H.5 
and Figure H.6) 
-15.156 (see Figure H.7 
and Figure H.8) 
The duration of the pre-construction stage 
200 days  242.12 (see Figure H.9 
and Figure H.10) 
42.130 (see Figure H.11 
and Figure H.12) 
The duration of the construction stage 
213 days 224.45 (see Figure 
H.13 and Figure H.14) 
11.444 (see Figure H.15 
and Figure H.16) 
The duration of the post-construction 
stage 
105 days 111.52 (see Figure 
H.17 and Figure H.18) 
6.526 (see Figure H.19 
and Figure H.20) 
*44.944 = -15.156+42.130+11.444+6.526 
The details of the results with regard to analysing the delay in the duration of the planning, 
pre-construction, construction and post-construction stages are explained in APPENDIX H:. 
In this appendix, Figure H.5 and Figure H.6 show the duration of the planning stage, while 
Figure H.7 and Figure H.8 show the results in this stage. Figure H.9 and Figure H.10 show 
the duration of the pre-construction stage, and Figure H.11 and Figure H.12 show the delay 
in this stage. The duration of the construction stage is shown in Figure H.13 and Figure H.14, 
while Figure H.15 and Figure H.16 show the delay in this stage. Finally, Figure H.17 and 
Figure H.18 show the results of analysing the duration of the post-construction stage, and 
Figure H.19 and Figure H.20 show the results of analysing the potential delay in this stage 
of the project.  
The next section provides the results for the sensitivity analysis of the IRFs and their impact 
on project duration.  
9.3 Results for Project Duration Sensitivity 
In this section, the research has used different methods and tests in order to test the sensitivity 
analysis of the IRFs and their impact on project duration. The tests were Tornado-Change in 
output mean, Tornado-Regression coefficients, Tornado-Correlation coefficients, Tornado-
194 
 
Regression mapped values, and Tornado-Contribution to variance tests. The results of the 
sensitivity tests were shown by the stages of the project as follows. For example, with regard 
to IRFs that affect the overall duration of the project, it was found that the different types of 
sensitivity tests have confirmed the IRFs that have the highest impact on project duration. 
These IRFs are limited warning signs; animal accidents; terrorism, sabotage and security; 
corruption; inadequate risk management; little research about risk management; and the 
weak ability to identify and monitor the threats and the IRFs, see Figure 9.5 and Figure 9.6.  
 
Figure 9.5: Tornado-Change in output mean (the overall project). 
 
 
Figure 9.6: Tornado-Regression coefficients (the overall project).  
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APPENDIX H: explains the details of the results with regard to analysing the duration 
sensitivity of the planning, pre-construction, construction and post-construction stages of the 
project. The next section presents the calculation of real-life delay in the project. 
9.4 Potential Delay in the Case Study OGP Project  
The previous sections have shown the potential and/or the expected delay that could be 
caused by the IRFs. However, in addition to the mentioned IRFs, the project might be 
subjected to other types of problems that could cause delay. Such problems are reflecting the 
situation from the real life of the project. In other words, this section will analyse the reality 
of the problem of delay in the project, not only the estimated delay. The construction of the 
project commenced on May 21, 2019 instead of April 1, 2019 due to the delay in signing the 
contract between the government and the construction company. Consequently, the project 
started later than the original plan, which caused 51 days of delay in real life. In other words, 
the 51 days delay is the project starting delay, which has been calculated using ASTA or 
@Risk. Such IRFs are beyond the author’s knowledge and need to be managed from very 
high levels of government. Therefore, such an exceptional delay has not been included in 
the simulation model with the case study. Table 9.2 presents a real-life project delay in 
addition to the delay caused by IRFs in the OGPs project below.  
Table 9.2: The comparison of project delay between the research findings and real-life delay 
in the project. 
Program Impact delay in project Real-life project  Case study results Delay 
Using 
ASTA 
Research findings   1334 days¬ 1349 (from Table 8.2)  15 days (+) (from 
ASTA, see Table 
8.2) 
Actual delay in project  1385 days¬¬ 
(=1334+51^) 
1385 + 15 (from Table 
8.2) =1400 days  
 66 days (+)* 
¬The initial duration of the project. 
¬¬ The delay caused by the late start of the project. 
^ The 51 days delay is the project staring delay, which has been calculated using ASTA. 
*The real life delay = 15 days (Table 8.2) + 51 (days) the delay that cause by late start of the 
project = 66 days. 
Using 
@Risk 
Research findings   1330 days¬ 1375 (from Table 9.1) 45 day (+) (from 
@Risk, see Table 
9.1) 
Actual delay in project 1381 days¬¬ 
(=1330+51^) 
1381 + 45 (from Table 
9.1) = 1426 days 
96 days (+)* 
¬The initial duration of the project. 
¬¬ The delay caused by the late start of the project. 
^ The 51 days delay is the project staring delay, which has been calculated using @Risk. 
*The real life delay = 15 days (Table 9.1) + 51 (days) the delay that cause by late start of the 
project = 96 days. 
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Correspondingly, the real delay in the project was 51 days (real-life delay). In addition to 
the real-life delay, the expected delay in the project due to the impact of the IRFs is 15 days 
using ASTA and 45 days using @Risk (case study results).  
9.5 Difference in Using ASTA Risk Simulator and @Risk to 
Analyse the Delay Impact of the IRFs on the Project 
Delivery 
The Risk Management Framework (RMF) has applied different risk simulation programs 
(which are ASTA risk simulator and @Risk simulator) to quantify the delay impact of the 
IRFs on project delivery. The comparison made between the results of the ASTA risk 
simulator and the @Risk simulator was to validate the findings of this research. Applying 
different risk simulation methods for risk simulation makes the results of risk analysis 
different. For example, the overall delay in the project was between 15 and 18 days using 
the ASTA risk simulator and 45 days using @Risk simulator. See Table 8.2 and Table 9.1 to 
understand the difference in the results caused by using the ASTA risk simulator and @Risk 
simulator. The table below summarises the results of the ASTA risk simulator and the @Risk 
simulator.  
Table 9.3: The difference in using the ASTA risk simulator and the @Risk simulator to 
analyse the delay in the project.   
Program   Results (delay) Cross reference  
ASTA risk simulator  15 – 18 days (using two different 
simulation methods and four 
different distribution methods) 
Table 8.2 
@Risk simulator 45 days Table 9.1 
 
The reasons behind comparing the results of the ASTA risk simulator and the @Risk 
simulator are to highlight the limitations of each program and validate the findings of this 
research. For instance: 
1- ASTA risk simulator has only four methods of risk distribution, but only one 
distribution method could be applied at a time during the process of risk simulation, 
which means the process of risk simulation was carried out four times, for each 
method of risk simulation. This is one of the limitations of using ASTA to quantify 
the impact of the IRFs on project duration. Meanwhile, the @Risk simulator helps to 
apply different distribution methods for each IRF and activity at the same time, which 
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will enhance the risk simulation results and add more confidence regarding the 
project completion probability.  
2- @Risk helps to analyse the delay in the project overall as well as by the project 
stages, which cannot be done using the ASTA risk simulator. In other words, @Risk 
could show the stage of the project that has the longest delay and the stage could be 
finished earlier. This is one of the advantages of @Risk.   
3- Moreover, @Risk could be used to analyse the delay in the duration of the individual 
activities (see APPENDIX D:). However, the ASTA Risk simulator cannot be used 
to analyse the delay in the project in such a way.  
4- One of the differences between the ASTA risk simulator and @Risk simulator is that 
ASTA could only be used to analyse the sensitivity impact of the project activities in 
order to calculate their impact on project duration. On the other side, @Risk 
simulator could be used to analyse the sensitivity impact of both the IRFs and the 
project activities in order to calculate their degree of impact on the duration of the 
project. 
5- The difference in the results from using the two risk simulation methods (which are 
Monte Caro Simulation and Latin Hypercube Simulation) and the four risk 
distribution methods (which are Uniform, Normal, Triangular and Skewed 
Triangular) integrated with the ASTA risk simulator was minimum, which enhances 
the results of the ASTA risk simulator as well as the findings of this research. The 
case is similar to the low values of standard deviation (Std) that result from using the 
ASTA risk simulator, which also enhances the results of the ASTA risk simulator 
and the research. The Std value for @Risk simulator was low too, which also 
enhances the results of the @Risk simulator and the research.  
In summary, compared to the ASTA risk simulator, @Risk simulator is a more useful and 
powerful tool to analyse the IRFs and the project delay. This is because @Risk can use more 
and different risk distribution methods than ASTA. It could be used to analyse the delay in 
the duration of the individual activities, by the stages of the projects and by the overall 
duration of the projects. Meanwhile, the ASTA risk simulator is useful to analyse the delay 
that affects the overall duration of the projects only. @Risk provides more detailed graphs 
than ASTA. And it can analyse the sensitivity of both the IRFs and the project activities and 
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calculate their degree of impact on project duration. In contrast, ASTA can only analyse the 
sensitivity of the project activities and calculate their degree of impact on project duration. 
The difference in the results of ASTA and @Risk is because the ASTA risk simulator applies 
one risk distribution method for all RFs and project activities at a time, which makes the RFs 
and the project activities give the same impact regarding the duration of the project, which 
is not accurate. On the other side, the @Risk simulator applies different risk distribution 
methods for the RFs and the project activities, rather than one distribution method at a time, 
with a degree of impact on the duration of the project. For example, RiskTriang (0,0.7,1) 
distribution was assigned to the stealing of the products and the materials RFs, which is 
different from assigning Uniform, Normal, Triangular or Skewed Triangular with no degree 
of impact on the duration of the project, as done in ASTA. Assigning different risk 
distribution methods for the RFs and the project activities with a degree of impact on the 
duration of the project was the reason behind the difference in the results of ASTA and 
@Risk. Therefore, the @Risk simulator gives more trusted results than the ASTA simulator. 
Furthermore, the RMF has used only one case study project with regard to analysing the 
delay in OGP projects. However, the IRFs might have a slightly different impact on the 
OGPs in different regions in the country. Additionally, the analysis and allocation of the 
IRFs to the work activities of the pipeline project were performed based on analysing the 
documents collected from these projects. This means that collecting more documents and 
conducting targeted questionnaires, focus group survey and/or interviews with the 
stakeholders in these projects will enhance the process of analysing the IRFs that affect the 
pipelines along these routes.  
9.6 Summary 
This chapter has used the @Risk simulator to analyse the delay in the project caused by the 
IRFs associated with the project. @Risk has helped in overcoming the limitations in using 
the ASTA Risk simulator to analyse the IRFs and their impact on the project. For example, 
the @Risk Simulator has helped in using different types of risk distribution rather than the 
Uniform, Normal, Skewed Normal and Skewed Triangular risk simulation which are 
available in the ASTA Risk simulator. @Risk helped in using different types of risk 
distribution methods at the time and it helped in analysing the delay by the overall duration 
of the project and by the stages of the project as well, which could not have been done using 
the ASTA risk simulator, such as: 
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• Analyse the delay caused by the IRFs in the overall duration of the project and during 
the stages of the project, see section 9.2. 
• Analyse the sensitivity analysis of the IRFs and their impact on the overall duration 
of the project and during the stages of the project, see section 9.3. 
• Analyse real-life delay in the project, see section 9.4. 
• Analyse the difference in using the ASTA Risk simulator and the @Risk Simulator 
to analyse the delay impact caused by the IRFs in the project, see section 9.5.  
• The advantage of using the @Risk simulator rather than the ASTA risk simulator is 
that the @Risk simulator has more flexibility in applying different risk distribution 
methods for the same IRFs and work activities at the same time. Additionally, the 
@Risk simulator could help the researchers to analyse the delay by the stages of the 
project, which could not have been done using the ASTA risk simulator.  
The next chapter will discuss the findings of the research. Additionally, the chapter provides 




CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter summarises the conclusions and recommendations, which are drawn from this 
research study. The chapter presents the potential benefits of the computer-based risk 
management model (see Chapter 5:) and the developed Risk Management Framework 
(RMF) (see Chapter 6:, Chapter 7:, Chapter 8:, and Chapter 9:). This chapter also explains 
the key contributions of knowledge and highlights the limitations of the developed RMF 
while evaluating its functionalities as well as the practical applications of the developed risk 
management framework particularly in Oil and Gas Pipeline (OGP) projects. Finally, the 
chapter provides recommendations for further study and research developments. 
10.1. Summary of the Research Conclusions 
The conclusions drawn from the research study are summarised under different sections to 
satisfy the research objectives and research questions listed in this research study. These 
sections include literature review, industry survey in Iraq, development of RMF, and 
evaluation of the functionalities of the computer-based risk management model and RMF. 
The key functionalities of the model include risk optimisation for identification of safest 
routes/alignments for OGP projects based on risk level, identification of Risk Mitigation 
Methods (RMMs), and the quantification of delay impact caused by relevant Influencing 
Risk Factors (IRFs) associated with OGP projects.   
10.1.1 Literature Review 
A comprehensive literature review was carried out to investigate the existing practices and 
limitations associated with risk management techniques in OGP projects, and RMMs and 
quantification of risk impact in these projects. The conclusions from the literature review are 
summarised below: 
• List of thirty risk factors and twelve RMMs in OGP projects have been identified 
based on a comprehensive review of the pipeline failure causes and risk management 
in OGP projects worldwide. These findings help in overcoming the problem of the 
shortage of data required for risk management in OGP projects.   
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• It was found that the existing RMFs are not effectively applicable in OGP projects 
elsewhere, and also, they are not active in managing the IRFs in OGP projects when 
the data and records about them are scarce. Moreover, there is a lack of studies about 
evaluating the RMMs with regard to their degree of effectiveness in OGP projects, 
which might make the responses to the IRFs not utilised, which is one of the 
limitations of existing risk management methods and frameworks in the projects. 
• It was found that there is a need for a logical evaluation of IRFs in OGP projects, 
specifically regarding the issue of Third-Party Disruption (TPD) because these 
factors have not been accurately evaluated in the past.  
• Moreover, the prior studies of risk management in OGP projects are mainly focused 
on managing the IRFs that affect the safety and the performance of the pipelines 
during the operation stage of these projects. However, different RMMs were 
suggested to mitigate the IRFs during the whole project. 
• The findings of the literature review have been used to conduct a questionnaire 
survey to analyse the impact of the IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects in Iraq. They 
have also been used to design an integrated RMF, which has been used in this 
research to assess and manage the IRFs in these projects.      
The findings of the literature review provide the answers for the first and second research 
questions and satisfy the first objective of the study.  
10.1.1 Industry Survey of OGP Projects  
A questionnaire survey has been designed to analyse the IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects 
in Iraq. The response rate of the survey was 49.5%, which is considered a good rate since 
the snowball sampling method was used to collect data amongst a large number of the 
targeted population in OPG projects in Iraq. The data was collected using a superstructure 
questionnaire survey, which was distributed using an online survey portal. The work 
experience of the researcher within OGP projects and the good networking of professionals 
working in the OPG industry helped to improve the survey response rate. The results of the 
survey were found to be reliable because the Cronbach's alpha correlation coefficient (α) 
was above the minimum level of 0.7. The findings from the survey are summarised below. 
• The levels of Risk Probability (RP) and Risk Severity (RS) of the IRFs that influence 
the safety of OGP projects in Iraq.  
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• The values of the RP and RS of the IRFs were used to calculate the Risk Importance 
Index (RII) for each IRF. Then, the IRFs were ranked based on their degree of 
influence on the projects and algebraic values of the calculated RII.  
• Based on the results of the survey, it was found that TPD IRFs such as terrorism & 
sabotage, insecure areas, and theft were the IRFs that have the most influence on 
OGP projects in Iraq in addition to the corruption, low public legal and moral 
awareness, and corrosion IRFs. This shows a need to be explicit about exactly what 
motivates intentional TPD and makes pipelines more vulnerable. 
• Based on the ranking of the IRFs with regard to their degree of impact on the projects, 
it was found that the safety and security IRFs are the ones that have the most 
influence on OGP projects in Iraq. 
• The survey has helped to identify the potential RMMs. Also, it helped to assess the 
RMMs with regard to their degree of effectiveness in managing the IRFs in the 
projects. Anti-corrosion measures (such as isolation and cathodic protection), 
moving to an underground pipeline, and protective barriers and perimeter fencing 
were found to be the most effective RMMs in OGP projects in Iraq.  
• Based on the results of the survey, it was found that the planning stage of the OGP 
projects has the highest priority with regard to managing the IRFs in these projects.  
• The majority of the respondents (71%) suggested that underground pipelines’ supply 
of oil and gas is safer than the aboveground ones. This means the IRFs relevant to 
construction and geological factors that result from moving the pipelines 
underground have less influence compared to the IRFs that affect the pipelines that 
are above ground in Iraq.  
• Based on the participants’ comments, the survey has identified some of the unique 
IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq. For example, not taking into account the future of urban 
planning, as well as pumping more than one type of petroleum product in the same 
pipe and the salt and metal contents in the transported products, which cause internal 
corrosion. These risk factors have not been stated in the existing literature.  
The results of the survey address the second objective of this study. 
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10.1.2 Analyse the IRFs in the Projects Using Fuzzy Theory 
In this study, the fuzzy theory integrated within MATLAB software was used for calculating 
the Risk Index (RI) of the IRFs and ranking them with regard to their degree of impact on 
the projects based on their values of RI.  
• Using the fuzzy theory in the process of the risk assessment remedies the problems 
relating to the uncertainty of analysing and ranking the IRFs based on the results of 
the survey only.  
• The values of the RP and RS of the IRFs, which were calculated from the survey, 
were used as inputs to calculate the values of RI of the IRFs. 
• Based on the values of RI of the IRFs, it was found that the most critical IRFs in 
OGP projects in Iraq are terrorism & sabotage; corruption; low public legal and moral 
awareness; insecure areas; and theft. The IRFs that have the least impact on the OGP 
projects in Iraq are geological risks; natural disasters and weather conditions; hacker 
attacks on the operating or control systems; vehicular accidents; and animal 
accidents.   
The results of the FIS provide answers for the third research question and address the third 
objective of this study.   
10.1.3 The Conclusions of the Findings of the RMF  
The integrated RMF designed in this research has been used to (i) select the safest route for 
a new oil and gas export pipeline project which will be built in the south of Iraq, (ii) 
recommend effective RMMs to OGP projects in Iraq, and (iii) quantify the delay impact on 
the delivery time of the export pipeline project which is caused by the associated IRFs. The 
outcomes of the three main functions of the RMF are as follows. 
10.1.3.1 Select Safest pipeline Routes/Alignments for the New OGP Projects 
The developed RMF has been used to select the safest pipeline route/alignment for 
the new pipeline projects based on the risk levels in the alternative routes/alignments 
that were suggested to build this project.  
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The inputs used by the RMF to select the optimum safe pipeline routes for the new 
pipeline project were a list of the IRFs that may affect the safety of the pipelines 
along these routes, which were identified from the literature review and the 
documents collected from the projects. The IRFs were evaluated based on the results 
of the FIS (see section 10.1.2). The process of calculating the impact of the IRFs on 
the pipeline routes and identifying safest pipeline routes for the new projects 
includes: (i) subjective and qualitative document analyses, (ii) risk allocation and (iii) 
risk calculation on the pipeline routes. Following the results of the RMF, it was found 
that pipeline route number 4 is the safer route to build a new export oil and gas 
pipeline in the south of Iraq and pipeline route number 2 is the risky route for this 
project. 
This pipeline will be built in the south of Iraq to link between the Badra oil field and 
the export point on the Gulf in Basra. The total length of the pipeline is 164 km. It 
will start from the Central Processing Facility (CPF) of Badra field (Faihaa 1), then 
cross the Bin Omran river to make a link with the Bazirgan pipeline. After that, the 
pipeline will be extended between Bazirgan and Gharraf to make a link with the 
third-party pipeline system at Gharraf–An Nassiriyah. Then it goes to the export 
point on the Gulf via Zubair. 
Using the RMF to select the safest pipeline routes/alignments for the new OGP 
projects provides an answer for the fourth research question and addresses the fourth 
objective of this research.  
10.1.3.2 Identification of Effective Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs) in OGP 
Projects 
The RMF has been used to identify, analyse and recommend effective RMMs which 
could be used to manage the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq. The RMMs were identified 
based on the findings of the literature review, and their degrees of effectiveness in 
managing the IRFs that were calculated based on the results of the survey. The RMF 
has been used to (i) classify the RMMs by their actions in managing the IRFs as 
direct and indirect RMMs and (ii) allocate the RMMs to the IRFs in the project 
depending on the nature and the character of the IRFs and RMMs.  
In summary, managing the IRFs in OGP projects is not limited to one project stage. 
Therefore, different RMMs were suggested to mitigate the IRFs during the whole 
project. Based on the survey, the planning and design stage is the stage with higher 
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priority to apply the RMMs and mitigate the IRFs. At the same time, the results 
revealed that the anti-corrosion efforts are the most effective RMMs, and the 
stakeholders who participated in this research stated that the underground OGPs are 
safer than the above ground ones in relation to their susceptibility to the IRFs. This 
means that the stakeholders assumed that the construction and geological IRFs that 
result from moving the pipelines underground have less influence compared to the 
TPD that results from having exposed pipelines.  
Using the RMF to suggest some effective RMMs has helped in answering the fifth 
research question and achieving the fifth objective of this research.  
10.1.3.3 Analysing the Delay Impact of the IRFs on Project Delivery  
The RMF has applied different programs, which are ASTA risk simulator and @Risk 
simulator to quantify the delay impact of the IRFs on project delivery. The overall 
delay in the project was between 15 and 18 days using the ASTA Risk simulator and 
45 days using the @Risk simulator. 
Using the RMF to quantify the delay impact in OGP project delivery which is caused 
by the associated IRFs has helped in answering the sixth research question and 
achieving the sixth objective of this research. 
In conclusion, this research has delivered a useful risk assessment system about identifying, 
analysing and mitigating the IRFs in OGP projects. The developed RMF provides a 
comprehensive and systematic approach to the risk management system in OGP for the 
organisations that have just begun to mitigate IRFs in their projects more effectively, which 
is the case in OGP projects in Iraq. Concerning OGP projects in Iraq, while the results 
identified various problems and risks, which cause pipeline failure, TPD is recognised as 
one of the prevailing issues obstructing the OGP projects. Moreover, the RMF developed in 
this research provides a systematic approach to selecting safe routes/alignments for OGP 
projects, recommends effective RMMs in the projects and quantifies the impact of the 
associated IRFs on the duration of the projects and their delivery time. Scientifically, OGP 
stakeholders (e.g. the decision-makers, policymakers and researchers) could use this 
research’s discoveries (i.e. the developed database) for monitoring and prioritising risks 
during design, re-design, construction, operation, and inspection and maintenance activities. 
The findings and recommendations of this research are more applicable to manage the IRFs 
in OGP projects in Iraq and other countries that have similar circumstances.  
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10.2 Research Contributions  
The research contributions to the knowledge, the practice (theoretical and practical 
contributions) from this research study and the answer of research questions are summarised 
as follows. 
10.2.1 Theoretical Contributions 
The findings of the literature review about identifying the common IRFs and RMMs in OGP 
projects have helped in overcoming the problem of the shortage of data required for risk 
management in these projects, which is one of the contributions of the literature review.    
Moreover, this research has engaged with the stakeholders in OGP projects in order to collect 
real perspectives about the IRFs and RMMs in the projects. This is because the data were 
collected from 198 participants who have real experience about the problems and close work 
experience within OGP projects in Iraq. The survey helped to assess the RP and RS levels 
of the IRFs, which is one of the contributions of the survey. Additionally, the survey has 
helped in analysing some of the RMMs with regard to their degree of effectiveness in 
managing the IRFs in the projects. The results of the survey were used to make the useful 
recommendations for identifying effective RMMs in OGP projects in Iraq, which is the 
second contribution of this research. 
The values of RP and RS of the IRFs were used as inputs for a computer model that uses 
fuzzy theory to assess the Risk Index (RI) of the risk factors. The results of the fuzzy theory 
were used to rank the IRFs with regard to their degree of impact on the projects using their 
values of RI. The fuzzy theory has helped in reducing the uncertainty and bias associated 
with analysing the IRFs in the project, which is another contribution of this research.  
Even though risk management cannot protect pipelines from all the associated risk factors, 
it should recognise the best way to manage and mitigate these factors. This research, 
therefore, has developed a systematic and an integrated risk management framework, which 
could be used for assessing and mitigating the IRFs in OGP projects. In addition, the 
developed framework is also useful to quantify the delay impact in the OGP projects. Hence, 
it is concluded that the RMF is a useful tool to analyse the IRFs associated with OGP projects 
at the planning, design and execution stages. The key practical applications of the developed 
RMF are selecting optimum safest routes/alignments for the new pipeline projects, 
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identifying the effective RMMs that could be used to mitigate the IRFs in the project and 
quantifying the amount of construction delay in the new projects caused by the IRFs.  
10.2.2 Practical Contributions 
This study is the first research related to making a comprehensive study of the OGP projects 
in Iraq to develop an integrated RMF. The stakeholders and academic researchers in the 
country could use the findings of this research in order to identify, understand and analyse 
the IRFs in their respective projects. This research used a comprehensive and integrated way 
of identifying, understanding and analysing the IRFs in the OGP projects, which is the first 
and fundamental step for risk management-related studies particularly in OGP projects in 
Iraq. This research, therefore, will help the oil and gas industry in Iraq to mitigate the 
associated IRFs more effectively. The midstream projects (i.e. the transported pipelines) will 
be benefited by the outcome of this study, which will be useful in achieving the target of 
increasing the oil export demand until 2035 suggested by the government after 2003. As the 
oil export activities are the backbone of Iraq’s economy but the slow development in 
increasing the capacity of the midstream section is obstructing the increase of the oil export 
rate, the findings of this research will help the economic growth of the country. 
The RMF designed in this study has been used in a number of ways/applications, as follows.  
1- The RMF provides a wide range of knowledge about identifying and analysing the 
IRFs. The way of analysing the IRFs is an integrated and more accurate way used 
while ranking the potential risk factors and effectively mitigating them in the 
projects. 
2- The RMF is useful to select the safe pipeline routes/alignments with regard to total 
risk level for the new projects.  
3- The RMF is useful to make recommendations about identifying effective risk 
mitigation methods in OGP projects in Iraq by suggesting some of the effective 
RMMs to manage the IRFs in these projects. This step could help in reducing the 
pipeline accidents and failure rate in the country. 
4- Analyse the construction delay in the new projects. This step includes analysing the 
potential impact of the IRFs on the duration of the projects during their planning and 
design stage.  
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5- Ten research publications were published from this research including three journal 
articles and seven conference papers. These publications have delivered most of the 
findings of this research and presented the research contributions in knowledge.  
10.3 The Answers of Research Questions and the Achieved Objectives  
This section summarises the answers of the research questions and the achieved objectives 
of this research. The main question of the research study was “Can this research provide a 
comprehensive and accurate way of assessing and managing the RFs in OGP projects, 
particularly in insecure and developing countries?” And, the aim of this research is to 
develop an integrated and systematic RMF to manage the RFs in OGP projects, particularly 
in insecure and developing countries. The RMF was used to identify, assess and rank the 
RFs and RMMs in OGP projects in Iraq. Also, the RMF was used to select the safest route 
for a new OGP project, which will be built in the south of Iraq and quantify the delay in the 
project caused by the associated IRFs in the project. Moreover, the RMF was used to make 
suggestions of effective RMMS to manage the IRFs in OGP project in Iraq. Table 10.1 shows 
the sub-research that addressed the main research question and the objectives that addressed 
these sub-questions and achieved the main aim of this research. 
Table 10.1: Research questions and objectives.  
Research questions  Research objectives  
Question 1: What are the limitations of the existing 
risk assessment and management methods that make 
them inapplicable in assessing the RFs in OGP 
projects? 
1. Conduct a comprehensive literature review to 
examine the strengths and the limitations of the 
existing risk management system, the RFs and 
the RMMs applicable in OGP projects. 
Question 2: What are the RFs and RMMs associated 
with OGP projects?   
Question 3: Can this research help in reducing the 
uncertainty while assessing the RFs and ranking 
them when the data about risk factors in OGP 
projects is insufficient? 
2. Explore the perceptions of the stakeholders 
about the impact of the RFs and RMMs in OGP 
projects to provide trusted data/inputs for the 
process of risk assessment in this research. 
3. Use the fuzzy theory integrated with MATLAB 
software to assess and rank the RFs in the 
projects using the findings from items 1 and 2 
above. 
Question 4: Can this research help with the 
optimisation of selecting the safest pipeline 
route/alignment for new OGP projects? 
4. Optimise the pipeline transmission 
paths/routes/alignments considering the 
identified influential risk factors in OGP 
projects. 
Question 5: What are the effective RMMs that 
could be used to manage the RFs in OGP projects? 
5. Provide recommendations for identifying 
effective risk mitigation methods in OGP 
projects. 
Question 6: What is the impact of the RFs on the 
project duration of OGP projects? 
6. Quantify the delay impact caused by relevant 
IRFs on the duration of OGP projects using 
ASTA risk simulator and @Risk simulator. 
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As explained in the table above, objective 1 provides answers for research questions 1 and 
2; objectives 2 and 3 provide the answers for research question 3; objective 4 provides the 
answers for research question 4; objective 5 provides the answers for research question 5; 
and objective 6 provides the answers for research question 6, as follows. 
• The answer for the first and second research question was based on the findings 
of the literature review about the risk factors RMMs in OGP projects.  A list of thirty 
risk factors (Table 2.3) and twelve RMMs (Table 2.5) in OGP projects have been 
identified based on a comprehensive review of the pipeline failure causes and risk 
management in OGP projects worldwide. Also, it was found that the existing RMFs 
are not effectively applicable in OGP projects elsewhere,  and they are not active in 
managing the IRFs in OGP projects when the data and records about them are scarce. 
Moreover, there is a lack of studies about evaluating the RMMs with regard to their 
degree of effectiveness in OGP projects, which might make the responses to the IRFs 
not utilised, which is one of the limitations of existing risk management methods and 
frameworks in the projects. The findings of the literature review and the survey 
provide the answers for the first and second research questions and satisfy the first 
objective of the study. 
• The answer for the third research question. A questionnaire survey was conducted 
to analyse the IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects based on the perceptions of the 
stakeholders. The findings of the literature review have been used to conduct a 
questionnaire survey to analyse the impact of the IRFs and RMMs in OGP projects 
in Iraq. The results of the survey have provided information about the probability 
(RP) (Table 4.3) and severity (RS) (Table 4.4) of the IRFs and the usability (Table 
4.9) and the effectiveness (Table 4.10) degrees of the RMMs in OGP projects in Iraq. 
This research has used the fuzzy theory to assess and rank the IRFs in OGP projects 
in Iraq, using the findings of the survey as inputs. The fuzzy theory has helped in 
providing more accurate results of assessing and ranking the IRFs in OGP projects 
by reducing the uncertainty and biases in analysing them based on the results of the 
survey only. The results of the survey and the fuzzy theory have highlighted the most 
critical IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq, which are: terrorism & sabotage, corruption, 
low public legal & moral awareness, insecure areas and theft. On the other side, the 
IRFs that have the least impact on OGP projects in Iraq are: geological risks, natural 
210 
 
disasters & weather conditions, hacker attacks on the operating or control systems, 
vehicular accidents and animal accidents (Table 5.1). 
Moreover, the results of the survey regarding evaluating the RMMs (e.g. their 
degrees of usability and effectiveness in OGP projects in Iraq) were used to make 
useful suggestions and recommendations about identifying effective risk mitigation 
methods in OGP projects in Iraq. Also, the results of the survey and the application 
of fuzzy theory were used in this research in order to select safe routes/alignments 
for the new OGP projects in Iraq, make suggestions of effective RMMs in the 
projects (Chapter 7:) and quantify the impact of the IRFs on the duration of these 
projects (Chapter 8: and Chapter 9:). 
The results of the survey address the second objective and the results of the fuzzy 
theory address the third objective of this study.   
• The answer for the fourth, fifth and sixth research questions. The integrated 
RMF designed in this research has been used to (i) select the safest route for a new 
oil and gas export pipeline project which will be built in the south of Iraq, (ii) 
recommend effective RMMs to OGP projects in Iraq, and (iii) quantify the delay 
impact on the delivery time of the export pipeline project which is caused by the 
associated IRFs.  
o The developed RMF has been used to select the safest pipeline route/alignment 
for the new pipeline projects based on the risk levels in the alternative 
routes/alignments that were suggested to build this project. Following the 
results of the RMF, it was found that pipeline route number 4 is the safer route 
to build a new export oil and gas pipeline in the south of Iraq and pipeline route 
number 2 is the risky route for this project. Using the RMF to select the safest 
pipeline routes/alignments for the new OGP projects provides an answer for 
the fourth research question and addresses the fourth objective of this research. 
o The RMF has been used to identify, analyse and recommend effective RMMs 
which could be used to manage the IRFs in OGP projects in Iraq. Based on the 
survey, the planning and design stage is the stage with higher priority to apply 
the RMMs and mitigate the IRFs. At the same time, the results revealed that 
the anti-corrosion efforts are the most effective RMMs, and the stakeholders 
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who participated in this research stated that the underground OGPs are safer 
than the above ground ones in relation to their susceptibility to the IRFs. This 
means that the stakeholders assumed that the construction and geological IRFs 
that result from moving the pipelines underground have less influence 
compared to the TPD that results from having exposed pipelines. Using the 
RMF to suggest some effective RMMs has helped in answering the fifth 
research question and achieving the fifth objective of this research. 
o The RMF has applied different programs, which are ASTA risk simulator 
(which used Monte Carlo and Latin Hypercube simulation) and @Risk 
simulator (which used Monte Carlo simulation) to quantify the delay impact of 
the IRFs on project delivery. The overall delay in the project was between 15 
and 18 days using the ASTA Risk simulator and 45 days using the @Risk 
simulator. Using the RMF to quantify the delay impact in OGP project delivery 
which is caused by the associated IRFs has helped in answering the sixth 
research question and achieving the sixth objective of this research. 
10.4 The Generalisability, Limitations of the Research Study 
The results of assessing and ranking the RFs in the projects were analysed based on an 
industrial survey carried out in Iraq. This means the results of the survey regards ranking the 
RFs in OGP projects is limited to Iraq only. The RMF was designed based on an extensive 
and worldwide literature review about risk management approaches in OGP projects, 
nevertheless, the framework was tested and evaluated using a case study project from Iraq, 
which means the findings and recommendations of this research will be suitable for Iraq and 
other countries with similar security problems. 
The developed RMF might be used to identify, classify and assess the IRFs and RMMs in 
OGP projects in a systematic and integrated way. The RMF could be used to select the 
optimum safest pipeline routes/alignments, recommend some of the effective RMMs and 
analyse the construction delay in OGP projects. However, the RMF has the following 
limitations.  
• The developed RMF cannot link the IRFs or draw failure scenarios to calculate the 
consequences of any hazardous event. Also, it does not provide a decision support 
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tool that has an automated system to analyse the information (e.g. IRFs, RP, RS, the 
RMMs and the effectiveness of RMMs).  
• The RMF was designed to assess and manage the IRFs in OGP projects. Howsoever, 
it was evaluated via a case study project and interviews carried out in OGP projects 
in Iraq. Therefore, the recommendations and findings of the RMF will be more 
applicable for OGP projects in Iraq than elsewhere. In this study, the functionalities 
of the RMF were tested and evaluated within an OGP project in Iraq. This means 
that the RMF developed in this research could be used to assess and mitigate the 
IRFs relevant to OGP projects in different geographical regions. Nevertheless, it will 
be better to carry out more experiments and validate the findings of the RMF before 
using it in OGP projects in different regions/areas with different characters and 
variations.  
• The IRFs associated with the OGPs projects all over Iraq were investigated and 
ranked. This provides wide knowledge about the IRFs and their impact on OGP 
projects across the country. The IRFs might have a slightly different impact on the 
OGPs in different regions in the country. However, the findings of this research were 
limited to one case study project, which is an oil and gas export pipeline project in 
the south of the country.  
• While a single case study was used in this research, the results of this research came 
from a long pipeline project, which extended for 164 km. The pipeline is crossing 3 
different cities, which are Al Kut, Maysan, and Basra. Also, it crosses different 
geographical environments and topographies, like rivers, lakes, roads, residential 
areas, green areas, etc. Therefore, the results of the case study reflect highly reliable 
and valid findings.   
10.5 Recommendations and Future Works 
The future work of this research includes the following: 
• Compare the degree of influence of the IRFs using Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) to provide more verified ranking of the IRFs. This is because making a direct 
comparison between the IRFs with regard to their degree of impact on the project 
will provide a more accurate ranking list of them.   
• Estimate the consequences of the hazardous events: we will use a neural network 
analysis tool to draw some pipe failure scenarios.  
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• Develop an automated decision-support method that can analyse the inputs (e.g. 
IRFs, RP, RS, RMMs, the effectiveness degrees of RMMs) in an automated way. 
• Develop a scenario-based model, to find the optimum/best schedule for developing 
and building OGP projects in Iraq. The model could help the stakeholders to show 
the inter-related various challenges and aspects, provide a graphic picture of the 
interdependence of these components and outline processes for the future. 
• The IRFs might have a slightly different impact on the OGPs in different regions in 
the country. The future work, therefore, will analyse the IRFs in other new projects 
when they appear.   
• Analysis of the cost-effects that result from applying the RMMs in OGP projects 
will be carried out by conducting some interviews with experts in these projects.  
• Development of a new database to store the findings of the research and make it 
accessible for stakeholders and researchers to use this data in studies related to risk 
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APPENDIX A: ETHICAL APPROVAL FIRST AND 
FINAL DRAFT OF THE SURVEY 
 




Table A.1: The first draft of the questionnaire survey (pilot-like survey). 
Section I: Introduction and the Participants' Demographic Information A 200-word introduction about 
the research and the survey 
Introduction  A 200-word introduction about the research and the survey  
Question 1: Education Degree Question 2: The participants’ 
occupation in OGPs 
Question 3: The participants’ 
experience in OGPs 
Section II: The Critical Risk Factors 
Question 4: How often are the following factors affecting the third-party disruption? 
(Always, Very often, Often, Sometimes, Seldom, Does not happen at all and Undecided) (Seven-Point Likert 
scale) 
Security and social * 
Public law legal and moral awareness  
Public socio-political  
Thieves  
Terrorism and sabotage  
Staff threats, kidnapped and murdered  
Leakage of sensitive information  
Pipe's location 
(Topography) * 
Geographical location such as ‘Hot Zones’  
Conflicts over land ownership  
Accessibility to pipelines  
Geological risks  
Occupational safety and 
environment * 
Lack of compliance with the safety regulations  
Non-availability of warning signs  
Sabotage opportunities arising due to above-the-ground pipeline  
Natural disasters and weather conditions  
Traffic accidents  
Animal attacks  
Technical * 
Shortage of IT services 
Corrosion; lack of cathodic protection  
Pipe's type, age, diameter and length 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control system  
Lack of regular inspection and maintenance  
Operational errors  
Design and manufacturing defects  
Roles and regulations * 
Government roles and the laws are not sound  
Lack of historical records about accidents’ Lack of accident historical records  
Lack of  appropriatetraining schemes  
Limited researchers are dealing with this problem  
Stakeholders are not paying  appropriateattention  
Inadequate risk management methods  
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The weak ability to identify and monitor the threats  
Corruption  
Question 5: Please, rank the 
above factors from 1-5 in 
order of the severity on the 
pipeline. Where 1 means the 
most critical and 5 is the 
least critical. 
Security and social Dropdown list (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
Pipe's location 
(Topography)  
Dropdown list (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
Occupational safety and 
environment  
Dropdown list (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
Technical  Dropdown list (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
Roles and regulations  Dropdown list (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
Question 6: Please, write any other risk factors that have not been mentioned in this survey. (Open-ended 
question) 
Section III: Risk Prevention Methods 
Question 7: How often are the following risk production methods used? 
 (Always, Very often, Often, Sometimes, Seldom, Do not use at all and Undecided) (Seven-Point Likert scale) 
Early stages of the projects  
(Subtitle) 
Risk registration  
Threat assessment  
Anti-terrorism design  
Avoid ‘Hot Zones’ 
Move to an underground pipeline  
Anti-corrosion isolation and cathodic protection  
Later stages of the projects  
(Subtitle)  
Patrols  
Professional remote monitoring  
Government-public cooperation  
Appropriate training  
Warning signs and marker tape above the pipeline  
Protective barriers and perimeter fencing  
Appropriate inspection, tests and maintenance  
Question 8: What do you 
prefer A or B? 
A- The aboveground pipeline, although it can often provide sabotage 
opportunities. 
B- The underground pipeline, despite the construction and maintenance 
difficulties. 
Question 9: Please, rank the stages of the project from 1-3 in order of 
the priority to mitigate pipeline third-party disruption. Where 1 means 
the highest priority and 3 is the lowest priority. 
Planning & design 
Construction 
Operation 
Question 10: Please, write any other risk prevention method in your opinion that has not been mentioned. 
(Open-ended question) 
Question 11: Please, if I need additional information, can I contact you? Please provide any contact information 




Table A.2: The final draft of the questionnaire survey. 
Section I: Introduction and the Participants' Demographic Information 
Introduction A 200-word 
introduction about the research and 
the survey  
Question 1: 
Education Degree 
Question 2: The 
participants’ 
occupation in OGP 
projects 




Section II: Analysing the Risk Factors 
Please, rank the following risk factors 
which are facing the oil and gas pipeline 
projects on the scale of likelihood and 
severity. Please note, to see the two scales, 
you may need to move the screen to the 
right or the left. 
 
Question 4: Risk factor likelihood scale. 
(Almost certain, Likely, Possible, 
Unlikely and Rare) (Five-Point Likert 
scale)  
Question 5: Risk factor severity and 
consequence scale. (Catastrophic, Major, 
Moderate, Minor and Negligible) (Five-

















Terrorism & sabotage  
Corruption  
Insecure areas  
Lawlessness  
Thieves  
Corrosion & lack of protection against it  
Improper safety regulations  
Improper inspection & maintenance  
Public’s legal and moral awareness 
Weak ability to identify & monitor the threats  
Stakeholders are not paying  appropriateattention  
Lack of  appropriatetraining  
Exposed pipelines  
Shortage of IT services & modern equipment  
Limited warning signs  
The pipeline is easy to access  
Lack of risk registration  
Little research on this topic  
Design, construction & material defects  
Conflicts over land ownership  
Threats to staff  
The education and poverty levels in OGP areas 
Operational errors  
Inadequate risk management  
Leakage of sensitive information  
Geological risks  
Natural disasters & weather conditions  
Vehicle accidents  
Hacker attacks on the operating or control system  
Animal accidents  
Question 6: Please, compare the main risk 
factors overall, and rank them from 1 - 5. 
Security & Social (S&S) 
Pipes' Location (PL) 
255 
 
Where: 1 means the highest risk factor, 
and 5 means the lowest risk. 
Dropdown list (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
Health, Safety and Environments (HSE) 
Rules and Regulation (R&R) 
Operational Constraints (OC) 
Question 7: Please, write any other risk factor in your opinion that has not been mentioned. 
Section III: Evaluating Risk Mitigations Methods 
Please, rank the following risk protection 
methods regarding the degree of 
application and effectiveness. 
 
Question 8: Protection methods usage 
scale. (Almost certainly used, Likely used, 
Possibly used, Unlikely used and Rarely 
used) (Five-Point Likert scale) 
 
Question 9: Protection methods 
effectiveness scale. (Extremely effective, 
Very effective, Moderately effective, 
Slightly effective and Ineffective) (Five-
Point Likert scale) 
 
 
Avoid ‘Insecure Zones’ 
Anti-terrorism design 
Avoid the registered risks and threats 
Appropriate training 
Move to an underground pipeline 
Anti-corrosion measures such as isolation and cathodic 
protection 
Protective barriers and perimeter fencing 
Warning signs and marker tape above the pipeline 
Foot and vehicle patrols 
High technology and professional remote monitoring 
Government-public cooperation 
Appropriate inspection, tests and maintenance 
Question 10: Which project stage is the 
most critical stage to mitigate the pipeline 
risks? Where 1 means the most critical and 
3 is the least critical. 
Dropdown list (1, 2, 3) 
During the planning and design stage, for example, avoid the 
‘Insecure Zones’ and the registered risks and threats; anti-
terrorism design; and  appropriatetraining.  
During the construction stage, for example, move to an 
underground pipeline, corrosion protection, protective 
barriers and perimeter fencing, warning signs and marker 
tape above the pipeline. 
During the operation stage, for example, patrols; high 
technology and professional remote monitoring; 
government-public cooperation; and  appropriateinspection 
and maintenance. 
Question 11: Overall, by comparing 
between the above and underground 
pipelines, which pipeline has the least 
chance of third-party risk disruption? 
The aboveground pipeline, although it is exposed, and it can 
provide sabotage and theft opportunities. 
The underground pipeline, despite the corrosion, geological, 
construction and maintenance risks. 
Question 12: Please, write any other risk prevention method in your opinion that has not been mentioned. 
Please, if I need additional information, could I contact you? Please provide any contact information if 





APPENDIX B: THE SURVEY PARTICIPANTS’ 
COMMENTS  
Table B.1: The comments of the participants about adding IRFs to the survey.  
Response No. Comment 
3 The brand of the pipes and their quality 
78 The manufacturing defects of the pipes 
109 Type of material of the pipe (chemical composition of the metal) 
105 We can add the age of the pipe 
178 Passing the design capacity and using the non-original spare parts  
5 
The welding is not following the international standers and the brand of the pipes and the coating 
materials 
6 Executive errors 
146 Industrial cheating 
29 The construction and operational errors 
128 
The damages the caused by other construction work during the drilling of new pipes, and also 
to the aging of the pipes and maintenance, the survival of the pipes immersed in areas containing 
oil derivatives produced by old damage, which negatively affects the packaging of the new pipe 
and thus increase the rate of damage and the difficulty of maintenance in the future, Passage of 
machinery and equipment over pipes. 
183 the slackness during the construction and corruption 
18 
The conflicts between the employers within the oil companies, which do not solve 
administratively and turn into acts of settling accounts through sabotage and without deterrence 
22 
The concern of the managers about the corruption to steal public money and lack of attention 
about the safety of the staff and citizen. The complicity of the weak souls of the local people 
and the employees of the region with the sabotages and the terrorists.  
199 The corruption of the site managers 
15 
Blasting the pipes for the benefits of the contractor. As well as the security and political factor 
of the country is the most influence factors over all 
87 The lack of guards along the pipelines 
39 
The lack of border controls of the country engorges the sabotages to damage the pipes to steal 
the products to sell it outside the country 
68 
The foreign oil and gas companies tend to prefer countries with stable political systems and a 
history of granting and enforcing long-term leases. However, some companies simply go where 
the oil and gas is, even if a particular country doesn't quite match their preferences. Numerous 
issues may arise from this, including sudden nationalization and/or shifting political winds that 
change the regulatory environment. Depending on what country the oil is being extracted from, 
the deal a company starts with is not always the deal it ends up with, as the government may 
change its mind after the capital is invested, in order to make more profit for itself. 
30 Thefts and not punishing the thieves 
17 Passing the pipelines via agricultural areas is exposing them directly for damage 
79 Choose the pipelines routes accurately and taking the future urban planning into account 
81 Moving the dangerous of fire and vapours far from the residence areas 
38 Corrosion 
198 
Misuse of shrinkage and expansion joints for long pipeline fitting. Neglecting the use of 
cathodic and anodic protection systems and thus not controlling high corrosion rates. 
33 The nature of the pumped fluid in special the silver contents 
75 
Non-stability in the raw specification (change in Apl between one field and another) and the 
difference of sulphur content of oil between field and another, which negatively affects the alloy 
pipe and thus the occurrence of cracking in the long term 




The non-isolation of salts from oil is considered one of the important reasons for the corrosion 
of oil pipelines 
27 The health status of labours 
43 Not to choose the right people to work 
86 Nepotism  
93 Put the unqualified person in the wrong place and nepotism and negligence 
97 Non-specialised labours 
103 Sagging in the staff and the lack of seriousness in taking responsibilities and duties. 
114 The lack of experience in dealing with problems 
121 Negative human behaviour 
127 
Choose the companies that have done successful pipeline projects with sufficient experience to 
carry out the construction work 
197 The stakeholders are not well educated about risk management and fail to provide public safety 
57 
The lack of teamwork and exchange of experiences and finding solutions. The lack of 
communications with the researchers and not following the studies about the risk management. 
There is no platform to receive new ideas and studies about the pipelines' safety. And not turned 
the ideas into action.  
There is no schedule timetables to solve the problems. There is a need for new rules that commit 
the decision makers and managers are to identify the risks and examine their solutions with 
experts. 
62 The organisational cultural and the organisational structure of the companies 
44 The high prices of oil products  
85 International conventions for the pipelines that crossing the neighbour countries 
112 
The government and the oil ministry do not consider the pipelines as significance sites and their 
exposure due to the sovereignty, security and stability of the country  
69 The obsession of the parties and the weakness of the government control 
82 There is no risk that has not been mentioned  
16 No comment  
20 No comment  
24 No comment  
96 No comment  
173 No comment  
190 No comment  
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Table B.2: Analysis of the participants’ comments about adding IRFs to the survey 
comment 
The Type of the IRFs in 
the comment 
The brand of the pipes and their quality Martials quality and type  
The manufacturing defects of the pipes Martials quality and type  
Type of material of the pipe (chemical composition of the metal) Martials quality and type  
We can add the age of the pipe Martials quality and type  
Passing the design capacity and using the non-original spare parts  Operational errors 
The welding is not following the international standers and the brand of the pipes and 
the coating materials Construction Defects  
Executive errors Construction Defects  
Industrial cheating Construction Defects  
The construction and operational errors Construction Defects  
The damages the caused by other construction work during the drilling of new pipes, 
and also to the aging of the pipes and maintenance, the survival of the pipes immersed 
in areas containing oil derivatives produced by old damage, which negatively affects 
the packaging of the new pipe and thus increase the rate of damage and the difficulty 
of maintenance in the future, Passage of machinery and equipment over pipes. Construction Defects  
the slackness during the construction and corruption Construction Defects  
The conflicts between the employers within the oil companies, which do not solve 
administratively and turn into acts of settling accounts through sabotage and without 
deterrence Corruption 
The concern of the managers about the corruption to steal public money and lack of 
attention about the safety of the staff and citizen. The complicity of the weak souls 
of the local people and the employees of the region with the sabotages and the 
terrorists.  Corruption 
The corruption of the site managers Corruption 
Blasting the pipes for the benefits of the contractor. As well as the security and 
political factor of the country is the most influence factors over all Security  
The lack of guards along the pipelines Security  
The lack of border controls of the country engorges the sabotages to damage the pipes 
to steal the products to sell it outside the country Security  
The foreign oil and gas companies tend to prefer countries with stable political 
systems and a history of granting and enforcing long-term leases. However, some 
companies simply go where the oil and gas is, even if a particular country doesn't 
quite match their preferences. Numerous issues may arise from this, including sudden 
nationalization and/or shifting political winds that change the regulatory 
environment. Depending on what country the oil is being extracted from, the deal a 
company starts with is not always the deal it ends up with, as the government may 
change its mind after the capital is invested, in order to make more profit for itself. Security  
Thefts and not punishing the thieves Security  
Passing the pipelines via agricultural areas is exposing them directly for damage 
geographical location 
"agricultural areas" 




Moving the dangerous of fire and vapours far from the residence areas geographical location  
Corrosion Operational errors 
Misuse of shrinkage and expansion joints for long pipeline fitting. Neglecting the use 
of cathodic and anodic protection systems and thus not controlling high corrosion 
rates. Operational errors 
The nature of the pumped fluid in special the silver contents The type of the product 
Non-stability in the raw specification (change in Apl between one field and another) 
and the difference of sulphur content of oil between field and another, which 
negatively affects the alloy pipe and thus the occurrence of cracking in the long term 
The type of the product 
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Pump several products in the same pipeline The type of the product 
The non-isolation of salts from oil is considered one of the important reasons for the 
corrosion of oil pipelines 
The type of the product 
The health status of labours Labours 
Not to choose the right people to work Labours 
Nepotism  Labours 
Put the unqualified person in the wrong place and nepotism and negligence Labours 
Non-specialised labours Labours 
Sagging in the staff and the lack of seriousness in taking responsibilities and duties. Labours 
The lack of experience in dealing with problems Labours 
Negative human behaviour Labours 
Choose the companies that have done successful pipeline projects with sufficient 
experience to carry out the construction work Labours 
The stakeholders are not well educated about risk management and fail to provide 
public safety Labours 
The lack of teamwork and exchange of experiences and finding solutions. The lack 
of communications with the researchers and not following the studies about the risk 
management. 
There is no platform to receive new ideas and studies about the pipelines' safety. And 
not turned the ideas into action.  
There is no schedule timetables to solve the problems. There is a need for new rules 
that commit the decision makers and managers are to identify the risks and examine 
their solutions with experts. Labours 
The organisational cultural and the organisational structure of the companies  
The high prices of oil products  Social 
International conventions for the pipelines that crossing the neighbour countries Governmental factors 
The government and the oil ministry do not consider the pipelines as significance 
sites and their exposure due to the sovereignty, security and stability of the country  Governmental factors 
The obsession of the parties and the weakness of the government control Governmental factors 
There is no risk that has not been mentioned   
No comment   
No comment   
No comment   
No comment   
No comment   




Table B.3: The comments of the participants about adding RMMs to the survey. 
Response No  The comments from the survey 
5 
Construct the B.R.C barriers on the both sides of the tube to reduce the risk of being exposed to 
the pipe and for easy maintenance 
6 Using high technology to monitor the pipelines 
18 Periodic maintenance 
20 Using different pipes brand that bears the corrosion 
22 
Evacuation of illegal residents from the areas of pipelines. Expand protection zones along 
pipelines.  Appropriatemonitoring and development of the cathodic protection system. 
24 Satellite monitoring for 24 hours 
27 CCTV 
29 Counting Covers 
30 Using high technology  
37 
The purchase of high-quality pipes based on international companies and the presence of a 
specialized department and an expert in the engineering examination to ensure the certificates of 
laboratory examination. 
38 Use optimisers 
43 Employ people to monitor the pipelines daily using modern technology 
50 Monitor the pipelines by aircraft 
53 Monitor pipelines with modern technology such as airplanes and marching cameras 
55 
The most important point in the subject to avoid passing near the people both as a city or outside 
the city in "rural areas". It has happened one time, that we have a lot of problems in the pipes of 
Majnoon where there are two breeders buffalo breeders and threatened to give them financial 
ratios and employ their people. 
57 
The imposition of fines and strict laws for the relevant bodies, including the public if the 
agreement between the government and them to protect the pipes 
62 Take advantage of previous lessons in the oil sector 
79 Constant monitoring and the of deterrence sanctions on transgressors 
87 The need to dig security trenches surrounded by warehouses and pipelines 
89 
The thief and the terrorist do not care if the pipe is open or buried because it is stolen or destroyed. 
The cost of an exposed pipe is cheaper and its maintenance is easier and may be less costly than 
protection. 
95 Covering the pipes especially the river crossing 
109 Use high-quality covering material. With continuous use of cathodic protection. 
112 
Inform people of the need to report any doubts about the vulnerability of the network and prepare 
a team ready to receive and verify complaints. 
113 The pipes can be extended inside concrete slabs as well as burial 
127 Air monitoring of the pipes because it covers large spaces and distances 
178 
It is possible to reduce the pumping the oil products for the final product from the refinery to the 
port, ie make the refinery close to the final product line and the possibility of transporting the 
crude oil or kerosene by train or sea freight buoys 
183 Construct the B.R.C barrier 
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Table B.4: Analysis of the participants’ comments about adding RMMs to the survey. 
 The comments from the survey Type Frequency 
Construct the B.R.C barriers on the both sides of the 
tube to reduce the risk of being exposed to the pipe 
and for easy maintenance 
Barriers 
 1 
Using high technology to monitor the pipelines 
Advanced IT 
System  2 
Periodic maintenance Maintenance  3 
Using different pipes brand that bears the corrosion Pipe Brand  4 
Evacuation of illegal residents from the areas of 
pipelines. Expand protection zones along pipelines.  
Appropriatemonitoring and development of the 




Satellite monitoring for 24 hours 
Advanced IT 
System  6 
CCTV 
Advanced IT 
System  7 
Counting Covers Anti Corrosion  8 
Using high technology  
Advanced IT 
System  9 
The purchase of high-quality pipes based on 
international companies and the presence of a 
specialized department and an expert in the 
engineering examination to ensure the certificates of 
laboratory examination. Pipe Brand Experts 10 
Use optimisers Product Type  11 
Employ people to monitor the pipelines daily using 
modern technology Grads  12 
Monitor the pipelines by aircraft 
Advanced IT 
System  13 
Monitor pipelines with modern technology such as 
airplanes and marching cameras 
Advanced IT 
System  14 
The most important point in the subject to avoid 
passing near the people both as a city or outside the 
city in "rural areas". It has happened one time, that 
we have a lot of problems in the pipes of Majnoon 
where there are two breeders buffalo breeders and 
threatened to give them financial ratios and employ 
their people. 
Geographical 
Location  15 
The imposition of fines and strict laws for the 
relevant bodies, including the public if the 
agreement between the government and them to 
protect the pipes 
Government 
and Public 
cooperation  16 
Take advantage of previous lessons in the oil sector 
Risk 
registration  17 
Constant monitoring and the of deterrence sanctions 
on transgressors 
Rules and 
regulation  18 
The need to dig security trenches surrounded by 
warehouses and pipelines 
Barriers 
 19 
The thief and the terrorist do not care if the pipe is 
open or buried because it is stolen or destroyed. The 
cost of an exposed pipe is cheaper and its 
maintenance is easier and may be less costly than 
protection.   20 
Covering the pipes especially the river crossing Anti Corrosion  21 
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Use high-quality covering material. With 
continuous use of cathodic protection. Anti Corrosion  22 
Inform people of the need to report any doubts about 
the vulnerability of the network and prepare a team 
ready to receive and verify complaints. 
Government 
and Public 
cooperation  23 
The pipes can be extended inside concrete slabs as 
well as burial Anti Corrosion  24 
Air monitoring of the pipes because it covers large 
spaces and distances 
Advanced IT 
System  25 
It is possible to reduce the pumping the oil products 
for the final product from the refinery to the port, ie 
make the refinery close to the final product line and 
the possibility of transporting the crude oil or 
kerosene by train or sea freight buoys Product Type  26 
Construct the B.R.C barrier Barriers 
Geographical 
Location 27 




Advanced IT System 7 24.13793103  
Anti-Corrosion 5 17.24137931  
Barriers 4 13.79310345  
Pipe Brand 2 6.896551724  
Product Type 2 6.896551724  
Geographical Location 2 6.896551724  
Government and Public cooperation 2 6.896551724  
Maintenance 1 3.448275862  
Experts 1 3.448275862  
Grads 1 3.448275862  
Risk registration 1 3.448275862  
Rules and regulation 1 3.448275862  





APPENDIX C: DOCUMENTS FROM THE 
PROJECT  
 
Figure C.1: The five pipeline routes of the project.  
Table C.1: The collected documents from the project. 
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Right of Way PetroChina 
International 
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Warning Tape PetroChina 
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APPENDIX D: THE ALLOCATION OF THE IRFS 
TO THE PROJECT ACTIVITIES  
The IRFs were allocated to the project activites after a careful read and subjective and 
objective analysis of the following documents:  
1- CEPA and INGAA (2016), which is a practical guide for pipeline construction, 
prepared by two well-known foundations working on pipeline projects. 
2- F.T.A. (2019), which is a step-by-step guide for pipeline construction prepared by 
FracTracker Alliance, which is a support group addressing pressing extraction-related 
concerns with a lens towards health effects and exposure risks on communities from oil 
and gas development in the USA. 
3- Nandagopal (2007), which is a book about “Pipeline Systems - Designing, 
Construction, Maintenance and Asset Management”. 
4- Folga (2007), which is a book about “General and Special Pipeline Construction 
Procedures” for “Aboveground Facility Construction Procedures” for natural gas 
pipelines. 
5- Center Point Enrgy (2019), which is a brief report about pipeline design and 
construction. 
Table D.1: The allocation of the IRFs to the project activities. 
The activities 







































Life-cycle plan           3.38 3.87     
Choosing the 
route(s)  3.99 3.75 3.8   3.49 3.38 3.87     
Route(s) 
approval 3.99 3.75 3.8   3.49 3.38 3.87   3.51 
Design and 








plans             3.87   3.51 
Time schedule           3.38 3.87   3.51 
Cost 







ns              3.87     
Materials order           3.38 3.87     
Survey, 
staking and 












crossings 3.99     3.35     3.87   3.51 
Pipe 
transporting to 
sit 3.99   3.8 3.35 3.49   3.87 3.54 3.51 
Temporary 
fencing and 
signage 3.99     3.35     3.87 3.54   




support 3.99     3.35   3.38 3.87     
Pipe set‐up  3.99     3.35     3.87   3.51 
Welding, 
fabrication and 
installing pipe 3.99     3.35     3.87   3.51 
NDT tests        3.35     3.87   3.51 
SAND BLAST       3.35     3.87     
Painting       3.35     3.87     
Coating        3.35     3.87     
Lowering pipe 
in and 
backfilling 3.99 3.75   3.35     3.87   3.51 
Cathodic 
Protecting the 
pipe       3.35   3.38 3.87   3.51 
Final fitting 3.99 3.75 3.8 3.35   3.38 3.87   3.51 
As‐built survey       3.35     3.87   3.51 
Hydro, 
pressure test       3.35   3.38 3.87     
Backfilling       3.35     3.87     
Fencing and 
signage             3.87     
Final clean-up    3.75   3.35 3.49   3.87 3.54 3.51 
Right-of-way 
reclamation 3.99     3.35     3.87   3.51 
Safety barriers 3.99     3.35 3.49   3.87   3.51 
Operation 
within design 
limits 3.99 3.75   3.35   3.38 3.87 3.54 3.51 
Commissionin
g operation 
value 3.99 3.75 3.8 3.35 3.49 3.38 3.87 3.54 3.51 
Measure the 
performance 





and efficiency             3.87     
Monitoring 
and inspection 







































ns   
Life-cycle plan                 
Choosing the 
route(s)              3.7   
Route(s) 
approval   3.68 3.57 3.17 2.8 1.95 3.7   
Design and 








plans                 
Time schedule   3.68 3.57 3.17     3.7   
Cost 





ns                  
Materials order                 
Survey, 
staking and 












crossings 3.76   3.57       3.7   
Pipe 
transporting to 
sit 3.76   3.57 3.17 2.8 1.95 3.7   
Temporary 
fencing and 
signage 3.76   3.57   2.8 1.95 3.7   




support 3.76   3.57      3.7   





installing pipe     3.57      3.7   
NDT tests              3.7   
SAND BLAST             3.7   
Painting             3.7   
Coating                  
Lowering pipe 
in and 
backfilling 3.76     3.17     3.7   
Cathodic 
Protecting the 
pipe     3.57       3.7   
Final fitting 3.76     3.17     3.7   
As‐built survey             3.7   
Hydro, 
pressure test             3.7   
Backfilling             3.7   
Fencing and 
signage     3.57 3.17     3.7   
Final clean-up  3.76   3.57       3.7   
Right-of-way 
reclamation             3.7   
Safety barriers 3.76   3.57       3.7   
Operation 
within design 
limits         2.8 1.95 3.7   
Commissionin
g operation 
value 3.76 3.68 3.57 3.17 2.8 1.95 3.7   
Measure the 
performance 
and efficiency 3.76 3.68 3.57 3.17 2.8 1.95 3.7   
Enhanced 
performance 
and efficiency            3.7   
Monitoring 
and inspection 









Reduced risk)     3.17     3.7 3.69   
Concept and 
definitions          
Life-cycle plan                  
Choosing the 
route(s)  3.7   3.48 3.1 3.72 3.67 3.68 3.3  
Route(s) 
approval   3.56 3.48 3.1   3.67 3.68    
Design and 








plans         3.72   3.68    
Time schedule     3.48 3.1   3.67 3.68    
Cost 







ns            3.67 3.68    
Materials order             3.68    
Survey, 
staking and 












crossings 3.7   3.48 3.1   3.67 3.68    
Pipe 
transporting to 
sit 3.7   3.48 3.1   3.67 3.68    
Temporary 
fencing and 
signage 3.7   3.48 3.1   3.67 3.68    




support     3.48 3.1   3.67 3.68    
Pipe set‐up  3.7   3.48 3.1   3.67 3.68    
Welding, 
fabrication and 
installing pipe           3.67 3.68    
NDT tests            3.67 3.68    
SAND BLAST           3.67 3.68    
Painting         3.72   3.68    
Coating          3.72   3.68    
Lowering pipe 
in and 
backfilling         3.72   3.68    
Cathodic 
Protecting the 
pipe     3.48     3.67 3.68    
Final fitting       3.1 3.72 3.67 3.68    
As‐built survey             3.68    
Hydro, 
pressure test             3.68    
Backfilling             3.68    
Fencing and 
signage           3.67 3.68    
Final clean-up  3.7 3.56 3.48     3.67 3.68    
Right-of-way 
reclamation     3.48     3.67 3.68    
Safety barriers     3.48 3.1   3.67 3.68    
Operation 
within design 
limits     3.48     3.67 3.68    
Commissionin
g operation 
value 3.7   3.48 3.1 3.72 3.67 3.68 3.3  
Measure the 
performance 





and efficiency     3.48     3.67 3.68    
Monitoring 
and inspection 









Reduced risk)   3.48 3.1   3.67 3.68      
 
Table D.2: The total risk and risk levels of the project activities.  
The activities of the project 
The RFs 
The total 
risk in the 
activity  
The total risk from 
100% 
Risk level 
Concept and definitions     0.859989363 
 LOW  
Life-cycle plan       71.8 3.409565779 
VERY HIGH 
Choosing the route(s)  3.64 3.64 3.03 76.65 3.639877674 
VERY HIGH 
Route(s) approval   3.64   73.14 3.473198344 
VERY HIGH 
Design and development   3.64   43.44 2.062834783 
MEDIUM 
Manufacturing and installation 
(procedure/plan)   3.64   29.28 1.390419025 
 LOW  
Risk assessment and management plans   3.64   49.67 2.358678722 
HIGH 
Time schedule       22.08 1.048512708 
 LOW  
Cost estimation        22.08 1.048512708 
 LOW  
Staking for construction and 
Communications        25.43 1.207594119 
 LOW  
Materials order   3.64   18.41 0.874235459 
 LOW  
Survey, staking and setting out       75.77 3.598089124 
VERY HIGH 
Clearing and grading the Right-Of-Way 
(ROW) 3.64     73.46 3.48839418 
VERY HIGH 
Topsoil stripping and Front-end grading 3.64     57.88 2.748546898 
HIGH 
Buildings, roads and rivers crossings 3.64     76.63 3.638927934 
VERY HIGH 
Pipe transporting to sit 3.64     59.02 2.802682065 
HIGH 
Temporary fencing and signage       51.09 2.426110246 
HIGH 
Trenching        54.05 2.566671732 
HIGH 
Temporary erosion control and side 
support 3.64     57.48 2.729552103 
HIGH 
Pipe set‐up  3.64     43.84 2.081829579 
MEDIUM 
Welding, fabrication and installing pipe 3.64     36.28 1.722827945 
MEDIUM 
NDT tests  3.64     32.77 1.556148615 
 LOW  
SAND BLAST 3.64     32.82 1.558522965 
 LOW  
Painting 3.64     32.81 1.558048095 
 LOW  
Coating  3.64     54.69 2.597063405 
HIGH 
Lowering pipe in and backfilling 3.64     46.71 2.218117236 
MEDIUM 
Cathodic Protecting the pipe 3.64     68.64 3.259506895 
VERY HIGH 
Final fitting 3.64     32.61 1.548550697 
 LOW  
As‐built survey 3.64     32.48 1.542377389 
 LOW  
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Hydro, pressure test 3.64     29.1 1.381871367 
 LOW  
Backfilling 3.64     36.16 1.717129507 
MEDIUM 
Fencing and signage 3.64     61.49 2.919974927 
HIGH 
Final clean-up        40.11 1.904703111 
MEDIUM 
Right-of-way reclamation       54.03 2.565721992 
HIGH 
Safety barriers       55.53 2.636952475 
HIGH 
Operation within design limits       97.54 4.631880865 
 LOW  
Commissioning operation value     3.03 97.54 4.631880865 
VERY HIGH 
Measure the performance and efficiency     3.03 29.26 1.389469285 
VERY HIGH 
Enhanced performance and efficiency       97.54 4.631880865 
VERY HIGH 
Monitoring and inspection of pipelines     3.03 42.57 2.021521103 
MEDIUM 
Preventive and predictive maintenance of 
facilities       59.54 2.827375299 
 LOW  
Risk Management (Risk evaluation and 





APPENDIX E: THE RESULTS OF THE 
TARGETED SURVEY EVALUATING THE 
IDENTIFIED AND RECOMMENDED RMMs 
(Stage I) 
The appendix presents the results of the targeted survey, which was about collecting the 
perceptions of several experts in OGP projects in Iraq with regard to the recommended risk 
mitigation methods which could be used to manage the risk factors in OGP projects. The 
figures below show the details of the result of the targeted survey.  
 
Figure E.1: The recommended RMM to manage the Terrorism, sabotage and the security, 
Stealing the products and Insecure areas IRFs. 
As the size of the figure above was not big enough to explain the full details, the 
recommended RMM to manage the Terrorism, sabotage and the security, Stealing the 
products and Insecure areas IRFs, were 1. Avoid the insecure areas. 2. Anti-terrorism design. 
3. Use protective barriers and perimeter fencing. 4. Use a high technology and advanced 
risk-monitoring system. 5. Government-public cooperation.6. Foot and vehicle patrols. 7. 
Use the rivers and lakes to extend the pipelines in the insecure areas despite the construction 









Figure E.3: The recommended RMMs to manage the Threats to staff IRF.
 
 
Figure E.4: The recommended RMMs to manage The pipeline is easy to access IRF. 
As the size of the figure above was not big enough to explain the full details, the risk factor 
(The pipeline is easy to access). The suggested risk mitigation methods (1. Use underground 
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pipeline. 2. Use a high technology and advanced risk-monitoring system. 3. Use protective 
barriers and perimeter fencing. 4. Foot and vehicle patrols. 5. Expand the protection zones 
along with the pipelines. 6. Use the rivers and lakes to extend the pipelines in the insecure).
 
 
Figure E.5: The recommended RMMs to manage the Geological risks such as groundwater 
and landslides IRF. 
 




Figure E.7: The recommended RMMs to manage the Corrosion and lack of protection 
against it IRF. 
As the size of the figure above was not big enough to explain the full details, the risk factors 
(Corrosion and lack of protection against it). The suggested risk mitigation methods (1. Use 
anti-corrosion such as isolation & cathodic protection 2. Extend the pipes inside concrete 
pipes. 3. Use optimisers and remove the salts and metals before pumping the petroleum 
products. 4. Pump only one type of product in the pipeline and use a different pipeline for 
each oil field).
 
Figure E.8: The recommended RMMs to manage The weak ability to identify and monitor 
the threats IRF. 
The risk factors (The weak ability to identify and monitor the threats). The suggested risk 
mitigation methods (1. Use a high technology and advanced risk-monitoring system. 2.  
Appropriateinspection, tests and maintenance. 3.  Appropriatetraining. 4. Record pipelines 
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accidents and risks in order to avoid them in the future).
 
Figure E.9: The recommended RMM to manage the Shortage of the IT services and modern 
equipment) IRF. 
As the size of the figure above was not big enough to explain the full details, the risk factors 
(Design, construction and material defects).  The suggested risk mitigation methods (1.  
Appropriatetraining. 2. Make studies about the safety of the pipelines and follow the new 
research about risk management. 3. Use high-quality pipes and spare. 4. Choose ell-known 
design companies to minimise design errors. 5. Choose well-known construction companies 
to minimise construction defects). 
 
Figure E.10: The recommended RMMs to manage the Design, construction and material 
defects IRF. 
As the size of the figure above was not big enough to explain the full details, the risk factors 
(Design, construction and material defects).  The suggested risk mitigation methods (1.  
Appropriatetraining. 2. Make studies about the safety of the pipelines and follow the new 
research about risk management. 3. Use high-quality pipes and spare. 4. Choose well-known 
284 
 
design companies to minimise design errors. 5. Choose well-known construction companies 
to minimise construction defects). 
 
Figure E.11: The recommended RMMs to manage the Operational errors IRF. 
As the size of the figure above was not big enough to explain the full details, the risk factor 
(Operational errors). The suggested risk mitigation methods (1. Choose well-known 
construction companies to minimise construction defects. 2. Commit to the operating 
standards. (e.g. do not pass the design capacity .3. Use optimisers and remove the salts and 
metals before pumping the petroleum products. 4. Pump only one type of product in the 
pipeline and use a different pipeline for each oil field). 
 




Figure E.13: The recommended RMMs to manage the Conflicts over land ownership IRF. 
 
 
Figure E.14: The recommended RMM to manage the Salt and metal contents in transported 
products such as silver IRF. 
As the size of the figure above was not big enough to explain the full details, the risk factor 
(Salts and metals contents in the transported products such as Silver).  The suggested risk 






Figure E.15: The recommended RMM to manage The pipes are older than the design age 
IRF.
 





Figure E.17: The recommended RMM to manage the Poor quality pipes IRF. 
 
Figure E.18: The recommended RMMs to manage the Natural disasters and weather 
conditions IRF. 
 





Figure E.20: The recommended RMM to manage the Lack of risk registration) IRF. 
 
Figure E.21: The recommended RMM to manage the Not paying  appropriateattention to 
risk management (e.g. not following scheduled programmes to solve problems) IRF. 
 





Figure E.23: The recommended RMMs to manage The aboveground pipelines increase 
sabotage and theft opportunities, as they will be easy to access IRF. 
 
Figure E.24: The recommended RMM to manage the Limited warning signs IRF. 
 
Figure E.25: The recommended RMMs to manage the Pumping more than one type of 




Figure E.26: The recommended RMMs to manage the Improper safety regulations IRF. 
 
Figure E.27: The recommended RMMs to manage the Inadequate risk management IRF. 
Below are the risk mitigations methods that were added by the participants in the targeted 
survey.  
• In the case of a leak, the central control room (CCR) to monitor and identify the 
damage 
• One of the advanced technology maintenance systems is SAP software, to provide  
appropriatepreventative maintenance. 
• Permanent pipeline warning signs: one of the monitoring inspection application is 
remote pipeline acoustic inspection. 
• During in-service operations, chemical additives should be applied to reduce the 
corrosion of metals. 
• Use periodic sampling for labs to make sure that a suitable system is in operation. 
• Use  appropriatecoating to mitigate external corrosion. 
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• Additional trench and slope protection to be executed as required to mitigate the 
deposit contamination. 
• Right of Way (ROW) to provide more access for maintenance and frequent 
surveillance. 
• To measure the corrosive effect of the stream on pipelines, we suggest installing a 




APPENDIX F:  THE RESULTS OF THE 
TARGETED SURVEY EVALUATING THE 
IDENTIFIED AND RECOMMENDED RMMs 
(Stage II) 
The appendix presents the results of the targeted survey, which was about collecting the 
perceptions of several experts in OGP projects in Iraq with regard to the recommended risk 
mitigation methods which could be used to manage the risk factors in OGP projects. At this 
survey, the participants were asked to explain their agreement with the suggested RMMs. 
The participants were asked to answer the questions on a five-point Likert scale when 5 
mean strongly agree and 1 meant strongly disagree. The figures below show the details of 
the result of the targeted survey. As the size of the figure above was not big enough to explain 
the full details, the recommended RMM to manage the Terrorism, sabotage and the security, 
Stealing the products and Insecure areas IRFs, were 1. Avoid the insecure areas. 2. Anti-
terrorism design. 3. Use protective barriers and perimeter fencing. 4. Use a high technology 
and advanced risk-monitoring system. 5. Government-public cooperation.6. Foot and 
vehicle patrols. 7. Use the rivers and lakes to extend the pipelines in the insecure areas 
despite the construction cost and the risk of corrosion. 
 
Figure F.1: The recommended RMM to manage the Terrorism, sabotage and the security, 
Stealing the products and Insecure areas IRFs. 
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Figure F.2: The recommended RMM to manage the Public's low legal and moral awareness 
IRFs. 
Figure F.3: The recommended RMMs to manage the Threats to staff IRF. 
Figure F.4: The recommended RMMs to manage The pipeline is easy to access IRF. 
As the size of the figure above was not big enough to explain the full details, the risk factor 
(The pipeline is easy to access). The suggested risk mitigation methods (1. Use underground 
pipeline. 2. Use a high technology and advanced risk-monitoring system. 3. Use protective 
barriers and perimeter fencing. 4. Foot and vehicles patrols. 5. Expand the protection zones 
along with the pipelines. 6. Use the rivers and lakes to extend the pipelines in the insecure). 
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Figure F.5: The recommended RMMs to manage the Geological risks such as groundwater 
and landslides IRF. 
Figure F.6: The recommended RMMs to manage the Animal accidents on the pipeline IRF. 
Figure F.7: The recommended RMMs to manage the Corrosion and lack of protection 
against it IRF. 
As the size of the figure above was not big enough to explain the full details, the risk factors 
(Corrosion and lack of protection against it). The suggested risk mitigation methods (1. Use 
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anti-corrosion such as isolation & cathodic protection 2. Extend the pipes inside concrete 
pipes. 3. Use optimisers and remove the salts and metals before pumping the petroleum 
products. 4. Pump only one type of product in the pipeline and use a different pipeline for 
each oil field). 
Figure F.8: The recommended RMMs to manage The weak ability to identify and monitor 
the threats IRF. 
The risk factors (The weak ability to identify and monitor the threats). The suggested risk 
mitigation methods (1. Use a high technology and advanced risk-monitoring system. 2.  
Appropriateinspection, tests and maintenance. 3.  Appropriatetraining. 4. Record pipelines 
accidents and risks in order to avoid them in the future). 
Figure F.9: The recommended RMM to manage the Shortage of the IT services and modern 
equipment) IRF. 
As the size of the figure above was not big enough to explain the full details, the risk factors 
(Design, construction and material defects).  The suggested risk mitigation methods (1.  
Appropriatetraining. 2. Make studies about the safety of the pipelines and follow the new 
research about risk management. 3. Use high-quality pipes and spare. 4. Choose ell-known 
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design companies to minimise design errors. 5. Choose well-known construction companies 
to minimise construction defects). 
Figure F.10: The recommended RMMs to manage the Design, construction and material 
defects IRF. 
As the size of the figure above was not big enough to explain the full details, the risk factors 
(Design, construction and material defects).  The suggested risk mitigation methods (1.  
Appropriatetraining. 2. Make studies about the safety of the pipelines and follow the new 
research about risk management. 3. Use high-quality pipes and spare. 4. Choose well-known 
design companies to minimise design errors. 5. Choose well-known construction companies 
to minimise construction defects). 
Figure F.11: The recommended RMMs to manage the Operational errors IRF. 
As the size of the figure above was not big enough to explain the full details, the risk factor 
(Operational errors). The suggested risk mitigation methods (1. Choose well-known 
construction companies to minimise construction defects. 2. Commit to the operating 
standards. (e.g. do not pass the design capacity .3. Use optimisers and remove the salts and 
metals before pumping the petroleum products. 4. Pump only one type of product in the 
pipeline and use a different pipeline for each oil field). 
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Figure F.12: The recommended RMM to manage the Lack of  appropriatetraining IRF. 
Figure F.13: The recommended RMMs to manage the Conflicts over land ownership IRF.  
Figure F.14: The recommended RMM to manage the Salt and metal contents in transported 
products such as silver IRF. 
As the size of the figure above was not big enough to explain the full details, the risk factor 
(Salts and metals contents in the transported products such as Silver).  The suggested risk 
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mitigation method (Use optimisers and remove the salts and metals before pumping the 
petroleum products). 
Figure F.15: The recommended RMM to manage The pipes are older than the design age 
IRF.




Figure F.17: The recommended RMM to manage the Poor quality pipes IRF. 
Figure F.18: The recommended RMMs to manage the Natural disasters and weather 
conditions IRF. 




Figure F.20: The recommended RMM to manage the Lack of risk registration) IRF. 
Figure F.21: The recommended RMM to manage the Not paying  appropriateattention to 
risk management (e.g. not following scheduled programmes to solve problems) IRF. 




Figure F.23: The recommended RMMs to manage The aboveground pipelines increase 
sabotage and theft opportunities, as they will be easy to access IRF. 
Figure F.24: The recommended RMM to manage the Limited warning signs IRF. 
Figure F.25: The recommended RMMs to manage the Pumping more than one type of 
petroleum product and crude oil from different fields in the same pipe IRF. 
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Figure F.26: The recommended RMMs to manage the Improper safety regulations IRF. 




APPENDIX G: THE RESULTS OF RISK 
SIMULATION USING ASTA RISK SIMULATOR 
This appendix presents the results of using ASTA risk simulator to analyse the delay in the 
project using two risk simulation methods (which are Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) and 
Latin Hypercube Simulation (LHS)) and four risk distribution methods (which are Uniform, 
Normal, Skewed Normal and Skewed Triangular), which are integrated with the ASTA risk 
simulator. The results of using these distribution methods are as follows.  
G.1. The Results of Using MCS to Analyse Risk Delay Impact in the 
Project  
This section presents the results of using MCS to analyse the delay in the project using four 
risk distribution methods, which are Uniform, Normal, Skewed Normal and Skewed 
Triangular, which are integrated with the ASTA risk simulator. The results of using these 
distribution methods are as follows.  
1-  Considering Uniform risk distribution, it was found that the project needs 1352 
days to be completed rather than 1334 days, which is the initial duration of the 
project. This means that the project will take a longer time due to the impact of the 
IRFs associated with it. It was found that the project is expected to be completed on 
January 31, 2023, rather than January 14, 2023, which means that the average delay 
in the project is 18 days with 50% probability, see Figure G.1.  
Additionally, the ASTA risk simulator shows the maximum hits of each sample, 
which is the date that got the highest frequency as a project finishing date during the 
simulation process. The maximum hits rate using the Uniform risk distribution 
method is 353, which reflects the mean value of the project duration. Moreover, the 
ASTA risk simulator shows the Standard Deviation (Std) of each sample. The Std 
measures the dispersion of the data from the mean, which shows the variability 
within the sample. In other words, the Std characterises the average distance of the 
data from the mean of the distribution value of the sample; which means the sample 
with a low Std is the more significant sample. The Std of this distribution method is 
18 days. This means there is a 68% probability that the project will be finished 
304 
 
between 1334 and 1370 days, whereas there is a 95% probability that it will be 
finished between 1316 and 1388 days, see Figure G.1.  
 
Figure G.1: Finish date likelihood and distribution using the Uniform data distribution 
method, using MCS. 
2- Considering Normal risk distribution, it was found that the average delay in the 
project is 16 days, which means it is expected that the project will be completed on 
January 29, 2023, with 50% probability, see Figure G.2. The maximum hits rate of 
this distribution method is 367, which reflects the mean value of the project duration. 
Meanwhile, the Std of this distribution method is 18 days. This means there is a 68% 
probability that the project will be finished between 1332 and 1368 days, whereas 





Figure G.2: Finish date likelihood and distribution using the Normal distribution method, 
using MCS. 
3- Considering Skewed Normal risk distribution, it was found that the average delay 
in the project is 16 days, which means it is expected that the project will be completed 
on January 29, 2023, with 50% probability, see Figure G.3. The maximum hits rate 
of this distribution method is 382, which reflects the mean value of the project 
duration. The Std of this distribution method is 18 days. This means there is a 68% 
probability that the project will be finished between 1332 and 1368 days, whereas 





Figure G.3: Finish date likelihood and distribution using the Skewed Normal data 
distribution method, using MCS. 
4- Considering Skewed Triangular risk distribution, it was found that the average 
delay in the project is 15 days, which means it is expected that the project will be 
completed on January 28, 2023, with 50% probability, see Figure G.4. The maximum 
hits rate of this distribution method is 310, which reflects the mean value of the 
project duration. The Std of this distribution method is 22 days. This means there is 
a 68% probability that the project will be finished between 1327 and 1371 days, 
whereas there is a 95% probability that it will be finished between 1305 and 1393 




Figure G.4: Finish date likelihood and distribution using the Skewed Triangular data 
distribution method, using MCS. 
The next section presents the results of using the ASTA risk simulator and HLS to analyse 
the impact of the IRFs on the case study project.  
G.2. The Results of Using LHS to Analyse Delay in the Project  
This section presents the results of using LHS to analyse the delay in the project using four 
risk simulation methods, which are Uniform, Normal, Skewed Normal and Skewed 
Triangular, which are integrated with the ASTA risk simulator. The results of using these 
distribution methods are as follows.  
1- Considering Uniform risk distribution, it was found that the average delay in the 
project is 17 days, which means it is expected that the project will be completed on 
January 30, 2023, with 50% probability, see Figure G.5. The maximum hits rate of 
this distribution method is 299, which reflects the mean value of the project duration. 
The Std of this distribution method is 18 days. This means there is a 68% probability 
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that the project will be finished between 1330 and 1372 days, whereas there is a 95% 
probability that it will be finished between 1309 and 1393 days, see Figure G.5.  
 
Figure G.5: Finish date likelihood and distribution using the Uniform data distribution 
method, using LHS. 
2- Considering Normal risk distribution, it was found that the average delay in the 
project is 16 days. The delay means that the project will take 1350 days to complete 
rather than the planned 1334 days, which means it is expected that the project will 
be completed on January 29, 2023, with 50% probability, see Figure G.6. The 
maximum hits rate of this distribution method is 300, which reflects the mean value 
of the project duration. The Std of this distribution method is 22 days. This means 
there is a 68% probability that the project will be finished between 1328 and 1372 
days, whereas there is a 95% probability that it will be finished between 1306 and 




Figure G.6: Finish date likelihood and distribution using the Normal data distribution 
method, using LHS. 
3- Considering Skewed Normal risk distribution, it was found that the average delay 
in the project is 15 days. The delay means that the project will take 1349 days to 
complete rather than the planned 1334 days, which means it is expected that the 
project will be completed on January 28, 2023, with 50% probability, see Figure G.7. 
The maximum hits rate of this distribution method is 322, which reflects the mean 
value of the project duration. The Std of this distribution method is 22 days. This 
means there is a 68% probability that the project will be finished between 1328 and 
1371 days, whereas there is a 95% probability that it will be finished between 1307 




Figure G.7: Finish date likelihood and distribution using the Skewed Normal data 
distribution method, using LHS. 
4- Considering Skewed Triangular risk distribution, it was found that the average 
delay in the project is 15 days, which means it is expected that the project will be 
completed on January 28, 2023, with 50% probability, see Figure G.8. The maximum 
hits rate of this distribution method is 311, which reflects the mean value of the 
project duration. The Std of this distribution method is 22 days. This means there is 
a 68% probability that the project will be finished between 1327 and 1371 days, 
whereas there is a 95% probability that it will be finished between 1305 and 1393 




Figure G.8: Finish date likelihood and distribution using the Skewed Triangular data 
distribution method, using LHS. 
G.3. The Results Duration Sensitivity 
This section provides the results of using the ASTA risk simulator to analyse the sensitivity 
index of the project activities and analyse their degree of impact affecting the duration of the 
project. ASTA risk simulator shows the sensitivity analysis of the activities of the project 
that are most likely to affect the duration of the project if their duration changes. In other 
words, the ASTA risk simulator ranks these tasks in terms of their likelihood of delaying the 
project finishing date. As shown in the table above, using different simulation and 
distribution methods to analyse the sensitivity index of the project activities has confirmed 
the two top activities that have a positive impact on the duration of the project, which are as 
follows. (i) The right of the way, which comes top twice; and (ii) the design and 
development, which come top six times. Similarly, the two top activities that have a negative 
impact on the duration of the project are (i) the trenching activities, which come top twice; 
and (ii) manufacturing and installation, which come top six times. Figure G.9 to Figure G.16 
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show the detailed ranking of the project’s activities using different simulation and 
distribution methods.  
1- With regard to analysing the duration sensitivity index of the project activities using 
MCS and Uniform methods, it was found that the right-of-way, design and 
development, final fitting, safety barriers, choosing routes, route approval and survey 
are the activities most likely to affect the duration of the project, see Figure G.9.   
 
Figure G.9: The duration sensitivity using the MCS method and Uniform data distribution 
method. 
2- With regard to analysing the duration sensitivity index of the project activities using 
MCS and Normal methods, it was found that the right-of-way, design and 
development, final fitting, safety barriers, choosing routes, route approval and survey 




Figure G.10: The duration sensitivity using the MCS and Normal data distribution method. 
3- With regard to analysing the duration sensitivity index of the project activities using 
MCS and Skewed Normal methods, it was found that the design and development 
and right of way are the activities most likely to affect the duration of the project, see 




Figure G.11: The duration sensitivity using the MCS and Skewed Normal data distribution 
method. 
4- With regard to analysing the duration sensitivity index of the project activities using 
MCS and Skewed Triangular methods, it was found that the design and 
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development, right of way and choosing routes are the activities most likely to affect 
the duration of the project, see Figure G.12. 
 
Figure G.12: The duration sensitivity using the MCS and Skewed Triangular data 
distribution method. 
5- With regard to analysing the duration sensitivity index of the project activities using 
LHS and Uniform methods, it was found that the design and development and right 
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of way are the activities most likely to affect the duration of the project, see Figure 
G.13. 
 
Figure G.13: The duration sensitivity using the LHS and Uniform data distribution method. 
6- With regard to analysing the duration sensitivity index of the project activities using 
LHS and Normal methods, it was found that the design and development, right of 
way and choosing routes are the activities most likely to affect the duration of the 




Figure G.14: The duration sensitivity using the LHS and Normal data distribution method. 
7- With regard to analysing the duration sensitivity index of the project activities using 
LHS and Skewed Normal methods, it was found that the design and development, 
right of way and choosing routes are the activities most likely to affect the duration 




Figure G.15: The duration sensitivity using the LHS method and Skewed Normal data 
distribution method. 
8- With regard to analysing the duration sensitivity index of the project activities using 
LHS and Skewed Triangular methods, it was found that the design and 
development, right of way and choosing routes are the activities most likely to affect 




Figure G.16: The duration sensitivity using the LHS and Skewed Triangular data 
distribution method. 
G.4 The Results of Criticality Index Sensitivity  
This section provides the results of using the ASTA risk simulator to analyse the criticality 
index of the activities that appear on the critical path of the project and their degree of impact 
on changing the duration of the project in case their durations are changed. The ASTA risk 
simulator identifies the tasks that have the highest iterations as the activities that might 
change the project duration. After running thousands of simulations (depending on the 
number of iterations), the ASTA risk simulator generates a report to rank the activities of the 
project from highest to lowest impact in terms of their degrees of criticality impact on the 
project duration. The activities with the higher criticality index are those that are more likely 
to affect the finishing date of the project. Some activities may appear as critical activities 
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using a certain simulation or distribution method, but they might not appear as critical 
activities using different methods.  
With regard to using MCS to analyse the criticality sensitivity index of the project activities, 
the activities stayed in the same position of ranking using Uniform and Normal distribution 
or Skewed Normal and Skewed Triangular distribution. However, the ranking positions of 
these activities are slightly different using Uniform and Normal distribution comparing to 
Skewed Normal and Skewed Triangular distribution. In the meanwhile, the ranking positions 
of the project activities were not changed using the four different risk distribution methods 
along with LHS. Nevertheless, the ranking positions were slightly changed comparing the 
results of MCS to LHS.  
1- The results of analysing the criticality sensitivity index of the project activities using 
MCS and Uniform distribution are shown in the figure below. 
Figure G.17: Results of criticality index sensitivity using MCS and Uniform distribution.  
2- Results of analysing the criticality sensitivity index of the project activities using 
MCS and Normal distribution are shown in the figure below. 
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Figure G.18: Results of criticality index sensitivity using MCS and Normal distribution. 
3- Results of analysing the criticality sensitivity index of the project activities using 
MCS and Skewed Normal distribution are shown in the figure below. 
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Figure G.19: Results of criticality index sensitivity using MCS and Skewed Normal 
distribution. 
4- Results of analysing the criticality sensitivity index of the project activities using 




Figure G.20: Results of criticality index sensitivity using MCS and Skewed Triangular 
distribution. 
5- Results of analysing the criticality sensitivity index of the project activities using 




Figure G.21: Results of criticality index sensitivity using LHS and Uniform distribution. 
6- Results of analysing the criticality sensitivity index of the project activities using 





Figure G.22: Results of criticality index sensitivity using LHS and Normal distribution. 
7- Results of analysing the criticality sensitivity index of the project activities using 





Figure G.23: Results of criticality index sensitivity using LHS and Skewed Normal 
distribution. 
8- Results of analysing the criticality sensitivity index of the project activities using 




Figure G.24: Results of criticality index sensitivity using LHS and Skewed Triangular 
distribution. 
G.5. Construction Programme of the Project 













APPENDIX H: THE RESULTS OF RISK 
SIMULATION USING @RISK 
The Excel sheet presented below shows the detailed results of the @Risk simulator, 




H.1. The Impact of the IRFs on the Duration of New OGP Projects  
The planned (original) duration of the project was 1334 days. This section shows the delay 
in the projects using the @Risk simulator. The delay was analysed in (1) the overall duration 
of the project, (2) the planning and design stage of the project, (3) the pre-construction stage 
of the project, (4) the construction stage of the project and (5) the post-construction stage of 
the project.  
H.1.1. The results of the delay in the overall duration of the project  
The results of risk simulation show the minimum and maximum duration of the projects are 
1329.30 days and 1441.84 days, respectively. The project has a 5% chance of being 
completed in a duration between 1329.30 and 1349.1 days or between 1404.5 days and 
1441.84 days. The project has a 90% probability of being finished in a duration between 




Figure H.1: The results of simulating the duration of the project using @Risk. 
The mean duration of the project is 1374.94 days, which means the project has a 50% 
probability of being completed in this duration, see Figure H.2. 
 
Figure H.2: The results of the accumulative duration of the projects using @Risk. 
The minimum delay and maximum delay in the project are -0.703 days and 111.84 days. 
The project has a 5% probability to be delayed between -0.703 and 19.1 days or 74.5 and 
111.84 days. The project has a 90% probability of being delayed between 19.1 days and 74.5 




Figure H.3: The delay in the project using @Risk. 
The mean delay in the duration of the project is 44.94 days, with a probability of 50%, see 
Figure H.4.  
 
Figure H.4: The accumulative delay in the project using @Risk. 
H.1.2. The results of the delay in the planning and design stage of the project  
The results of risk simulation show the minimum and maximum duration of the planning 
and design stage of the project are 771.260 days and 834.608 days, respectively. The project 
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has a 5% chance of being completed in a duration between 771.260 days and 782.0 days or 
between 813.5 days and 834.608 days. The planning and design stage has a 90% probability 
of being completed between 782.0 days and 813.5 days, see Figure H.5. 
 
 
Figure H.5: The results of simulating the duration of the project (planning stage) using 
@Risk. 
The mean duration of the planning and design stage is 796.844 days, which means this stage 




Figure H.6: The results of simulating the calculative duration of the project (planning stage) 
using @Risk. 
The minimum delay and maximum delay in the planning and design stage of the project 
are -40.740 days and 22.608 days. The project has a 5% probability of being delayed between 
-40.740 and -30 days or 1.5 and 22.608 days. This stage has a 90% probability of being 
delayed between -30 and 1.5 days, see Figure H.7. 
 
Figure H.7: The delay in the planning stage using @Risk. 
The mean delay at this stage of the project is -15.156, which means this stage of the project 





Figure H.8: The accumulative delay in the planning stage using @Risk.  
H.1.3. The results of the delay in the pre-construction stage of the project  
The results of the risk simulation show that the minimum and maximum duration of the 
project are 214.902 days and 267.182 days. The pre-construction stage has a 5% probability 
of being completed in a duration between 214.902 days and 229.8 days or between 255.9 
days and 267.182 days. This stage of the project has a 90% probability of being completed 




Figure H.9: The results of simulating the duration of the project (pre-construction stage) 
using @Risk. 
The mean duration of the pre-construction stage of the project is 242.130 days, which means 
there is a 50% probability that this stage of the project will be completed in the mean 
duration, see Figure H.10. 
 
Figure H.10: The results of simulating the accumulative duration of the project (pre-
construction stage) using @Risk. 
The minimum delay and maximum delay in the this stage of the project are 14.902 days and 
67.182 days. The project has a 5% probability of being delayed between 14.902 and 29.8 
days or 55.9 and 67.182 days. The delay in the duration of the pre-construction stage of the 





Figure H.11: The delay in the pre-construction stage using @Risk. 
The mean delay at this stage of the project is 42.10 days, with the probability of 50%, see 
Figure H.12. 
 
Figure H.12: The accumulative delay in the pre-construction stage using @Risk. 
H.1.4. The results of the delay in the construction stage of the project  
The results of the risk simulation show that the minimum and maximum duration of the 
project are 201.911 days and 283.328 days, respectively. This stage of the project has a 5% 
chance of being completed in a duration between 201.911 days and 211.7 days or between 
339 
 
243.9 days and 283.328 days. The construction stage has a 90% probability of being 
completed between 211.7 days and 243.9 days, see Figure H.13. 
 
Figure H.13: The results of simulating the duration of the project (construction stage) using 
@Risk. 






Figure H.14: The results of simulating the accumulative duration of the project (construction 
stage) using @Risk. 
The minimum delay and maximum delay in the project are -11.089 days and 70.328 days. 
The project has a 5% probability of being delayed between -11.089 and -1.3 days or 30.9 
and 70.328 days. The delay in the duration of the construction stage of the project is 
between -1.3 days and 30.9 days, with a probability of 90%, see Figure H.15.  
 
Figure H.15: The delay in the construction stage using @Risk. 





Figure H.16: The accumulative delay in the construction stage using @Risk. 
H.1.5. The results of the delay in the post-construction stage of the project  
The results of the risk simulation show that the minimum and maximum duration of the post-
construction stage of the projects are 93.209 days and 136.005 days, respectively. This stage 
of the project has a 5% chance  of being completed in a duration between 93.209 days and 
103.26 days or between 120.77 days and 136.005 days. The post-construction stage of the 
project has a 90% probability of being completed in a duration between 103.26 days and 




Figure H.17: The results of simulating the duration of the project (post-construction stage) 
using @Risk. 
The mean duration of the project is 111.526 days, with a probability of 50%, see Figure 
H.18. 
 
Figure H.18: The results of simulating the accumulative duration of the project (post-




The minimum delay and maximum delay in the project are -11.791 days and 31.005 days. 
The project has a 5% probability of being delayed between -11.791 and -1.74 days or 15.77 
and 31.005 days. The delay in the duration of the post-construction stage of the project is 
between -1.74 days and 15.77 days, with a probability of 90%, see Figure H.19.  
 
Figure H.19: The delay in the post-construction stage. 
The mean delay at this stage of the project is 6.526 days, with a probability of 50%, see 
Figure H.20. 
 
Figure H.20: The accumulative delay in the post-construction stage. 
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The figures and tables below present the results of calculating the delay in duration of the 
activities and the stages of the case study project of this research considering the associated 
risk factors. Additionally, the results show the delay in the overall duration of the project.  
Activity  



















The duration of the project activities of the planning and design stage 






77.09 81.82 94.02 78.51 86.62 
-2.184 










route(s) activity  
 
139 
127.90 136.40 169.17 130.86 144.60 
-2.609 






120.97 128.53 153.33 123.17 136.70 
-2.459 
The duration of 





116.29 123.65 147.10 118.57 131.09 
-2.365 






50.76 54.10 61.70 51.79 57.48 
-0.899 







119.59 128.56 150.02 123.37 136.68 
-2.441 





59.11 61.24 68.57 59.78 63.41 
-0.754 
The duration of the project activities of the pre-construction stage 







59.12 61.24 68.42 59.82 63.36 
0.349 
The duration of 
survey, staking 
and setting out 
 
6 
38.59 42.35 51.01 39.74 46.44 
0.015 





5.16 6.01 7.39 5.53 6.63 
0.715 

















35.89 43.12 63.31 37.83 53.58 
1.951 






35.53 42.95 64.95 38.00 53.85 
0.717 






52.33 60.71 74.68 55.58 67.24 
0.427 






19.83 22.43 27.84 20.69 24.58 
1.174 
The duration of the project activities in the construction stage 





123.86 140.17 174.32 130.59 152.35 
0.074 
The duration of 
the temporary 
erosion control 
and side support 
 
90 
74.35 83.07 98.40 78.15 89.05 
1.739 
The duration of 




82.93 91.73 110.59 85.73 99.81 
1.913 







126.19 143.91 173.88 133.85 157.37 
2.667 
The duration of 




134.46 147.66 183.78 139.65 159.48 
2.883 
The duration of 




133.73 147.88 187.16 138.43 160.90 
2.713 





131.09 147.72 192.93 138.50 161.43 
2.635 






128.92 147.62 190.54 137.88 162.21 
0.834 





118.62 131.84 173.73 122.66 144.31 
2.736 
The duration of 
the lowering 














130.02 147.04 201.60 136.68 162.73 
0.276 
The duration of 




13.22 14.28 17.78 13.59 15.26 
1.070 






128.46 147.07 228.57 134.79 168.12 
0.038 





5.31 6.04 9.17 5.57 6.82 
0.074 
The duration of the project activities of the pre-construction stage 
The duration of 




37.23 41.65 63.38 38.41 47.17 
0.190 





14.98 17.19 21.65 15.79 18.94 
0.312 






24.70 28.31 35.22 25.96 31.27 
0.424 





33.51 38.42 46.66 35.18 42.51 
0.778 
The duration of 




59.35 70.79 89.65 63.64 79.99 
0.190 
Table H.1: The results of simulating the duration of the project using @Risk. 
Simulation Summary Information 
Workbook Name @RISK6.xlsx 
Number of Simulations 1 
Number of Iterations 10000 
Number of Inputs 586 
Number of Outputs 45 
Sampling Type Latin Hypercube 
Simulation Start Time 10/12/2019 12:56 
Simulation Stop Time 10/12/2019 12:58 
Simulation Duration 00:01:59 
Random # Generator Mersenne Twister 
Random Seed 1285830980 
Total Errors 0 
Collect Distribution Samples All 
Convergence Testing Disabled 
Smart Sensitivity Analysis Enabled 
Table H.2: The results of the accumulative duration of the project using @Risk. 
Summary Statistics for The duration of the project 
Statistics   Percentile   
Minimum 1314.63 1.0% 1338.82 
Maximum 1494.82 2.5% 1344.54 
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Mean 1374.94 5.0% 1348.84 
Std Dev 17.27 10.0% 1353.86 
Variance 298.4160467 20.0% 1360.65 
Skewness 0.515618309 25.0% 1363.22 
Kurtosis 4.108770087 50.0% 1373.72 
Median 1373.72 75.0% 1385.60 
Mode 1372.04 80.0% 1388.44 
Left X 1348.84 90.0% 1396.60 
Left P 5% 95.0% 1404.42 
Right X 1404.42 97.5% 1412.15 
Right P 95% 99.0% 1422.24 
#Errors 0     
Table H.3: The delay in the project using @Risk. 
Simulation Summary Information  
Workbook Name   @RISK6.xlsx   
Number of Simulations 1   
Number of Iterations 10000 
Number of Inputs 586   
Number of Outputs 45   
Sampling Type   Latin Hypercube 
Simulation Start Time 10/12/2019 12:56 
Simulation Stop Time 10/12/2019 12:58 
Simulation Duration 00:01:59 
Random # Generator Mersenne Twister 
Random Seed   1285830980 
Total Errors   0 
Collect Distribution Samples All 
Convergence Testing Disabled 
Smart Sensitivity Analysis Enabled 
Table H.4: The accumulative delay in the project using @Risk. 
Summary Statistics for Total delay in the project (days) 
Statistics   Percentile   
Minimum -15.37 1.0% 8.82 
Maximum 164.82 2.5% 14.54 
Mean 44.94 5.0% 18.84 
Std Dev 17.27 10.0% 23.86 
Variance 298.4160467 20.0% 30.65 
Skewness 0.515618309 25.0% 33.22 
Kurtosis 4.108770087 50.0% 43.72 
Median 43.72 75.0% 55.60 
Mode 42.04 80.0% 58.44 
Left X 18.84 90.0% 66.60 
Left P 5% 95.0% 74.42 
Right X 74.42 97.5% 82.15 
Right P 95% 99.0% 92.24 
#Errors 0     
Table H.5: The duration of the planning and design using @Risk 
Simulation Summary Information  
Workbook Name @RISK6.xlsx   
Number of Simulations 1   
Number of Iterations 10000 
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Number of Inputs 586   
Number of Outputs 45   
Sampling Type Latin Hypercube 
Simulation Start Time 10/12/2019 12:56 
Simulation Stop Time 10/12/2019 12:58 
Simulation Duration 00:01:59 
Random # Generator Mersenne Twister 
Random Seed 1285830980 
Total Errors 0 
Collect Distribution Samples All 
Convergence Testing Disabled 
Smart Sensitivity Analysis Enabled 
Table H.6: The results of the accumulative duration of the planning and design using @Risk. 
Summary Statistics for The duration of the planning and design stage 
Statistics   Percentile   
Minimum 770.05 1.0% 777.91 
Maximum 838.58 2.5% 780.54 
Mean 796.84 5.0% 782.72 
Std Dev 9.35 10.0% 785.42 
Variance 87.39155523 20.0% 788.86 
Skewness 0.418719934 25.0% 790.25 
Kurtosis 3.286047284 50.0% 796.22 
Median 796.22 75.0% 802.65 
Mode 793.76 80.0% 804.41 
Left X 782.72 90.0% 809.12 
Left P 5% 95.0% 813.21 
Right X 813.21 97.5% 817.03 
Right P 95% 99.0% 821.40 
#Errors 0     
Table H.7: The results of simulating the duration of the project (planning stage) using 
@Risk. 
Simulation Summary Information  
Workbook Name   @RISK6.xlsx   
Number of Simulations 1   
Number of Iterations 10000 
Number of Inputs 586   
Number of Outputs 45   
Sampling Type   Latin Hypercube 
Simulation Start Time 10/12/2019 12:56 
Simulation Stop Time 10/12/2019 12:58 
Simulation Duration 00:01:59 
Random # Generator Mersenne Twister 
Random Seed   1285830980 
Total Errors   0 
Collect Distribution Samples All 
Convergence Testing Disabled 
Smart Sensitivity Analysis Enabled 
Table H.8: The results of simulating the calculative duration of the project (planning stage) 
using @Risk. 
Summary Statistics for Total delay in the planning stage (days) 
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Statistics   Percentile   
Minimum -41.95 1.0% -34.09 
Maximum 26.58 2.5% -31.46 
Mean -15.16 5.0% -29.28 
Std Dev 9.35 10.0% -26.58 
Variance 87.39155523 20.0% -23.14 
Skewness 0.418719934 25.0% -21.75 
Kurtosis 3.286047284 50.0% -15.78 
Median -15.78 75.0% -9.35 
Mode -18.24 80.0% -7.59 
Left X -29.28 90.0% -2.88 
Left P 5% 95.0% 1.21 
Right X 1.21 97.5% 5.03 
Right P 95% 99.0% 9.40 
#Errors 0     
Table H.9: The results of the duration of the pre-construction using @Risk. 
Simulation Summary Information 
Workbook Name @RISK6.xlsx   
Number of Simulations 1   
Number of Iterations 10000 
Number of Inputs 586   
Number of Outputs 45   
Sampling Type   Latin Hypercube 
Simulation Start Time 10/12/2019 12:56 
Simulation Stop Time 10/12/2019 12:58 
Simulation Duration 00:01:59 
Random # Generator Mersenne Twister 
Random Seed   1285830980 
Total Errors   0 
Collect Distribution Samples All 
Convergence Testing Disabled 
Smart Sensitivity Analysis Enabled 
Table H.10: The results of the accumulative duration of the pre-construction using @Risk. 
Summary Statistics for The duration of the pre-construction stage 
Statistics   Percentile   
Minimum 212.53 1.0% 223.43 
Maximum 278.97 2.5% 226.95 
Mean 242.12 5.0% 229.66 
Std Dev 7.75 10.0% 232.64 
Variance 60.05647259 20.0% 235.96 
Skewness 0.145673833 25.0% 237.26 
Kurtosis 3.694922415 50.0% 242.03 
Median 242.03 75.0% 246.82 
Mode 238.20 80.0% 248.02 
Left X 229.66 90.0% 251.62 
Left P 5% 95.0% 255.27 
Right X 255.27 97.5% 258.60 
Right P 95% 99.0% 262.39 
Table H.11: The delay in the pre-construction stage using @Risk. 
Simulation Summary Information  
Workbook Name   @RISK6.xlsx   
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Number of Simulations 1   
Number of Iterations 10000 
Number of Inputs 586   
Number of Outputs 45   
Sampling Type   Latin Hypercube 
Simulation Start Time 10/12/2019 12:56 
Simulation Stop Time 10/12/2019 12:58 
Simulation Duration 00:01:59 
Random # Generator Mersenne Twister 
Random Seed   1285830980 
Total Errors   0 
Collect Distribution Samples All 
Convergence Testing Disabled 
Smart Sensitivity Analysis Enabled 
Table H.12: The accumulative delay in the pre-construction stage using @Risk. 
Summary Statistics for Total delay in the pre-construction stage (days) 
Statistics   Percentile   
Minimum 12.53 1.0% 23.43 
Maximum 78.97 2.5% 26.95 
Mean 42.12 5.0% 29.66 
Std Dev 7.75 10.0% 32.64 
Variance 60.05647259 20.0% 35.96 
Skewness 0.145673833 25.0% 37.26 
Kurtosis 3.694922415 50.0% 42.03 
Median 42.03 75.0% 46.82 
Mode 38.20 80.0% 48.02 
Left X 29.66 90.0% 51.62 
Left P 5% 95.0% 55.27 
Right X 55.27 97.5% 58.60 
Right P 95% 99.0% 62.39 
#Errors 0     
Table H.13: The delay in construction stage using @Risk. 
Simulation Summary Information 
Workbook Name   @RISK6.xlsx   
Number of Simulations 1   
Number of Iterations 10000 
Number of Inputs 586   
Number of Outputs 45   
Sampling Type   Latin Hypercube 
Simulation Start Time 10/12/2019 12:56 
Simulation Stop Time 10/12/2019 12:58 
Simulation Duration 00:01:59 
Random # Generator Mersenne Twister 
Random Seed   1285830980 
Total Errors   0 
Collect Distribution Samples All 
Convergence Testing Disabled 
Smart Sensitivity Analysis Enabled 
Table H.14: The accumulative delay in construction stage using @Risk. 
Summary Statistics for The duration of the construction stage 
Statistics   Percentile   
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Minimum 201.56 1.0% 207.83 
Maximum 334.58 2.5% 209.70 
Mean 224.45 5.0% 211.48 
Std Dev 10.76 10.0% 213.66 
Variance 115.7014887 20.0% 216.39 
Skewness 1.730903149 25.0% 217.40 
Kurtosis 9.007190789 50.0% 222.27 
Median 222.27 75.0% 229.06 
Mode 219.49 80.0% 231.10 
Left X 211.48 90.0% 237.61 
Left P 5% 95.0% 244.42 
Right X 244.42 97.5% 251.60 
Right P 95% 99.0% 262.29 
#Errors 0     
Table H.15: The delay in the construction stage using @Risk. 
Simulation Summary Information  
Workbook Name   @RISK6.xlsx   
Number of Simulations 1   
Number of Iterations 10000 
Number of Inputs 586   
Number of Outputs 45   
Sampling Type   Latin Hypercube 
Simulation Start Time 10/12/2019 12:56 
Simulation Stop Time 10/12/2019 12:58 
Simulation Duration 00:01:59 
Random # Generator Mersenne Twister 
Random Seed   1285830980 
Total Errors   0 
Collect Distribution Samples All 
Convergence Testing Disabled 
Smart Sensitivity Analysis Enabled 
Table H.16: The accumulative delay in the construction stage using @Risk. 
Summary Statistics for Total delay in the construction stage (days) 
Statistics   Percentile   
Minimum -11.44 1.0% -5.17 
Maximum 121.58 2.5% -3.30 
Mean 11.45 5.0% -1.52 
Std Dev 10.76 10.0% 0.66 
Variance 115.7014887 20.0% 3.39 
Skewness 1.730903149 25.0% 4.40 
Kurtosis 9.007190789 50.0% 9.27 
Median 9.27 75.0% 16.06 
Mode 6.49 80.0% 18.10 
Left X -1.52 90.0% 24.61 
Left P 5% 95.0% 31.42 
Right X 31.42 97.5% 38.60 
Right P 95% 99.0% 49.29 
#Errors 0     
Table H.17: The results of simulating the duration of the project (post-construction stage) 
using @Risk. 
Simulation Summary Information  
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Workbook Name   @RISK6.xlsx   
Number of Simulations 1   
Number of Iterations 10000 
Number of Inputs 586   
Number of Outputs 45   
Sampling Type   Latin Hypercube 
Simulation Start Time 10/12/2019 12:56 
Simulation Stop Time 10/12/2019 12:58 
Simulation Duration 00:01:59 
Random # Generator Mersenne Twister 
Random Seed   1285830980 
Total Errors   0 
Collect Distribution Samples All 
Convergence Testing Disabled 
Smart Sensitivity Analysis Enabled 
Table H.18: The results of simulating the accumulative duration of the project (post-
construction stage) using @Risk. 
Summary Statistics for The duration of the post-construction stage 
Statistics   Percentile   
Minimum 90.81 1.0% 100.04 
Maximum 136.25 2.5% 101.71 
Mean 111.52 5.0% 103.06 
Std Dev 5.61 10.0% 104.73 
Variance 31.45622659 20.0% 106.84 
Skewness 0.444457666 25.0% 107.66 
Kurtosis 3.455551585 50.0% 111.09 
Median 111.09 75.0% 114.99 
Mode 110.61 80.0% 116.00 
Left X 103.06 90.0% 118.85 
Left P 5% 95.0% 121.37 
Right X 121.37 97.5% 123.73 
Right P 95% 99.0% 126.55 
#Errors 0     
Table H.19: The delay in the post-construction stage. 
Simulation Summary Information  
Workbook Name   @RISK6.xlsx   
Number of Simulations 1   
Number of Iterations 10000 
Number of Inputs 586   
Number of Outputs 45   
Sampling Type   Latin Hypercube 
Simulation Start Time 10/12/2019 12:56 
Simulation Stop Time 10/12/2019 12:58 
Simulation Duration 00:01:59 
Random # Generator Mersenne Twister 
Random Seed   1285830980 
Total Errors   0 
Collect Distribution Samples All 
Convergence Testing Disabled 
Smart Sensitivity Analysis Enabled 
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Table H.20: The accumulative delay in the post-construction stage. 
Summary Statistics for Total delay in the post-construction stage (days) 
Statistics   Percentile   
Minimum -14.19 1.0% -4.96 
Maximum 31.25 2.5% -3.29 
Mean 6.52 5.0% -1.94 
Std Dev 5.61 10.0% -0.27 
Variance 31.45622659 20.0% 1.84 
Skewness 0.444457666 25.0% 2.66 
Kurtosis 3.455551585 50.0% 6.09 
Median 6.09 75.0% 9.99 
Mode 5.61 80.0% 11.00 
Left X -1.94 90.0% 13.85 
Left P 5% 95.0% 16.37 
Right X 16.37 97.5% 18.73 
Right P 95% 99.0% 21.55 
#Errors 0     
 
Below are some of screenshots from the calculations of the @Risk simulator.  
 













Figure H.24: A screenshot from the calculations of the @Risk simulator. 
H.2. The Results for Duration Sensitivity 
In this section, the research has used different methods and tests in order to test the sensitivity 
analysis of the IRFs and their impact on the duration of the project. The tests were Tornado-
Change in output mean, Tornado-Regression coefficients, Tornado-Correlation coefficients, 
Tornado-Regression mapped values, and Tornado-Contribution to variance tests. The results 
of the sensitivity tests were shown by the stages of the project as follows.  
H.2.1. The IRFs that affect the overall duration of the project 
The different types of sensitivity tests have confirmed the IRFs that have the highest impact 
on the duration of the project. These IRFs are limited warning sings; animal accidents; 
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terrorism, sabotage and security; corruption; inadequate risk management; little research 
about risk management; and the weak ability to identify and monitor the threats and the IRFs, 
see Figure H.25 to Figure H.30.  
 
Figure H.25: Tornado-Change in output mean (the overall project).  
 
 
Figure H.26: Tornado-Regression coefficients (the overall project).  
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Figure H.27: Tornado-Correlation coefficients (the overall project).  
Figure H.28: Tornado-Regression mapped values (the overall project).  
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Figure H.29: Tornado-Contribution to variance (the overall project). 
Figure H.30: Spider graph – Change in output mean (the overall project). 
H.2.2. The IRFs that affect the duration of the planning and design stage of the project  
The different types of sensitivity tests have confirmed the IRFs that have the highest impact 
on the duration of the planning and design stage of the project. These IRFs are animal 
accidents; terrorism, sabotage and security; corruption; lack of records; inadequate risk 
management; the pipelines are exposed and easy to access; and lack of  appropriatetraining 
and practice about risk management, see Figure H.31 to Figure H.36. 
360 
 
Figure H.31: Tornado-Change in output mean (Planning and design stage). 
Figure H.32: Tornado- Regression coefficients (Planning and design stage). 
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Figure H.33: Tornado-Correlation coefficients (Planning and design stage). 
 
Figure H.34: Tornado-Regression mapped values (Planning and design stage). 
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Figure H.35: Tornado-Contribution to variance (Planning and design stage). 
Figure H.36: Spider graph – Change in output mean (Planning and design stage). 
H.2.3. The IRFs that affect the duration of the pre-construction stage of the project  
The different types of sensitivity tests have confirmed the IRFs that have the highest impact 
on the duration of the pre-construction stage of the project. These IRFs are limited warning 
signs; terrorism, sabotage and security; corruption; inadequate risk management; socio-
political factors; natural disasters and weather conditions; public awareness; the absence of 
law towards TPD; lack of  appropriatetraining; lack of records; stealing the products and the 
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materials; improper safety regulations; the pipelines are exposed and easy to access; and 
construction defects, see Figure H.37 to Figure H.42. 
Figure H.37: Tornado-Change in output mean (Pre-construction stage). 
 




Figure H.39: Tornado-Correlation coefficients (Pre-construction stage). 
 




Figure H.41: Tornado-Contribution to variance (Pre-construction stage). 
 
Figure H.42: Spider graph – Change in output mean (Pre-construction stage). 
H.2.4. The IRFs that affect the duration of the construction stage of the project  
The different types of sensitivity tests have confirmed the IRFs that have the highest impact 
on the duration of the construction stage of the project. These IRFs are limited warning signs; 
terrorism, sabotage and security; corruption; inadequate risk management; socio-political 
factors; natural disasters and weather conditions; public awareness; the absence of law 
towards TPD; lack of  appropriatetraining; lack of records; stealing the products and the 
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materials; improper safety regulations; the pipelines are exposed and easy to access; and 
construction defects, see  Figure H.43 to Figure H.48. 
 
Figure H.43: Tornado-Change in output mean (Construction stage). 
 




Figure H.45: Tornado-Correlation coefficients (Construction stage). 
 




Figure H.47: Tornado-Contribution to variance (Construction stage). 
 
Figure H.48: Spider graph – Change in output mean (Construction stage). 
H.2.5. The IRFs that affect the duration of the post-construction stage of the project  
The different types of sensitivity tests have confirmed the IRFs that have the highest impact 
on the duration of the post-construction stage of the project. These IRFs are terrorism, 
sabotage and security; stealing the products and the materials; corruption; the absence of law 
towards TPD; inadequate risk management; the weak ability to identify and monitor the 
threats and IRFs; the pipelines are exposed and easy to access; limited warning signs; 
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improper safety regulations; leakage of sensitive information; public awareness; and Threats 
to staff, see Figure H.49 to Figure H.54. 
 
Figure H.49: Tornado-Change in output mean (Post-construction stage). 
 




Figure H.51: Tornado-Correlation coefficients (Post-construction stage). 
Figure H.52: Tornado-Regression mapped values (Post-construction stage). 
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Figure H.53: Tornado-Contribution to variance (Post-construction stage). 
Figure H.54: Spider graph – Change in output mean (Post-construction stage). 
